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Preface 
This is a thesis ‘with publications’ and is predominantly composed of papers either published, in review or 
in preparation that report the original research undertaken. These papers are compiled as chapters for this 
thesis with only minor amendments. The chapters are preceded by an introduction to the research project 
and followed by a discussion that draws together the key outcomes and findings of the collective research. 
Each paper has been written as a self-contained account, and thus each has its own abstract, introduction, 
methods, results and discussion. This inevitably results in some degree of overlap and repetition between 
chapters, and I ask in advance for the reader’s patience. 
This research is deliberately application-focussed, with a key objective to provide assistance to private land 
conservation practitioners and policy-makers. This has very much guided the focus and content of the 
research papers. 
The work presented here is predominantly my own. The contributions from others and publication details 
associated with each chapter are provided below. 
 
The work presented in Chapter 2 is an edited version of the submitted paper: 
Hardy MJ, Fitzsimons JA, Bekessy SA, Gordon A. (in review) Purchase, conserve, repeat: A review of using 
revolving funds to conserve private land. (Submitted to Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment) 
Co-author Ascelin Gordon provided advice on the research design and the data analysis, and generated R 
code to plot Figure 1. Maria Plancarte Fexas assisted with the development of Figure 2. All co-authors 
provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial assistance. 
 
The work presented in Chapter 3 is an edited version of the published paper: 
Hardy MJ, Fitzsimons JA, Bekessy SA, Gordon A. 2017. Exploring the permanence of conservation 
covenants. Conservation Letters 10: 221-230 doi: 10.1111/conl.12243. 
Initial ideas for this paper arose at a Private Land Conservation workshop held at the University of 
Melbourne, 11-14 June 2013, supported by the Australian Government’s National Environmental Research 
Program. All co-authors provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial 
assistance. 
 
The work presented in Chapter 4 is an edited version of the accepted paper currently in press: 
Hardy MJ, Fitzsimons JA, Bekessy SA, Gordon A. (2017) Factors influencing property selection for 
conservation revolving funds. Conservation Biology: in press. doi: 10.1111/cobi.12991 
All co-authors provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial assistance. Maria 
Plancarte Fexas assisted with the development of Figure 6. Five anonymous reviewers provided 
constructive comments on the methodology and interpretation of results, and the manuscript has been 
accepted for publication as of 17 July 2017. 
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The work presented in Chapter 5 is an edited version of the submitted paper: 
Hardy MJ, Bekessy SA, Fitzsimons JA, Mata L, Cook C, Nankivell A, Smillie K, Gordon A. (in review) Protecting 
nature on private land using revolving funds: Which properties are suitable? (Submitted to Biological 
Conservation) 
All co-authors provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial assistance. Maria 
Plancarte Fexas assisted with the development of Figure 8. Co-author Luis Mata provided R code that was 
adapted to plot Figure 9 and Figure 10, and along with Anna Backstrom helped facilitate a workshop where 
much of the data for this paper was elicited from experts. The workshop was supported by the Australian 
Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions. 
 
The work presented in Chapter 6 is an edited version of the paper in preparation: 
Hardy MJ, Chades I, Fitzsimons JA, Bekessy SA, Gordon A. (in prep). Comparing acquisition strategies for 
private land conservation revolving funds (in preparation for submission to the Journal of Applied 
Ecology) 
Co-authors Ascelin Gordon and Iadine Chades assisted with the design of the simulation model, and Ascelin 
Gordon assisted with the model’s architecture and development. Co-authors Ascelin Gordon, James 
Fitzsimons, and Sarah Bekessy provided feedback on study design, interpretation of results and editorial 
assistance. 
 
My supervisors Dr Ascelin Gordon, Professor Sarah Bekessy, and Dr James Fitzsimons, have all provided 
substantive feedback on the development of the ideas presented in this thesis, and the design of the 
research. 
 
I also wish to disclose that during this research I have been working for a private land conservation 
organisation, within a revolving fund program. 
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Abstract 
It is widely recognised that stemming the decline of biodiversity requires greater conservation efforts on 
private land. Two common approaches used by conservation organisations to permanently protect 
biodiversity on private land involve acquiring and managing private property with high conservation value, 
or alternatively protecting conservation values by entering into a permanent conservation agreement with 
the owners of that land. However, these approaches are often limited by financial resources, and the 
number of landowners willing to volunteer their property for protection. An alternative approach is to use a 
capital fund (often referred to as a ‘revolving fund’ or ‘revolving loan fund’) to purchase private land with 
high conservation value, and then on-sell the property to new owners with the requirement for them to 
enter into a permanent conservation covenant or easement. The proceeds from the property sale are then 
reinvested back into the fund, enabling the purchase and protection of additional properties. The process is 
potentially cost-effective and sustainable, yet successful outcomes rely on practitioners making difficult 
decisions, characterised by complex and uncertain interactions between social, financial and conservation 
considerations. 
Revolving funds are a relatively novel approach to conservation, currently used in at least four countries to 
conserve nature on private land. Over 684,000 hectares have been protected using the revolving fund 
approach to date. Despite their potential, little is currently known about their use as a conservation tool 
and their role in private land conservation. Through qualitative and quantitative approaches, this thesis 
investigates the role and implementation of revolving funds and how decision-theoretic approaches might 
enhance their contribution to private land conservation. I use Australia as a case study, which established 
its first revolving fund program in 1989 and currently has five revolving fund programs in operation. I 
explore the permanence of the conservation mechanism used by revolving funds to protect ecological 
values, identify the main considerations and influences in decision-making for revolving funds, develop 
decision-theoretic methods to assist practitioners through these complex decisions, and use a simulation 
model to explore trade-offs between different property acquisition strategies for revolving funds. 
The research reveals revolving funds as having unique characteristics that enable them to fill an important 
niche amongst other approaches for permanently protecting biodiversity on private land, particularly due 
to their ability to recover costs. The assessment of the protection mechanisms used by revolving funds finds 
very few have been released, suggesting the approach is facilitating the implementation of an enduring 
mechanism for protecting biodiversity on private land. Data on agreement breaches was limited, but some 
emerging issues were identified relating to third party trespass, successor landowners and elderly 
landowners. Interviews with revolving fund managers reveal the complexity of revolving fund property 
selection decisions, with multiple interacting components representing ecological, social and financial 
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considerations. Managers are balancing challenging trade-offs, particularly between conservation, financial, 
amenity and other factors (e.g. providing for the development of a residence whilst also protecting 
ecological values), and the complexity involved in property selection is likely constraining the 
implementation of this tool. A probabilistic reasoning model of property selection developed in 
collaboration with revolving fund managers shows how threat, cost and alternative approaches to 
protection are the main factors influencing the suitability of a property for purchase by revolving funds. 
Revolving funds may be particularly useful in high threat, high land value areas (e.g. agricultural lifestyle 
areas), but to achieve conservation gains in this context, managers need to accept longer resale times or 
lower resale prices. Using a simulation model I explored the effect over time from implementing different 
revolving fund purchasing strategies (prioritising acquisitions based on conservation values, financial 
values, and combinations of these). The analysis showed that whilst strategy is important, the conservation 
threshold (the minimum conservation value at which a property can be considered) has a greater influence 
on the overall conservation outcomes than strategy, and that larger fund sizes are likely to deliver greater 
return on investment. The results highlight the importance of setting clear program objectives and aligning 
the size of revolving funds with the relevant property market. 
Whilst a challenging approach to implement, and unlikely to be suitable for protecting all types of private 
land, revolving funds are already contributing to conservation efforts and are worth considering as part of 
the private land conservation policy mix. The unique ability for revolving funds to recover costs provides an 
opportunity to permanently protect private land that may be difficult to protect through other approaches 
– particularly where the expense of acquisition without resale is prohibitive. This research has focussed on 
revolving funds in Australia, but similar programs operate in at least four countries, and the results will fill a 
research gap on how this approach contributes to conservation efforts, helping to develop an evidence 
base for refining the implementation of revolving funds. The application of the decision-support methods 
developed in this thesis will assist in more effective implementation of this unique approach to 
conservation. 
  
Chapter 1
Conservation on private land: promises and opportunities of revolving fund programs
Nature Conservation Trust of NSW revolving fund property near Wagga Wagga, NSW, Australia 
(Photo credit: NCT NSW)
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Chapter 1 
1 Conservation on private land: promises and opportunities of revolving fund 
programs 
Across much of the world biodiversity is in decline. As of 2016, more than 8,100 species of vertebrates, 
4,400 species of invertebrates and 11,600 species of plants are listed as threatened on the IUCN Red List of 
Threatened Species (IUCN 2017). A wide range of factors are contributing to this decline, including habitat 
loss and fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, overexploitation, and climate change. For species 
already on the IUCN Red List, the dominant threats remain over-exploitation and the expansion and 
intensification of agriculture (Maxwell et al. 2016). Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 194 
countries committed to progress the conservation of biodiversity in all its forms – ecosystems, species and 
genetic resources (CBD 1992). In 2002 and 2010, strategic plans were developed to progress efforts under 
the CBD, the most recent incorporating the Aichi Biodiversity Targets (CBD 2010). However, considerable 
gains are needed to meet coverage targets for all regions and species (Butchart et al. 2015), and current 
progress appears to be insufficient to meet these targets (SCBD 2014). 
In addressing the problem of biodiversity loss, much of the historical conservation effort in many parts of 
the world has centred on public land (Langholz & Lassoie 2001). However, against the background of 
continuing biodiversity loss, and as the resources and the land available for expanding the public 
conservation estate become increasingly scarce (Figgis 2004; Cowell & Williams 2006), it is now well 
accepted that investment in conservation beyond public land is a crucial part of addressing biodiversity 
decline (Langholz & Krug 2004; Gallo et al. 2009). Whilst detailed information about biodiversity on private 
land is often scarce, it is increasingly recognised that private land is home to important biodiversity (Knight 
1999), some of which is potentially only found on private land. As such, the contribution of private land to 
conservation efforts is growing worldwide. Recent attention from the IUCN has highlighted the important 
role and contribution that private land plays in biodiversity conservation, leading to the formal definition of 
protected areas (as defined by the IUCN (Dudley 2008)) under private governance, as Privately Protected 
Areas (PPAs) (Stolton et al. 2014). The prominence of PPAs in conservation will likely increase, particularly 
as it has been shown that private land will be important for meeting the Aichi targets, for expanding the 
protected area estate and conserving threatened species (Venter et al. 2014; Maciejewski et al. 2016). 
A range of measures have been developed to conserve biodiversity on private land, which can be broadly 
categorised into involuntary measures, (e.g. a government conserving biodiversity through regulation) and 
voluntary measures (e.g. where the landholder chooses to voluntarily participate in a private land 
conservation program; Kamal et al. 2015). Whilst involuntary measures are often restrictive, voluntary 
measures are often about encouraging pro-active management for biodiversity, and both play an important 
  4 
role in private land conservation. With the political and ethical challenges arising from an over-emphasis on 
involuntary measures, much attention has been placed on voluntary measures that encourage private 
landholders to adopt land management practices or activities that maintain or enhance ecological values. 
These voluntary measures can be classified as resulting in binding, or non-binding protection, both of which 
can be paired with financial and non-financial incentives to encourage uptake. However, because of the 
nature of private land ownership, whereby landholders and land uses can change frequently, binding 
approaches provide greater certainty of conservation in the long term, particularly permanent (in-
perpetuity) forms of protection. 
Conservation organisations implement permanent protection via two dominant approaches. The first is for 
a conservation organisation (or government agency) to acquire private land with conservation value and 
manage it for biodiversity (‘acquisition’). Whilst conceptually simple, the expense of acquiring the property 
can make this an expensive approach to conservation (Adams et al. 2011), that also requires consideration 
of ongoing management costs (Pasquini et al. 2011). The second approach is for a conservation 
organisation to enter into a permanent agreement with the owner of a private property, requiring the 
landowner to use and/or manage their property in ways that are consistent with maintaining its natural 
values. 
Amongst the most prominent permanent conservation agreements are conservation covenants and 
easements. These are legally binding, on-title, and usually in-perpetuity agreements made between a 
conservation agency (e.g. a land trust or government agency) and the landholder that provide legal 
protection for biodiversity values on private land. Obligating both current and future owners, covenants 
and easements restrict land use to activities compatible with natural values, and/or require active 
management of the property to enhance its ecological value. The protection mechanisms within covenants 
and easements mean that many properties with these agreements are able to be considered as PPAs 
(Fitzsimons 2015), and in some instances contribute to national and international conservation targets 
(Bingham et al. 2017). However, the contribution of these approaches to conservation targets is often 
limited by low numbers of landholders volunteering to enter into such agreements with their property, 
and/or limited alignment between the biodiversity values of these properties and protected area 
commitments. 
A relatively novel approach is to pursue permanent protection through the use of “revolving funds”. 
Sometimes known as “conservation buyer programs” (TNC 2015) or implemented as “revolving loan funds” 
(Clark 2007), these approaches allow conservation organisations to acquire and then on-sell private 
property with conservation value (“conservation properties”) to willing new owners, with a condition of 
them entering a permanent conservation covenant or easement. The proceeds from the property sale are 
then reinvested back into the fund to continually acquire, covenant and sell additional properties, thereby 
“revolving” the funds. The approach can be seen as a cost-effective way to expand the amount of private 
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land protected for biodiversity conservation (Cowell & Williams 2006), and offers conservation 
organisations the ability to quickly respond to opportunities in the real estate market as they arise (Binney 
& Whiteoak 2010). This is of particular benefit where properties with significant conservation value come 
up for sale and can be on-sold to recover costs (e.g. those that will contribute to national conservation 
targets), especially if land values are prohibitively high for the acquisition approach. The fund is often 
initiated through government and/or philanthropic capital, and then implemented and maintained by non-
profit organisations, although variations of the approach have been used by private entities (e.g. 
“conservation development”, see Milder & Clark 2011). So far the revolving fund approach has been 
implemented in Australia (Figgis 2004), Canada (Freedman 2013), Chile (Patagonia Sur 2016), and the 
United States (Birchard 2005; The Nature Conservancy 2015). 
Yet the implementation of revolving funds likely differs to other approaches to private land conservation, 
involving different elements of complexity and uncertainty. To function effectively, revolving funds need to 
purchase properties with conservation value, and then on-sell them with a covenant or easement that 
restricts the new owner’s use of the land and/or requires them to actively manage it for biodiversity. The 
process gives revolving funds the potential to replenish funds through property resale and remain 
financially sustainable, although this can only occur if and when the acquired property is able to be on-sold. 
From the revolving fund manager’s perspective, concerns over resale would relate to the price the property 
can be sold for (‘resale price’) relative to the price paid to acquire the property (‘acquisition price’), and the 
time it takes to re-sell the property (‘resale time’), with the resale process likely driven by a range of 
conservation, social and financial factors. For example, these may include the attractiveness of the property 
to potential buyers, the market for conservation properties, and the impact of the permanent agreement 
on the realised resale price (relative to the acquisition price). Unless all of these factors align, revolving 
fund decisions likely involve complex trade-offs between conservation outcomes, financial resources, legal 
and planning issues, social and ecological considerations and landholder preferences. This makes for a 
complex decision, further complicated by the need for managers to make acquisition decisions quickly to 
take advantage of opportunities as they arise, often with limited information, resources and substantial 
uncertainty about the current status of the property, or what would happen with or without intervention. 
Furthermore, the dynamic, sequential nature of these investments means that the outcomes of past 
property acquisitions and re-sales have implications for what can be acquired in the future. At present 
there is little published literature on revolving funds, and few resources that provide assistance for 
revolving fund managers on how to make trade-offs between the biodiversity values that they need to 
protect, and the myriad other considerations involved in running a revolving fund. 
With the application of revolving funds in several countries, robust decision-support tools that can account 
for this complexity and uncertainty could improve the cost-effectiveness of revolving funds for creating 
PPAs and contributing to conservation targets. Approaches based on decision theory are used in many 
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disciplines to help with these types of problems. Decision-theoretic approaches explicitly acknowledge the 
logic by which a decision is reached, and through statistical analyses make use of the information available 
to inform management decisions (Dee & Gerber 2012). The process allows decision makers to 
systematically step through complex decision problems and compare and make trade-offs between 
multiple alternative actions, whilst incorporating elements of uncertainty. Whilst caution is needed where 
there are large gaps in knowledge, which can lead decision-makers to focus too heavily on what is known 
rather than information that is less certain (Polasky et al. 2011), the approach can facilitate the selection of 
options most likely to maximise expected benefits. In the crisis-driven discipline of conservation science, 
where scientists and practitioners are often required to act even with imperfect knowledge (Soule 1985; 
Kareiva & Marvier 2012), this type of approach can be highly beneficial. 
Though its use in private land conservation has been limited, decision theoretic approaches have previously 
been developed for other conservation problems such as setting conservation priorities (Wilson et al. 
2009), conservation management (Regan et al. 2005), climate adaptation (Wintle et al. 2011), fire 
management (Driscoll et al. 2010) and land acquisitions (McDonald-Madden et al. 2008b). Acknowledging 
that the financial resources of conservation initiatives are often limited, and decisions likely need to be 
made with limited knowledge, these approaches can also help managers account for the inherent 
uncertainty that characterises much environmental decision making. To date these approaches have not 
been applied to revolving funds, and have potential to increase the contribution of this tool to the 
conservation of private land. 
Revolving funds in Australia 
Using Australia as a case study, this research focuses on the use of revolving funds for private land 
conservation, with particular emphasis on understanding their current status and how their 
implementation could be refined to increase their contribution to protecting biodiversity on private land. 
Australia is one of 17 megadiverse nations (Mittermeier & Mittermeier 1997), and similar to many 
countries is experiencing a concerning decline of biodiversity. As one indicator, the number of species and 
communities listed at the national level under Australia’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 continues to increase, with 480 animal species, 1,294 plant species and 74 ecological 
communities currently listed as threatened (Jackson et al. 2017). Australia is a signatory to the CBD, and the 
conservation estate has increased to now cover more than 137 million hectares (over 17 percent of 
Australia’s land area) (DotE 2014), alongside efforts at multiple levels to manage the threats and pressures 
on native species. Yet major threats to biodiversity in Australia remain (Jackson et al. 2017), including the 
pressures arising from invasive species, habitat loss, inappropriate fire regimes and changing climate (DoE 
2015). The pressures driving this decline are likely to continue, and in the case of climate change, likely to 
increase. 
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Private and leasehold land represents over 76 percent of Australia’s area (Geoscience Australia 1993) and is 
home to threatened species and ecological communities. Private land is also where the vast majority of 
vegetation clearance has taken place (Figgis 2004), and where threats from invasive species, vegetation 
loss, fragmentation and degradation are continuing problems (SoEC 2011; Jackson et al. 2017). Recognising 
the scale of threats to biodiversity, the Australian Government has repeatedly stated the value of 
protecting biodiversity conservation on private lands (COAG 1993; DEWHA 2009; NRMMC 2010a, NRMMC 
2010b; DoE 2014). 
As part of broader conservation efforts on private land, Australia has seen the creation of a substantial 
number of conservation covenants (Fitzsimons & Carr 2014), some of which are formally included as part of 
the national protected area estate (the National Reserve System). Partly due to the resourcing and 
management challenges associated with expanding other forms of protected areas in Australia (NRMMC 
2010b), covenants have been identified as critical for meeting protected area targets (Craigie et al. 2015). 
Some of these covenants have been established through the operation of revolving fund programs 
(Fitzsimons 2015), the first of which was established by Trust for Nature (Victoria) in 1989. The 
organisation’s experience with the approach led to the establishment of five other major revolving fund 
programs in other states during the 1990s and early 2000s – Tasmania, South Australia, Western Australia, 
New South Wales and Queensland. Five of these major fund programs remain operating, with the program 
in Western Australia (run by the National Trust of Australia (WA)) ceasing operations in 2011. These funds 
are run by private land conservation organisations as part of their work to permanently protect private land 
for biodiversity: Trust for Nature (Victoria), the Tasmanian Land Conservancy, the Nature Conservation 
Trust of New South Wales, the Nature Foundation SA and Queensland Trust for Nature. 
Like revolving funds in general, these Australian programs have received only limited attention in the 
literature (e.g. Cowell & Williams 2006; Pasquini et al. 2011) and grey literature (e.g. Carter 1998; Binney & 
Whiteoak 2010) and little is currently known about their implementation or how they are contributing to 
private land conservation. Understanding this could help refine their implementation and their contribution 
to Australian private land conservation efforts, and also our understanding of how revolving funds can be 
used more generally within conservation policy to protect biodiversity on private land – both in Australia 
and internationally. 
Aim of the research 
Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this research aims to identify the challenges and opportunities with 
the implementation of private land conservation revolving funds, and how decision theoretic approaches 
could be used to develop decision-support tools and improve the way they function. 
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Research questions 
This research is being guided by the overarching question: 
“What are the resource allocation challenges confronting the use of revolving funds for private 
land conservation, and how can decision-theoretic approaches help address these challenges?” 
 
Within this there are four specific research questions: 
(1) How permanent and secure are the conservation agreements used by revolving funds to protect 
private land? 
(2) How are decisions currently made by private land conservation organisations, and what are the 
main factors influencing revolving fund purchasing decisions? 
(3) To what extent can decision theoretic approaches be used to support revolving fund decisions on 
the suitability of a property for acquisition and how much to pay for individual properties as they 
become available? 
(4) To what extent do different property acquisition strategies affect the longer-term outcomes of 
revolving funds? 
 
An outline of subsequent chapters 
The following chapter, Chapter 2, investigates the history, current status and use of revolving funds in 
private land conservation globally. Reviewing the literature and collating information on revolving funds 
globally, this chapter looks at what is known about the role of this tool in conservation and addresses 
questions such as: Where and how are they used? What are the challenges and benefits of their use? How 
can their application be improved? [Paper in review, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment] 
Chapter 3 explores an important question in private land conservation – how permanent and secure are 
permanent conservation agreements? Using data obtained from all major covenanting organisations across 
Australia, the paper explores the longevity of the protection mechanism used by revolving fund programs. 
[Paper published, Conservation Letters, Appendix C] 
Chapter 4 investigates the main influences on the revolving fund property selection decision. Using data 
obtained through interviews with all private land conservation revolving fund managers in Australia, the 
paper discusses the factors and trade-offs involved in revolving fund property selection, and how they may 
be affecting managers’ decisions. [Paper accepted, in press, Conservation Biology] 
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Chapter 5 is a research paper exploring a decision theoretic approach to revolving fund property selection. 
Developing a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) in conjunction with revolving fund managers as a potential 
decision support tool, the paper identifies and explores the dominant factors managers consider in 
selection properties for revolving funds. Specifically, it addresses the question how different factors 
contribute to the suitability of properties, and how much managers should pay for them. [Paper in review, 
Biological Conservation] 
Chapter 6 compares the outcomes of different revolving fund acquisition strategies over time and explores 
the sequential dimension of revolving fund property selection. It uses a stochastic simulation of the 
revolving fund acquisition and sale process, that is parameterised with historical property data from all 
major revolving fund programs in Australia. Exploring a range of different acquisition strategies (e.g. 
prioritising conservation value, purchase price, or resale price, and combinations of these) under different 
scenarios, the paper identifies the relative conservation gains from revolving funds using different 
acquisition criteria for choosing properties to purchase, including a measure of the relative conservation 
“Return on Investment”. [Paper in preparation, Journal of Applied Ecology] 
Chapter 7 synthesises the main findings of the research, and explores how the decision theoretic 
approaches developed here could be used and integrated to guide revolving fund decisions. It also 
identifies opportunities for future research and provides a conclusion to the thesis. 
  
Chapter 2 
Purchase, protect, repeat: A review of using revolving funds to conserve private land
Tasmanian Land Conservancy revolving fund property near Derwent Hills, Tasmania, Australia 
(Photo credit: Matthew Newton)
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Chapter 2 
2 Purchase, protect, repeat: A review of using revolving funds to conserve private 
land 
Abstract 
Global conservation efforts are increasingly focused on expanding the amount of private land permanently 
protected for biodiversity. These efforts are often constrained by financial resources, particularly where 
land acquisition is expensive, or where landholders are reluctant to enter into conservation agreements. 
Revolving funds are used by conservation organisations in a number of countries and allow for the 
purchase, on-sale and protection of private land. For the first time I systematically review the literature on 
revolving funds and collate information on their use around the world. I find more than US$384m available 
in these funds, and over 684,000 hectares protected to date. I identify unique attributes of this tool, the 
challenges of its implementation, and discuss its potential for protecting land out of reach of other 
approaches. The analysis highlights the importance of selecting appropriate properties, and I argue a 
structured approach to decision-making could increase the effectiveness of revolving funds. 
Introduction 
The protection of private land is an important part of global efforts to conserve biodiversity. Whilst short-
term (e.g. The Conservation Reserve Program, see USDA 2017) and non-binding mechanisms (e.g. Land for 
Wildlife, see DELWP 2017) exist for conserving private land (Mayer & Tikka 2006; Santangeli et al. 2016), 
growing in prominence is the establishment of Privately Protected Areas (PPAs). With an intent to provide 
in perpetuity protection, PPAs are increasingly important instruments for achieving the Convention on 
Biological Diversity Aichi Target for ecologically representative protected area networks (Stolton et al. 
2014). Permanent protection approaches are often preferable for private land as they offer heightened 
certainty that biodiversity values will remain protected into the future. 
Two dominant approaches currently exist for permanently protecting biodiversity on private land. Perhaps 
the most prominent is the outright purchase of land with conservation value and its ongoing management 
for biodiversity (‘acquisition’). The acquisition approach allows conservation organisations to strategically 
purchase land of high conservation value and manage it over time, an approach that may be particularly 
effective for conserving private land where development pressures are high and land supply is tightly 
constrained (Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008). However, acquiring land can be expensive, especially in 
landscapes with competing land uses and high land values (e.g. peri-urban areas) (Newburn et al. 2005), 
and funding for long-term management can be difficult to obtain (Pasquini et al. 2011). Whilst important 
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for conservation, the acquisition approach on its own is unlikely a viable solution to conserving biodiversity 
on private land (Fairfax et al. 2005).  
The second dominant approach is for conservation organisations to establish permanent agreements with 
landholders, such as conservation covenants and easements. These agreements are voluntary to establish, 
but legally bind current and future owners to either active management or restricted use of their land to 
conserve biodiversity (Fitzsimons and Carr 2014), and are used by organisations in a growing number of 
countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States (Ewing 2008; Fishburn et al. 
2009; Fitzsimons 2015; TNC 2016). They offer an enduring approach to protection (Hardy et al. 2017a) that 
reduces development pressures on biodiversity (Pocewicz et al. 2011), whilst avoiding the costs of land 
acquisition and ongoing management (Parker 2004; Comerford 2013) and the social disruption of large-
scale land acquisition by governments (see Mansergh et al. 2008). However, their implementation relies on 
landholders volunteering their property for protection (which many landholders may be averse to due to 
the associated loss of development rights), limiting their application to a subset of landholders (Comerford 
2013), and sometimes requiring the use of financial incentives to encourage uptake (Rissman et al. 2013). 
Each new permanent agreement also requires conservation organisations to take on long-term costs (Figgis 
et al. 2005), such as administration, monitoring and compliance, and enforcement (Rissman et al. 2013), as 
well as the provision of ongoing stewardship support. Where the agreement is difficult for the organisation 
to establish, monitor, or enforce, these costs may make acquisition a preferable approach (Parker 2002), 
provided the property is available for purchase. 
Conservation using revolving funds 
An alternative is for conservation organisations to acquire private land and then sell it on to new, 
conservation-minded owners. This can be facilitated through the use of “revolving funds” (in some cases 
operating as “revolving loan funds”), which are a pool of capital that conservation organisations can use for 
a variety of purposes, including land acquisition and protection (McBryde et al. 2005). Fund capital can be 
used to purchase private land with conservation value, which is then on-sold to new owners, with an in-
perpetuity covenant or easement added to the property title in the process (Fitzsimons & Wescott 2001; 
Figgis 2003; Clark 2007; Milder 2007). Fund capital is replenished mostly through on-selling the purchased 
properties (McBryde et al. 2005; Clark 2007) where ideally all purchase, transaction and ongoing costs are 
recovered in the process (Brewer 2003; Cowell & Williams 2006), and if not replacement fund capital may 
be raised. Once replenished, funds are then used to purchase and protect additional properties (Safstrom 
1996). Two main types of revolving fund exist, with the primary difference in how fund capital is distributed 
– either within a conservation organisation (an “internal” revolving fund) or to a separate organisation or 
individual (an “external” revolving fund), with an agreement for the borrower to return the money (often 
with low or zero interest) within a given time frame (see Clark 2007). Revolving funds are closely related to 
‘conservation buyer’ programs (Land Trust Alliance 2008) except the conservation organisation actually 
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takes interim ownership of the property, and also ‘pre-acquisition’ programs (Hunter & Kohring 2009) 
except instead of transferring to a public agency the property is typically on-sold to a private party. 
Depending on how they are applied, revolving funds could also be considered part of ‘conservation 
development’ (‘projects that combine land development, land conservation, and revenue generation while 
providing functional protection for conservation resources’ (Milder 2007)), although not all revolving fund 
transactions result in additional development of the property. 
Despite the uptake of revolving funds and their potential to be financially self-sustaining, their role in 
conservation has received little attention. Here I provide the first global summary synthesis and analysis of 
private land conservation revolving funds, collating information on programs currently operating, and those 
which have since ceased operation, collected from the literature, web searches and practitioner 
knowledge. I also review the literature on revolving funds to identify the benefits and challenges of their 
use for permanently protecting private land. With a particular focus on conservation policy, I describe how 
revolving funds fit alongside the other main approaches to protecting biodiversity on private land, and 
assess the potential for modifications that may improve conservation outcomes. 
Gathering information on revolving funds 
I conducted a systematic review of scholarly databases (Web of Science, Google Scholar, Proquest and 
Scopus) and the world wide web for published and grey literature (predominantly reports, and excluding 
webpage content) relating to the process of purchasing unprotected private land and on-selling it with a 
permanent conservation agreement (search terms are available in Appendix B; Table A 1). Articles were 
included only if there was specific mention of using revolving funds and/or purchasing and re-selling private 
land to conserve biodiversity. I also added reports and book chapters that I knew contained information on 
revolving funds but had not been picked up through the search. From each of the articles in the final list I 
extracted any benefits or challenges of using revolving funds that had been identified, and then coded 
these based on emerging themes (see Appendix B; Table A 2 for coding framework). 
Drawing from an exhaustive search of the literature, web searches and practitioner knowledge, I also 
compiled the first comprehensive global list of current and past revolving funds that have been used to 
purchase and on-sell private land. Programs were only included where they had been used for purchasing 
and protecting private land for biodiversity. Where information was available I recorded their total fund 
size, area protected, start date, end date, number of loans or properties protected, and the total value of 
all purchases or loans. 
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History and current state of revolving funds 
From the collation of revolving fund data I found the programs used to protect private land growing in 
number (Figure 1), with 21 funds currently in operation globally. The first revolving fund was established in 
1955 in the USA, the country where the majority of current programs operate (13 out of 21), along with an 
additional two programs that are based in the USA but operate across both the USA and Canada. In 
Australia, the first of the six revolving fund programs was established in 1989, with five currently operating. 
In Chile, one program has been established and has been operating for nine years. I identified a total of 
eleven revolving fund programs that have closed since they began operating. 
 
Figure 1. Timelines depicting the years of operation for revolving fund programs worldwide for conserving private land. Most of 
the 21 programs currently operating have emerged over the past 15 years. Crosses indicate programs that have ceased operating. 
Only programs with sufficient data available have been plotted. Data was collated using a review of academic and grey literature 
and consultation with experts on revolving funds 
 
Revolving funds have facilitated the protection of almost 684,000 hectares globally, 66% (450,000 hectares) 
of which has occurred in the USA (Figure 2). Almost US$384m is held in revolving funds globally, with the 
size of fund programs averaging US$12.8m. By country, revolving funds covering both Canada and the USA 
had the largest average size (US$30m), with the USA having the largest amount available in total (almost 
US$214m). I note that these figures are underestimates as data was not available for all programs. Details 
of all revolving fund programs in each country are given in Appendix B (Table A 3). 
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Figure 2. Number, average time of operation and average fund size of revolving fund programs used to permanently protect 
private land. More than US$384m are available in revolving funds, which have protected more than 684,000 hectares. All values 
are in USD. (Further information available in Appendix B; Table A 3) 
Outcome of comprehensive review 
I found a total of 72 articles that met the criteria for inclusion in the review. Of these, 47 were either 
journal articles, books or book chapters, with the remainder of articles comprising grey literature. 
Approximately 10 percent of the articles focused in detail on revolving funds, with the vast majority 
mentioning this approach only as part of a broader topic. The full list of articles is provided in Appendix B 
(Table A 5). 
Benefits of revolving funds 
A large range of benefits were attributed to revolving funds (Figure 3), some of which appear unique to this 
approach. These included the ability of revolving funds to recover costs and recycle money for continual 
land purchase and protection – the most frequently cited benefit identified in the review (39 percent of all 
articles). The ability of revolving funds to conserve expensive land was raised by 15 percent of all articles, 
particularly where costs could be recouped through resale. Surprisingly, there were only two specific 
mentions of their potential to be self-sustaining (4 percent), and all but one of these came from the grey 
literature. 
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Figure 3. The frequency of articles mentioning each of the revolving fund benefits that arose from the literature review. Shown 
as a percentage of all articles found. * indicates benefits unique to revolving funds 
 
There were a number of benefits identified for revolving funds that also apply to other approaches for 
protecting private land. These included the ability of revolving funds to strategically target important 
properties with high conservation value (36 percent), for example land under threat of development, or 
land close to, complementing or linking protected areas. Also discussed was their ability to act quickly and 
purchase land as opportunities arise (14 percent), their beneficial development of the conservation 
property market (14 percent), and shifting land ownership to conservation-minded owners (14 percent). 
The process was stated as having particular benefit where voluntary protection or acquisition approaches 
were unlikely to be feasible, for example where landholders had been unwilling to participate or where 
land was expensive (15 percent). 
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Figure 4. The frequency of articles mentioning each of the revolving fund challenges that arose from the literature review. Shown 
as a percentage of all articles found. * indicates challenges unique to revolving funds 
 
Challenges for revolving funds 
A summary of the challenges attributed to using revolving funds is provided in Figure 4. Some of these were 
unique to the revolving fund approach, the most frequently cited of which was the pressure to recover 
costs through property sales (15 percent of all articles), and the limited demand for conservation properties 
(15 percent). Also mentioned was the pressure to turn over properties to achieve conservation (10 percent) 
and the sequential consequences of making unfavourable decisions (6 percent). 
A number of challenges were raised for revolving funds that also apply to other protection approaches. 
Amongst these were the supply of conservation properties (10 percent of all articles), operating in a 
dynamic property market (6 percent), and making decisions under uncertainty with limited information (13 
percent). Also mentioned was the difficulty of operating with limited staff resources and expertise (10 
percent), the potential for negative community perceptions over engaging in the property market (10 
percent of articles), managing opportunity costs (7 percent), and the constraints of operating with limited 
fund capital (7 percent). 
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The role for revolving funds in private land conservation 
My review finds revolving funds having a number of beneficial attributes that make them useful for 
permanently protecting private land and increasing the contribution of PPAs. I have provided a summary of 
these in Table 1. Some attributes are unique – most notable is their ability to recover costs through 
property on-sale, which facilitates the protection of additional properties. More than 684,000 hectares has 
been protected to date, and the review identifies heightened potential for revolving funds to protect 
expensive land (often in landscapes that are valuable for other productive uses and which contain 
threatened ecosystems), making them particularly useful where land values are beyond the reach of, or 
inefficient for, acquisition programs, and/or where landowners are reluctant to enter into permanent 
conservation agreements. However, I note that many of the articles in this review contained only limited 
information on revolving funds. Whilst there are some related studies evaluating the impacts of 
conservation development (e.g. Pejchar et al. 2007; Milder et al. 2008) and the cost-effectiveness of the 
pre-acquisition approach (Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008), I found very few formal evaluations specifically 
focused on revolving funds in either the academic or the grey literature, with Clark (2007), McBryde et al 
(2005) and Binney and Whiteoak (2010) providing the most detailed accounts of revolving funds. Alongside 
their growing use, the unique attributes and process offered by revolving funds as a conservation tool 
highlights the need for further research, aimed in particular at evaluating their contribution to private land 
conservation and the creation of PPAs. 
My review also found a number of challenges that likely limit the capacity for revolving funds to purchase 
and protect private land. Reliant on the property market, revolving funds are constrained by the demand 
for and supply of conservation properties, particularly those that enable cost recovery through on-sale. 
Very little guidance is available in the literature about which properties are suitable, beyond general 
statements on conservation value and attractiveness to market (Whelan 1997), but social factors are likely 
very important. The capacity of revolving funds is also likely linked to the size of the fund (where 
presumably larger gains can be made with larger fund sizes due to the ability to purchase greater numbers 
of properties, and the associated flexibility to absorb greater risks with recovering costs and resale times) 
and the ability to regularly turn over (‘revolve’) properties. Their capacity is also somewhat impeded by 
operational challenges, requiring complex decision-making with considerable uncertainty over the timing or 
nature of outcomes, driven in large part by limited information and the dynamics of the property market. 
Fund managers need to balance conservation goals with limits on fund capital and the need to sustain the 
fund over time, where decisions can have sequential impacts (e.g. buying a property difficult to on-sell 
holds up additional purchases). Policy-makers and practitioners should note that in sum these challenges 
make it difficult for revolving funds to purchase multiple properties and make large conservation gains 
quickly (Binney & Whiteoak 2010), but how these impact on revolving fund effectiveness is not yet clear. 
  18 
This would be worthy of future research, particularly in comparison to other permanent protection 
approaches. 
Nonetheless, having a mix of approaches is likely beneficial for implementing private land conservation 
(Doremus 2003) and may also boost participation rates (see Greiner et al. 2008). The ability of revolving 
funds to utilise the conservation property market and proactively create PPAs, like other forms of 
conservation development (Milder 2007) makes revolving funds a useful part of the private land 
conservation policy mix alongside voluntary, binding and non-binding approaches, financial incentive 
payments, and acquisition. However, as revolving funds share attributes with other permanent protection 
approaches (see Table 1) policy-makers need to be aware of the potential for overlap. For example, 
because both revolving funds and acquisition can target specific properties and are limited by the number 
of owners willing to sell, these approaches could end up buying properties in similar areas, which could 
drive up land prices or push development into unwanted areas (Armsworth et al. 2006). Here collaborative 
approaches to land protection between land conservation agencies would be beneficial (Jansujwicz & 
Calhoun 2010; Gordon et al. 2013), but this issue highlights the need to clarify a space for revolving funds in 
the conservation policy mix. From this review I suggest the role for revolving funds is in protecting private 
land with conservation value where: i) conservation values are compatible with and attractive for private 
ownership; ii) an acquisition-to-hold approach or permanent agreement with existing landowners is 
unlikely or infeasible; and iii) on-sale is likely to recover costs within a reasonable timeframe. Policy-makers 
considering the use of revolving funds should also note that due to their constraints, the likely contribution 
of revolving funds is incremental protection of private land rather than rapid gains (see also Cowell & 
Williams 2006), a longer-term investment that facilitates a gradual increase in the number of PPAs. 
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Table 1. The space for revolving funds amongst other approaches to permanent protection of private land with conservation 
value 
Private land 
conservation 
mechanism 
Main costs to organisation Key benefits Key challenge 
Voluntary covenants 
and easements 
Upfront and ongoing 
administration costs 
Compliance, monitoring 
and enforcement costs 
Ongoing stewardship 
support costs 
Little or no acquisition or 
management costs* 
Conservation support from 
existing landholders 
 
Limited to voluntary participation 
from landholders 
Maintaining landholder motivation 
and satisfaction through time 
Revolving funds Property purchase and re-
sale costs 
Upfront and ongoing 
administration costs 
Compliance, monitoring 
and enforcement costs 
Ongoing stewardship 
support costs 
Replenishable, self-sustaining 
perpetual fund 
Target important properties^ 
Ability to protect expensive land 
and recover costs 
Speed of intervention 
Develop conservation property 
market 
Ensuring purchase costs are 
recovered through resale  
Identifying and purchasing re-
saleable properties, with limited 
information 
Requires market of conservation-
minded buyers 
Limited to landholders willing to sell 
Limited to properties likely to sell in 
reasonable time and recover costs 
Maintaining new landholder’s 
motivation and satisfaction through 
time 
Acquisition for the 
purpose of holding 
Purchase and ongoing 
management costs 
Direct acquisition and specialist 
management  
Target important conservation 
properties 
Acquiring properties that will be 
hard to on-sell or are likely to 
make a loss 
Speed of intervention 
Limited to landholders willing to sell 
Purchase and management costs 
Funding the absolute cost of the 
property (capital intensive) 
* Some programs may provide incentive payments upon signing or post signing 
^ May also be true for conservation covenants and easements, see Fitzsimons and Carr (2014) 
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Despite their increasing use, it is important for policy-makers to note that revolving funds may not be 
appropriate in all regions. All of the funds identified in this review were operating in countries with 
predominantly market-based economies (although interestingly none of these were found to be operating 
from within Canada), and it is unlikely that revolving funds would be suitable without an existing market for 
private conservation properties, or where demand for conservation properties is weak. This may also apply 
to the type of fund (internal or external), where perhaps due to the large number of land trusts, and the 
market for conservation properties, all external revolving funds were based in the USA. The reliance of 
revolving funds on conservation easements and covenants to protect land means the approach is unlikely 
to be suitable where property rights are not well defined or enforced (Pasquini et al. 2011). Moreover, 
conservation organisations need a pool of starting capital (i.e. raised through government, philanthropic or 
private investment sources) with sufficient purchasing power to buy important conservation properties, 
along with the ability to have an agreement signed over the property, as well as considerable ecological and 
real estate expertise and staff resourcing to adequately assess potential purchases. 
Improving the implementation of revolving funds 
My review suggests complex, cross-disciplinary decision-making is required for implementing revolving 
funds. Property selection appears a particular challenge that draws together elements of economics, social 
science, policy, ecology and conservation, characterised by limited information and high uncertainty, with 
decisions having sequential impacts on future success. Many conservation organisations are resource-
constrained, which raises questions about the capacity and capability of these organisations to support high 
level analysis of the factors driving conservation property markets. Moreover, despite the importance of 
property selection, the review of the literature did not uncover research identifying which types of 
properties are most appropriate for revolving funds. Presumably some properties have a mix of ecological, 
social and financial characteristics that make them more suitable for revolving funds than others. The 
identification and prioritisation of high conservation value sites can be done in a number of ways (Wilson et 
al. 2006; Tulloch et al. 2015), and a socio-ecological approach could help identify regions attractive to 
conservation buyers that will also benefit biodiversity (Ban et al. 2013). But which mix of characteristics 
make a property suitable for fast resale and a high likelihood of recovering costs? How do I trade-off 
between these characteristics to find the most important ones? And how can I ensure both conservation 
and resale goals are met within the dynamic and uncertain nature of the real estate market? 
Structured approaches to decision-making are particularly suited to these types of decisions, helping with 
choices under uncertainty, choices between different options, and where temporal variability may affect 
outcomes (Dee & Gerber 2012). These approaches could help revolving fund managers make transparent 
trade-offs between multiple property types and identify the components of a suitable property (Gregory et 
al. 2012), allowing them to focus only on suitable properties. This information on property suitability could 
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also be incorporated into conservation planning and refined over time (Grantham et al. 2010), improving 
the tool’s effectiveness for conservation. 
I suggest as a starting point developing a structured approach that can answer three key research 
questions: i) which properties are most suitable for revolving funds, and what prices should organisations 
be paying for them?; ii) what is the effect over time of different purchasing strategies (for example, is it 
more effective to purchase properties with exceptional conservation values and delayed resale than to 
purchase properties with lower conservation values but a greater likelihood of rapid turnover, and thus 
faster incremental gains?)?; and iii) how do conservation outcomes scale with increased size or risk profiles 
of revolving funds (do larger funds lead to more conservation, and does purchasing power diminish over 
time with property price inflation?)? 
Conclusions 
Increasing the amount of private land permanently protected for biodiversity is likely to remain an 
important focus for global conservation efforts. Where supportive conditions exist, and with appropriate 
property selection, revolving funds show promise as a self-sustaining approach that proactively facilitates 
the creation of PPAs, incrementally increasing the amount of private land permanently protected for 
biodiversity. Of interest to policy-makers, revolving funds appear complementary to other private land 
conservation approaches, protecting properties where acquisition is expensive or infeasible (that are 
attractive for on-sale), or landholders are unwilling to enter into a permanent conservation agreement. This 
potentially frees up capital for other acquisition funds to buy other properties. Nonetheless, revolving fund 
implementation appears complex, and arguably a structured approach to decision-making could help 
increase the effectiveness of the tool, whereby trade-offs between conservation values and financial 
sustainability can be explicitly considered. Beyond these immediate questions, a number of general issues 
with revolving funds remain unexplored: Which properties are more suitable for private owners and which 
for conservation organisations, over the long term?; How does the social landscape change with the 
ongoing implementation of revolving funds – as permanent agreements become more common in the real 
estate market do they become more acceptable, or is there a social or political ceiling to this approach?; 
Can they be used to encourage other sustainable land uses rather than solely biodiversity conservation?; 
And what is the likely financial ceiling for setting up revolving funds? Resolving these issues will allow for 
more effective application of revolving funds in conjunction with other approaches, and in turn, enhanced 
conservation of biodiversity on private land. 
 
Chapter 3 
Exploring the permanence of conservation covenants 
Sign at Bimblebox Nature Refuge, Queensland, Australia 
(Photo credit: Sonya Duus)
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Chapter 3 
3 Exploring the permanence of conservation covenants 
Abstract 
Conservation on private land is a growing part of international efforts to stem the decline of biodiversity. In 
many countries, private land conservation policy often supports in-perpetuity covenants and easements, 
which are legally binding agreements used to protect biodiversity on private land by restricting activities 
that may negatively impact ecological values. With a view to understand the long-term security of these 
mechanisms, I examined release and breach data from all 13 major covenanting programs across Australia. 
I report that out of 6,818 multi-party covenants, only 8 had been released, contrasting with approximately 
130 of 673 single-party covenants. Breach data was limited, with a minimum of 71 known cases where 
covenant obligations had not been met. With a focus on private land conservation policy, I use the results 
from this case study to argue that multi-party covenants appear an enduring conservation mechanism, 
highlight the important role that effective monitoring and reporting of the permanency of these 
agreements plays in contributing to their long-term effectiveness, and provide recommendations for 
organisations seeking to improve their monitoring programs. The collection of breach and release data is 
important for the continuing improvement of conservation policies and practices for private land.  
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Introduction 
It is widely recognised that stemming the decline of biodiversity requires a greater focus on conservation 
efforts targeting private land. With private land covering a large part of the terrestrial landmass and 
supporting important biodiversity, its significance for conservation is gaining prominence in many 
countries, including Australia, Canada, the USA, New Zealand, Chile and South Africa (Langholz & Lassoie 
2001; Ewing 2008; Fishburn et al. 2009; von Hase et al. 2010). The approaches used by policy-makers to 
conserve biodiversity on private land vary considerably, from voluntary to incentives-based schemes to 
regulation. A number of studies have recently evaluated these various approaches, including the 
effectiveness of incentive-based programs to protect biodiversity (von Hase et al. 2010), the ability of 
voluntary stewardship programs to conserve habitat (Platt & Ahern 1995), and the extent to which 
conservation easement programs contribute to reducing development pressure and maintaining 
biodiversity (Pocewicz et al. 2011). Studies have also looked at the degree to which private land 
conservation aligns with strategic conservation goals (Kiesecker et al. 2007; Adams et al. 2014). Yet 
important questions still remain about the effectiveness and long-term consequences of private land 
conservation mechanisms (Merenlender et al. 2004). 
Of growing importance in private land conservation policy is the establishment of Privately Protected Areas 
(PPAs) – a protected area, as defined by the IUCN (Dudley 2008), under private governance (Stolton et al. 
2014). PPAs are established in different ways in different countries, and the mechanisms used to protect 
biodiversity through legal or other effective means also vary. Here, I investigate two components central to 
private land conservation policy; the permanence (duration) and security (resistance to removal) of 
conservation agreements with landholders, focusing on conservation covenants as one form of PPA. I focus 
on examining these issues in Australia, which has a large number of individual conservation covenants 
(Stolton et al. 2014; Fitzsimons 2015). I first provide background information on my case study and the 
challenges around permanence and security for policy-makers, before presenting the results and using 
them as context to highlight the central role that monitoring and reporting of covenant releases and 
breaches plays in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of these agreements. 
Private land conservation in Australia 
As in many countries, conservation policy in Australia has historically focused on public land (Figgis 2004). 
Although public protected areas cover more than 65 million ha across 8.5 percent of the continent (DotE 
2014), private and leasehold land covers over 62 percent of Australia’s land area (AUSLIG 1993), and 
contains significant biodiversity value (Fitzsimons & Wescott 2001). Many of Australia’s threatened species 
occur entirely outside of public protected areas (Watson et al. 2011), as do some of the most threatened 
ecosystems (Figgis et al. 2005; Taylor et al. 2011). Although the long-term security of private land 
conservation mechanisms is not yet clear, with the continuing loss of biodiversity, and broad acceptance 
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that the public conservation estate is insufficient on its own, private land conservation policies and 
programs are increasingly important (Gordon et al. 2011). 
Conservation covenants are an important component of Australia’s private land conservation policy mix. 
Similar to conservation easements in North America, conservation covenants are mostly voluntary, legally 
binding agreements between an authorised organisation and a landholder (Todd 1997). They can apply to 
all or part of a property and are registered on the property title (Figgis 2004), usually running in-perpetuity. 
The vast majority are established primarily to protect land with high nature conservation value, where the 
landholder retains ownership but has a reduced ‘bundle of rights’, in effect giving up development and 
land-use rights incompatible with conservation (Iftekhar et al. 2014). Whilst covenants can be tailored to 
individual properties (Adams & Moon 2013) each covenant contains a standard set of obligations which 
remain relatively fixed over the term of the agreement, with limited, site-specific management 
requirements determined during establishment (Figgis et al. 2005). All Australian covenants are backed by 
specific enabling legislation (Fitzsimons 2015), specifying the body authorised to administer the covenant, 
typically a statutory authority. 
Since the creation of the first conservation covenant in Australia, a Wildlife Refuge in New South Wales in 
1951 (DECCW 2010), the number of covenants has grown considerably to 7,491 in 2014 (Figure 5). This 
includes 4,894 covenants likely to meet the private protected area criteria in Australia which require the 
area to be valuable, secure through statutory provisions, well-managed for conservation, and clearly 
defined (see Fitzsimons 2015). With the number of covenants set to grow further, it is important to 
evaluate their permanence as a conservation mechanism. 
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Figure 5. Cumulative trend in the number and area of covenanted properties in Australia. Columns represent covenanted area, 
and the triangles represent the number of covenants. Darker green columns and filled triangles indicate National Conservation 
Lands Database (DSEWPaC 2011) data, lighter green and the hollow triangle represents data collected for this study. 
 
Permanence and security 
From a conservation policy perspective, the permanence and security of agreements with private 
landholders are central issues. Whilst permanence can relate to a number of ecological and social factors in 
conservation, here I focus on ‘permanence’ as the length of time that a conservation agreement (e.g. a 
covenant or easement) remains in place to protect conservation values (Fitzsimons 2006). An agreement’s 
permanence can have substantial implications for the persistence of conservation values (Jones et al. 
2005), and is of particular importance on private land, where landholders and land uses can change 
frequently, especially amid pressure from mining, agriculture, and other types of development (Cox & 
Underwood 2011; Pocewicz et al. 2011; Adams & Moon 2013). With covenant restrictions typically 
associated with the property title and lasting in perpetuity, they are commonly considered the most 
permanent private land conservation mechanism in Australia. Thus they are formally able be classified as 
protected areas and can contribute to Australia’s international protection targets (Fitzsimons 2006, 2015). 
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Related to permanence is an agreement’s strength (its ‘security’), which refers to the level of authority 
required to establish, alter and/or terminate or extinguish (‘release’) that agreement (Fitzsimons 2006). 
Although security provisions vary between programs, all covenants in Australia are backed by legislation 
(Fitzsimons 2015), with release usually requiring approval from multiple parties including a government 
Minister. The exception is the Wildlife Refuge program, which is only available in the state of New South 
Wales and is unique amongst Australian covenants for only requiring approval for release from a single 
party (e.g. the landholder) (Figgis 2004). 
Threats to permanence 
Although protected area downgrading, downsizing and degazettement (PADDD) is a known policy issue and 
has been noted as a threat to public reserves (Mascia & Pailler 2011), some see covenants as less secure 
than public protected areas (e.g. Centre for Environmental Management 1999). Of particular importance 
here are mineral exploration and extraction rights, which have been identified as an emerging threat to the 
natural values on covenants (Root-Bernstein et al. 2013; Adams & Moon 2013), although covenants do not 
have the legal ability to prevent such activities as mineral rights rest with governments, not landholders. 
Changing property ownership, market conditions and government policy have also been noted as threats to 
the permanence of private land conservation more generally (Figgis et al. 2005; Jones et al. 2005). In 
Australia, concerns over covenant permanence also relate to their relatively recent adoption (most 
covenants have been established since the 1990s (Fitzsimons & Carr 2014; Figure 5), compared to public 
protected areas, which saw considerable expansion in the mid to late 20th Century and some 274 (3.6%) of 
which are over 100 years old (DotE 2014). 
Beyond these broader issues, a particular challenge for private land conservation policy globally is the 
identification and enforcement of ‘breaches’, which are instances of landholders failing to meet their 
obligations or violating the conditions of their agreement in some way (Owley 2011). Breaches can vary in 
severity, and in extreme cases could lead to a release of the covenant. It is possible that the reasons behind 
breaches are similar to releases, and understanding these could allow for early and targeted intervention to 
prevent release. However, identifying breaches can be difficult for administering bodies, with the need to 
account for the agreement’s flexibility (Rissman 2010), variability in permitted land uses (Rissman et al. 
2007), changing ecological and social conditions (Rissman et al. 2014), and financial and practical limitations 
on their capacity to monitor covenanted land (Kiesecker et al. 2007; Korngold 2007; Fitzsimons & Carr 
2014). Moreover, how administering bodies respond to breaches is important for ensuring the 
effectiveness of these agreements, faced with the costs of pursuing legal action (Rissman & Butsic 2011) or 
the consequences of modifying the boundaries and/or obligations of these agreements (‘amendments’) 
through time (McLaughlin 2007; Jay 2013). 
Little information exists on the permanence and security of PPAs in Australia. Here, for the first time, I 
collate and examine the available data on covenants from all major Australian covenanting programs (Table 
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1). The initial motivation was to determine if data was available to answer the following three questions: i) 
what proportion of conservation covenants within the major covenanting programs have been released; ii) 
what proportion are known to have had their conditions breached; iii) what were the main reasons for the 
release or breach, and what factors could help predict these; and if so what are the main issues affecting 
the permanence of covenants? 
Methods 
Between October 2013 and January 2014, I asked individuals within the 13 major Australian covenanting 
organisations who were familiar with and had access to database records to provide the numbers of and 
reasons for covenant releases and breaches. I followed up responses with further questioning where 
needed. The programs involved cover all states and territories (with the exception of the Australian Capital 
Territory; Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Details of the covenanting programs included in this study. 
State Covenant program First 
covenant 
Covenanting organisation Security 
NSW Conservation Agreement 1990 Office of Environment and Heritage Multi-party 
NSW Trust Agreement 2005 Nature Conservation Trust of NSW Multi-party 
NSW Registered Property Agreement 1997 Office of Environment and Heritage Multi-party 
NSW Wildlife Refuge 1951 Office of Environment and Heritage Single-party 
NT Conservation Covenant 2009 Parks and Wildlife Commission NT Multi-party 
Qld Nature Refuge and Coordinated 
Conservation Area 
1994 Department of Environment and Heritage Protection Multi-party 
SA Heritage Agreement 1994 Department of the Environment, Water and Natural 
Resources 
Multi-party 
Tas Conservation Covenant 1999 Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment 
Multi-party 
Vic Conservation Covenant 1986 Trust for Nature (Victoria)  Multi-party 
Vic Section 69 Agreement 1987 Department of Environment and Primary Industries Multi-party 
WA Conservation Covenant 1971 The National Trust of Australia (WA) Multi-party 
WA Nature Conservation Covenant 1990 Department of Parks and Wildlife  Multi-party 
WA Conservation Covenant 1980 Department of Agriculture and Food Multi-party 
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Database records varied across organisations and programs – both in the detail (e.g. the type of impact 
caused the breach) and the style of recording (i.e. hard copy or electronic). Detailed information was not 
always available due to confidentiality, limited record-keeping, or the difficulty of retrieving data when 
resourcing restrictions precluded their ability to sift through hard copy records. Where only limited data 
was available, I asked program staff to instead provide estimates. The type of information provided by staff 
clearly fell into two categories: 1) ‘minimum bound estimates’, where staff provided the known cases but 
indicated that the true number was likely greater but unknown; 2) ‘rough estimates’, where staff were 
unsure of actual cases and could only provide a rough estimate. The description of the activities behind the 
covenant release and breach data were used to categorise these into common themes. 
Covenant releases and breaches 
I considered covenants ‘released’ if they had been signed over a particular piece of land in the past but had 
subsequently been removed from the land title (i.e. the covenant had been terminated in accordance with 
the relevant security provisions). Because obligations vary between programs, I considered a covenant 
‘breached’ if its obligations had not been met, but the covenant had remained in place. I did not count third 
party damage (e.g. by neighbours) as a landholder breach, but recorded this information separately, as I 
consider this type of damage reasonably beyond the immediate control of the landholder and the 
administering body. 
Results 
Covenant releases 
The single-party NSW Wildlife Refuge covenants had by far the highest number of releases, although this 
was based on the estimate provided by program staff (130 out of 673). A total of eight out of 6,818 multi-
party covenants (0.12%) had been released across Australia, with Victoria (4) and Western Australia (3) 
having the highest numbers of releases (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Number of covenants, area covenanted, releases and breaches, by covenant type 
State Total 
number of 
covenants 
in place 
Area 
covenanted 
(ha) 
Percentage of 
private land 
area* in the 
jurisdiction that 
is covenanted 
Number 
released 
Percentage 
released 
Number 
breached 
Percentage 
breached 
Single party covenants 
      
New South Wales 673 1,889,791.52 2.65 130
†
 19.31 n/a n/a 
Multi-party covenants 
      
Western Australia 2,016 1,322,684.69 1.20 3 0.15 42
‡
 2.08 
South Australia 1,523 646,280 1.12 0 0 1
‡
 0.07 
Victoria 1,419 64,741 0.42 4 0.28 4
‡
 0.28 
New South Wales 672 170,595.35 0.24 0 0 4
‡
 0.60 
Tasmania 731 84,655 3.11 1 0.14 20 2.74 
Queensland 455 3,439,875 2.20 0 0 0 0 
Northern Territory 2 131,043.01 0.19 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
National total 
(multi-party only) 
6,818 5,859,874.05 1.22 8 0.12 71 1.04 
National total  
(single and multi-
party covenants) 
7,491 7,749,665.57 1.61 138 1.84 71 0.95 
* includes indigenous land; † Detailed records unavailable and the numbers represent staff member’s rough estimate. ‡ Detailed 
records unavailable and the numbers here are cases specifically known to staff and represent minimum bounds. 
 
For multi-party covenants, the reasons for release varied considerably, ranging from unauthorised timber 
removal to government acquisition or administrative error (Table 4). As examples, two early covenants 
were established on old farms, which were released after it became clear they had limited conservation 
value and were unsuitable for covenanting. Another covenant at Ironbark Basin in Victoria was released 
when the land was transferred to the State Government for inclusion in a national park. Arguably, in this 
case ‘release’ may not be the most appropriate term given the conservation values remained protected. 
Equivalent data for single-party Wildlife Refuges was unavailable, however indications from program staff 
suggests that these releases occurred predominantly at the request of the landholder. 
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Table 4. Reported reasons for covenant releases 
 Reason No. 
reported 
cases 
Multi-party 
releases 
Site subsequently deemed unsuitable 2 
Acquired by state government for development 2 
Ceded to government as reserve 1 
Unauthorised timber removal 1 
Administrative error – unintended covenant 1 
Elderly landowner – unable to meet obligations 1 
Total multi-party releases 8 
Single-party 
releases 
Releases at landholder request 130* 
Total single-party releases 130 
* Detailed records unavailable and the type and number of releases represent staff member’s rough estimate. 
 
Covenant breaches 
Detailed breach data was not available from most programs, which precluded deeper quantitative analysis. 
Of the available data, 71 breaches were reported (Table 3), with most of these in Western Australia (42) 
and Tasmania (20). However, given the constraints on covenant monitoring by the programs (Fitzsimons & 
Carr 2014), these reported breaches should be interpreted as minimum bound estimates, with the true 
number likely to be greater. 
Some 43 of the 71 breaches (60%) had insufficient information for classification (Table 5).  Of those able to 
be categorised, as a percentage of all reported breaches, most arose from land clearing and/or 
development (13%), road construction (7%), forestry operations (7%) or unauthorised timber removal (7%). 
Some 25% of all breaches were attributed to a third party. In one third party breach, forestry contractors 
working on a neighbouring property cleared vegetation on a covenanted property where the boundary 
delineation was unclear; in another case, a third party had gained illegal entry to the property and collected 
firewood. 
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Table 5. Summary of available information on covenant breaches and the responsible parties. Numbers represent minimum 
bound estimates 
 Party responsible  
Reason Landholder Third 
Party 
Unknown No. 
reported 
cases 
Land clearing and/or development 6 3 - 9 
Road construction 1 4 - 5 
Forestry operations - 5 - 5 
Unauthorised timber removal (e.g. firewood) - 5 - 5 
Dumping rubbish 2 - - 2 
Management actions incomplete 1 - - 1 
Recreational vehicles - 1 - 1 
Unknown / insufficient information - - 43 43 
Total reported breaches 10 18 43 71 
 
Discussion 
The importance of strong security provisions 
Using Privately Protected Areas (PPAs) to conserve biodiversity is a growing approach in conservation 
policy. By definition, PPAs require protection through legal or other effective means (Stolton et al. 2014), 
and by extension, their effectiveness as a permanent conservation mechanism relates directly to the ease 
in which that agreement can be released, amended or enforced. 
Focusing on Australian covenants as a form of PPA, my case study found only a small number of multi-party 
covenants had been released, suggesting they are a conservation mechanism with high permanence. 
Moreover, the study also highlights a clear distinction in the proportion of releases between covenants 
with differing security provisions, with a relatively high proportion of single-party Wildlife Refuge releases 
(19%) compared with multi-party covenants (0.12%). Considering the extent of legal challenges that 
permanent agreements face (Rissman & Butsic 2011) and are likely to face in the future, this is a clear 
demonstration to policy-makers of the value of strong security provisions, whereby requiring authorisation 
from multiple parties reduces the potential for release, and contributes towards ensuring these 
agreements meet their promise of in-perpetuity protection (McLaughlin 2007). I thus emphasise the 
importance for policy makers to consider and prioritise multi-party provisions to secure their agreements. 
However, this extra security would have to be weighed up against the potential for these provisions to act 
as a deterrent to landholders entering the program (Kabii & Horwitz 2006). 
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Preparing for threats to agreements 
Whilst strong security provisions may help prevent release, the early identification of threats to these 
agreements could help policy-makers prepare and adapt to emerging issues. Part of this requires 
understanding the reasons why covenants are being released. The data analysed in this study showed no 
standout cause for multi-party covenant release and instead, each appears a product of individual 
circumstances. However, in the single party Wildlife Refuges program, the higher number of releases was 
attributed to landholders opting to withdraw. Further research is needed to understand why landholders 
are leaving the program, for example by investigating landholder commitment and satisfaction with the 
covenanting program (e.g. Selinske et al. 2015). 
Beyond release, some breaches of obligations are a potential threat to the permanence of agreements, 
through damage to ecological values of the property which may in some extreme cases cause major loss in 
values, leading to covenant release. It is possible that the reasons behind breaches may be similar to 
releases, providing room for organisations to intervene early to prevent release. In this study, of those 
breaches with sufficient information, land clearing showed up as the biggest issue. Due to the limited 
available data, the extent of this issue is unclear, as are the reasons for clearing, but it highlights one of the 
key challenges for policy makers – how to minimise unwanted landholder behaviour from a distance with 
minimal intervention. One approach could be for private land organisations to increase the level of 
enforcement and consider strengthening the compliance components within the legal agreement if needed 
(see Jay 2013). However, maintaining a strong and constructive relationship with landholders could help 
prevent the substantial costs associated with enforcement (Rissman & Butsic 2011) and as a preventative 
measure, an increased focus on landholder support may help clarify landholder understanding of their 
obligations (Stroman & Kreuter 2014) and help uncover the reasons behind this clearing. 
In response to breaches, a number of organisations mentioned covenant amendment as a preferred 
method of resolution to release, provided the property’s ecological values remained protected. This fits 
with the findings of Rissman (2010), who noted that land trusts in the USA have an incentive to act 
moderately when obligations are not met. I did not look directly at amendments, and the data available 
from this study was insufficient to determine how many covenants have been amended, or even the nature 
of these changes (e.g. renegotiating boundaries or obligations). However, as amendments can relate to the 
permanence of covenant obligations and the effectiveness of these agreements for use in conservation 
policy, I highlight the need for programs to monitor and record the nature and extent of any amendments 
to permanent agreements and suggest this as an important area requiring further research. 
Some organisations suggested that the turnover of conservation covenants to successor landholders may 
be developing into a policy issue, which has also been noted elsewhere (Collins 2000; Czech 2002; Rissman 
& Butsic 2011; Stroman & Kreuter 2014). These are landholders who, for example, have purchased or 
inherited the property from the original covenantor. Without being original parties to the covenant, their 
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ownership of protected properties may result in higher rates of legal challenge (Rissman & Butsic 2011) 
and/or breaching of conditions. It may be that successor covenantors prove an important predictor of 
covenant breach or requests for release, although understanding the reasons behind this requires further 
research. Policy makers would be well placed to consider ways of engaging and supporting new owners, as 
well as elderly covenantors who may need additional support in order to meet their obligations (Fitzsimons 
& Carr 2014). 
Although a significant policy challenge, dealing with current and future owners of protected properties is 
only one dimension of permanence. My case study suggests that policy-makers also need to account for 
actors outside of the direct agreement. Most breaches in this study for which detailed information was 
available were attributed to damage from a third party (25% of all known breaches). This has also been 
noted as an issue for easements in the USA (Rissman & Butsic 2011). This raises an important question for 
policy makers about who holds responsibility for monitoring, preventing and rectifying damage to 
covenanted properties resulting from trespass, particularly if the third party remains unidentified. Trespass 
is an issue for conservation areas in general, impacting both the public and private conservation estate.  
As noted elsewhere, I also agree that the decoupling of above- and below-ground property rights is an 
important issue for conservation covenants (Root-Bernstein et al. 2013; Adams & Moon 2013). In Australia, 
covenants do not provide protection for underground resources, with mineral exploration and extraction 
rights remaining in government ownership. Although this study shows that mining activities have not yet 
resulted in covenant release, it is likely that in the near future coal extraction will be permitted on a Nature 
Refuge covenant in the Galilee Basin in Queensland (Lauder 2013). This is an important policy issue, not 
only because mineral extraction can result in the loss of ecological value, but also because of the potential 
loss of public investment (McLaughlin 2012) and faith in conservation that has played an important role in 
funding the development of the private conservation estate. 
A need for improved monitoring and recording 
It is likely that the growth in permanent conservation agreements will continue, particularly with their 
increasing use via new pathways such as biodiversity offsets, which are growing in prominence 
internationally and in all Australian jurisdictions (Bull et al. 2013). It is possible that this will also lead to an 
increase in the number of releases and breaches, making effective monitoring of these agreements 
essential for identifying issues, supporting enforcement (Rissman & Butsic 2011), and evaluating their 
ecological contribution. Whilst my study showed few releases, detailed breach information was limited, 
with the number of breaches occurring largely unknown. This is surprising given the prominence of 
permanence as a key feature of the mechanism, but such fragmented and incomplete data is not unique to 
covenants, having also been noted before for easements in the USA (Wilson Morris & Rissman 2010). 
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The relevant policy questions therefore become where, how and what to monitor? Limited resourcing of 
covenanting organisations makes monitoring a particular challenge (Fitzsimons & Carr 2014), and 
organisations may be best to focus their efforts where and when the probability of breach is highest (Czech 
2002). From this study, a starting point may be in areas with known concentrations of successor 
covenantors or hotspots for third-party trespass. Aerial photographs, remote-sensing and predictive 
modelling techniques offer opportunities to identify possible breaches remotely, which could be used 
where resourcing limitations impede the recommended annual site visits (LTA 2004). Where breaches are 
hard to detect remotely, indirect observations, self-reporting and direct questioning of landholders could 
be used (see Gavin et al. 2010), and more generally, specialised landholder questioning techniques could 
help obtain estimates of non-compliance (Nuno & St. John 2015; Thomas et al. 2015). When organisations 
collect breach data, I suggest other data should be recorded in addition to the location, actor (i.e. the 
landholder or a third party), and the type and extent of the damage. This should include both the 
landholder type (i.e. originator or successor) and where possible, the intention of the actor (i.e. accidental 
or intentional).  Of course beyond identifying a breach, organisations must also ensure there are sufficient 
resources and capacity available for enforcement (Rissman & Butsic 2011). 
This study provides insights into the methodological challenges of multi-jurisdictional studies on 
conservation agreements. Obtaining sufficient and consistent breach data proved particularly difficult, due 
largely to organisation resourcing constraints on its collection, differences in how breaches are monitored 
and recorded across organisations (i.e. centrally or regionally, electronically or in hard copy), and privacy 
concerns over sharing this type of information. There were also challenges in analysing across different 
programs (e.g. what constitutes a ‘breach’ under different legislation or landholder agreements). However, 
the study highlights an opportunity to share data, pool resources and collaborate across organisations to 
allow for more detailed quantitative and qualitative studies in the future. For this, support is needed from 
policy-makers for more consistency in covenant monitoring (e.g. LTA 2004), as well as a coordinated 
approach to recording and sharing breach and release data in ways that address confidentiality concerns. 
This data should be in digital form in centralised and secure databases, such as the National Conservation 
Easement Database in the USA (USEFC 2014), with data sharing provisions to allow for comparison across 
different agreement types, such as US easements and Australian covenants. In Australia, the National 
Conservation Lands Database (DSEWPaC 2011) has the potential to be an equivalent portal, although its 
future viability is currently uncertain. 
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Conclusions 
As the role of PPAs in protecting biodiversity grows, so does the need to ensure they remain an effective 
part of the conservation policy toolkit. The numbers of covenant releases and known breaches in this case 
study were low, suggesting that covenants may be an enduring mechanism for conservation, although I 
acknowledge the likely under-reporting and minimal data available for breaches. However, ongoing 
compliance monitoring of covenant breaches and releases will allow policy-makers to respond to issues as 
they arise, and will also enable future comparison of the permanence of PPAs to the public estate and 
other protected area categories. This data is key to understanding the permanence and long-term 
effectiveness of these agreements and crucial for improving the sustainability of conservation policy on 
private land. 
  
Chapter 4
Factors influencing property selection for conservation revolving funds
Nature Foundation SA revolving fund property at Blanchetown, South Australia, Australia 
(Photo credit: NFSA)
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4 Factors influencing property selection for conservation revolving funds 
Abstract 
Finding sustainable ways to increase the amount of private land protected for biodiversity is a challenge for 
many conservation organisations. In a number of countries, organisations use ‘revolving fund’ programs, 
whereby land is purchased, and then on-sold to conservation-minded owners with a condition to enter into 
a conservation covenant or easement. The proceeds from sale are then used to purchase, protect and on-
sell additional properties, incrementally increasing the amount of protected private land. As the 
effectiveness of this approach relies upon selecting the right properties, I sought to explore the factors 
currently considered by practitioners and how these are integrated into decision-making. I conducted 
exploratory, semi-structured interviews with managers from each of the five major revolving funds in 
Australia. Responses suggest that whilst conservation factors are important, financial and social factors are 
also highly influential, with a major determinant being whether the property can be on-sold within a 
reasonable timeframe, and at a price that replenishes the fund. To facilitate the on-sale process, often 
selected properties include the potential for the construction of a dwelling. Practitioners are faced with 
clear trade-offs between conservation, financial, amenity and other factors in selecting properties; and 
three main potential risks: difficulty recovering the costs of acquisition, protection, and resale; difficulty on-
selling the property; and difficulty meeting conservation goals. The findings suggest that the complexity of 
these decisions may be limiting revolving fund effectiveness. I draw from participant responses to identify 
potential strategies to mitigate the risks identified, and suggest that managers could benefit from a shared 
learning and adaptive approach to property selection given the commonalities between programs. 
Understanding how practitioners are dealing with complex decisions in the implementation of revolving 
funds helps to identify future research to improve the performance of this conservation tool. 
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Introduction 
Increasing the amount of private land protected for biodiversity is widely recognised as an essential part of 
conservation policies in many countries, with permanent agreements such as conservation covenants or 
easements being an important component of these efforts (Fishburn et al. 2009). Established voluntarily 
between landholders and an administering body (typically a land trust or government agency) (Kamal et al. 
2015), these binding, usually in-perpetuity agreements restrict harmful activities and/or encourage 
proactive conservation management (Figgis 2004). The agreements are commonly used to protect land 
with high conservation value or benefit (Fitzsimons & Carr 2014) or under threat from development 
(Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008). However, these agreements usually require landholders to volunteer their 
property for protection, often limiting their application to properties owned by conservation-minded 
landholders (Comerford 2013). Encouraging landholders to enter into a permanent agreement can be 
difficult, although this is sometimes assisted through offering financial incentives (Farmer et al. 2015). 
An alternative to covenants and easements is to purchase and permanently hold a property for 
conservation (‘acquisition’). Through this approach, private land of high conservation value is purchased, 
owned and managed for conservation (Bernstein & Mitchell 2005), commonly by a conservation 
organisation (Pasquini et al. 2010) or government agency (where it usually reverts to public land; Taylor et 
al. 2014). A number of studies have looked at the issues involved in acquiring private land for conservation, 
which range from prioritizing inexpensive land with intact ecosystems (Czech 2002), to accounting for 
funding and assessment periods and market volatility (McDonald-Madden et al. 2008b). Studies have also 
looked at the strategic purchasing and long-term management costs for private land conservation (Pasquini 
et al. 2011), and the need to account for non-ecological factors, such as equity and public access (Fairfax et 
al. 2005). However, purchase and ongoing management costs can make acquisition an expensive approach, 
and typically covenants and easements cost significantly less for a conservation agency (e.g. Main et al. 
1999), partly through transferring management responsibilities onto landholders. In addition, multiple 
purchases in the same area can also inflate land prices making future acquisitions more expensive 
(Armsworth et al. 2006). 
An alternative approach is the use of ‘revolving funds’, sometimes operating as ‘revolving loan funds’ (Clark 
2007) (hereafter referred to as revolving funds). Organisations use these funds to pre-emptively intervene 
in the real estate market (Low 2003) and purchase land with conservation value, and then on-sell it to a 
willing third party (the conservation buyers) (Brewer 2003) in the process adding a conservation covenant 
to the property (Fitzsimons & Wescott 2001) (also referred to as an organisation ‘retaining an easement’). 
Any proceeds from the sale are returned to the fund to repeat the cycle (Figgis 2003), offering a potentially 
sustainable approach to the permanent protection of private land without relying on voluntary protection 
from landholders or locking up capital by purchasing to hold. As revolving funds often seek freehold land 
with residential potential, they could be considered part of the broader ‘conservation development’ 
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approach (Milder 2007), allowing for limited development in appropriate parts of the property whilst using 
the covenant or easement to ensure ecological assets are protected (Pejchar et al. 2007). With minor 
variations, revolving funds currently operate in at least four countries, including the USA, Canada, Chile and 
Australia (see Cowell & Williams 2006; Freedman 2013; The Nature Conservancy 2015; Patagonia Sur 
2016). 
Choosing land to protect through revolving funds is somewhat different for conservation organisations 
compared to regular covenanting or acquisition-to-hold as each purchase and subsequent resale directly 
impacts the potential for future purchases with the revolving fund. Purchases can pose a risk to the fund if 
the land cannot be on-sold within a reasonable timeframe and/or fails to recoup its costs. Ideally, land is 
turned over frequently, recouping costs or providing a profit, to ensure the fund remains self-sustaining 
(Brewer 2003) and in continuous use. Thus, the suitability of land likely depends upon a mix of 
conservation, economic and social/amenity factors, and managers will likely need to make trade-offs 
between these factors when selecting properties. 
Here, I explore the challenge of revolving fund property selection by exploring how fund managers are 
approaching this issue, using a case study of all major Australian programs. The aim of this research was to 
identify the mix of factors that influence managers’ perceptions of the suitability of properties for revolving 
funds and the trade-offs between them, through interviews with managers. Understanding how 
practitioners are dealing with these complex decisions can then allow us to better understand how future 
research may help improve the performance of this conservation tool. 
Methods 
Case study 
Australia currently has five major revolving fund programs in operation (Table 6). These programs 
predominantly focus on purchasing private freehold land from willing sellers (comprising a parcel or several 
parcels of land, hereafter referred to as a revolving fund ‘property’) in rural or semi-rural landscapes, with a 
mix of lifestyle amenity and ecological values (and occasionally agricultural values), and often with some 
residential development potential. After purchase, the properties are on-sold to new owners and in the 
process an in-perpetuity conservation covenant is placed on the property’s title(s), specifically designed to 
protect land with high conservation value (Cowell & Williams 2006) (or requiring the new owner to do so as 
a condition of sale). The new owners are then required to manage and use the property in accordance with 
the covenant obligations (Figgis 2004), with most receiving an annual phone call and site visit every 3-5 
years from covenanting organisations  as part of monitoring, compliance and stewardship support 
(Fitzsimons & Carr 2014). Adding the covenant controls the land use of revolving fund properties to 
activities compatible with conserving biodiversity, protected by an enduring conservation mechanism 
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(Hardy et al. 2017a). Up to 2016, Australian revolving funds have generated 155 covenants covering more 
than 145,000 hectares (Table 6). 
Trust for Nature (Victoria) was the first organisation to establish a revolving fund in Australia (Table 6), 
which led to similar programs in other States (Cowell & Williams 2006). All programs are run by non-profit 
organisations, were established with government start-up capital, and rely on property transactions and 
philanthropic donations to replenish funds. Each program operates only within its home state, although 
some focus on particular regions within that state. Revolving fund activities form the core work of 
Queensland Trust for Nature and the Nature Conservation Trust of NSW, whereas revolving funds are run 
within the other organisations alongside other conservation activities (such as conservation covenants or 
acquisition-to-hold). 
Table 6. Major revolving fund programs currently operating in Australia.* 
Organisation Australian State Year 
established 
Total fund size 
(AUD approx.) 
Properties 
“revolved” 
Area protected 
(hectares) 
Nature Conservation Trust of NSW New South Wales 2002 $10m 25 19,567 
Queensland Trust for Nature Queensland 2004 $7m 17 104,000 
Nature Foundation SA South Australia 2002 $1.4m 28 12,242 
Tasmanian Land Conservancy Tasmania 2004 $6.5m 28 2,928 
Trust for Nature (Victoria) Victoria 1989 $4m 57 6,834 
  Total $28.9m 155 145,571 
* As of June 2016 
 
Although run independently by separate organisations, these programs operate in similar ways, 
maintaining a pool of financial capital for the purpose of increasing the amount of private land protected 
for biodiversity. Potential purchases are first identified by staff, the community, partner organisations or 
offered by landholders, they are then assessed against the organisation’s internal acquisition criteria 
(typically conservation and resale criteria) via desktop and on-site assessments. Once deemed suitable and 
available for purchase, a price is negotiated with the vendor (based on formal valuation advice) and a 
recommendation then made to a board or committee who make the final decision. Purchasing decisions 
are often constrained by time (occasionally within weeks – particularly where vendors are motivated to 
sell), available capital, resources (e.g. number of staff for assessments), and information (e.g. the likely 
impact of the covenant on resale). Not all properties assessed are identified as suitable, and not all 
properties identified as suitable are purchased, particularly if the asking or sale price is above current 
market value. How the suitability assessment process relates to securing conservation covenants and the 
ongoing sustainability of these funds is the main focus of this paper. 
  40 
Interviews 
I held semi-structured interviews with a manager from each of the five major revolving fund programs 
operating in Australia (Table 6) (five interviews in total). These executive-level managers are both 
responsible for, and involved in, the entire revolving fund process within their organisations, and also have 
deep working knowledge of revolving fund purchases and sales. The organisations they work within are 
relatively small, and all managers interviewed would be highly cognisant of organisational decision-making 
related to revolving funds, as well as other conservation approaches such as covenanting and purchasing to 
hold (acquisition). All interviews were conducted between November 2014 and February 2015, either in 
person or via telephone, and each lasted approximately one hour. Interviews were conducted in 
accordance with RMIT University Human Research Ethics approval (Project No. CHEAN A 0000018556-
03/14). 
The first section of the interview asked participants to provide background information on their program, 
including its size, objectives and preferences. In the second section, participants were asked to nominate all 
of the factors they considered important when assessing the suitability of a property for their revolving 
fund, and what makes a successful or unsuccessful revolving fund property. In the third section, I asked 
about any other factors or challenges that influence their property selection decisions. The interviews were 
conducted through a series of open-ended questions (following Bryman 2016 pp 467-475; see also 
Appendix D), with participants given the freedom to discuss as many issues as they thought relevant. 
Data analysis 
All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed, and participants were invited to review their transcript 
for accuracy before analysis. Drawing from themes raised in the literature, I developed a coding manual 
(see Appendix D (Table A 6)) of factors likely to influence property suitability, and the main trade-offs in 
property selection decisions. I coded the relevant transcript phrases according to the manual, adding extra 
factors and trade-offs as they emerged (following Bryman 2016 pp 584-587). Once all relevant factors (as 
mentioned collectively by the participants) had been coded, I recorded the proportion of participants who 
mentioned each factor, and arranged the common factors into a generalised influence diagram 
representing a typical purchasing decision for revolving fund managers. Drawing from participant 
responses, I also identified the main risks present in property selection, their likely causes, and potential 
mitigation strategies. 
Results 
Influences on property suitability 
Ten factors influencing the selection of a property for purchase were identified from the interviews (Table 
7). These fell into three broad categories – ecological, financial and social.  
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Table 7. Factors influencing property selection for revolving funds. 
Factor Example quote Proportion of 
respondents 
Amenity “Whilst it might be the best … property to be conserving a particular ecosystem, if it doesn’t 
have legal and physical access, and it doesn’t have development, an area for domestic 
ability, then it’s just not suitable” (Participant 5) 
5/5 
Landscape 
attributes 
“We look to add to connectivity in the existing reserves wherever possible” (Participant 4) 5/5 
Purchase costs “As soon as you pay too much, you’re chasing your tail. So you’ve got to be able to negotiate 
the right acquisition price.” (Participant 2) 
5/5 
Resale price “A ‘revolve’ costs money, and it doesn’t just cost money in terms of making sure that you 
return your price that you’ve purchased it for, it costs money in terms of all of your 
transactions and holding costs.” (Participant 5) 
5/5 
Resale time “You want to turn things over regularly, so that you can purchase and protect as much as 
you can in a given time period” (Participant 3) 
5/5 
Threatened 
species and/or 
communities 
“Protect assemblages of biodiversity, plants and animals that are under threat” (Participant 
4) 
5/5 
Aesthetics “It’s the aesthetic, the intrinsic and external characteristics of a property, that make it 
appealing to the particular target real estate market we’re looking for” (Participant 5) 
4/5 
Complements 
reserve system 
“We’re looking for [ecological] communities and ecosystems that are poorly reserved” 
(Participant 5) 
4/5 
Conservation 
story 
“There is another amazing fact about a property that can make it massively easy to 
purchase and on-sell. And that’s something with a compelling conservation story.” 
(Participant 1) 
2/5 
Social/community 
context 
“You have to do research into the area and size and what other people have bought and 
whether there’s a conservation ethos in the local community” (Participant 1) 
2/5 
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All participants identified the presence of threatened species and ecological communities as important, as 
well as landscape conservation attributes, such as connectivity between existing conservation reserves. 
Most (4 out of 5) also identified the property’s contribution to the reserve system as influential, targeting 
ecosystems that are under-represented in the public conservation estate. Purchase costs (e.g. acquisition, 
holding and administrative costs), likely resale price (how much the program expected to receive from on-
selling the property) and resale time (expected time before the property would be on-sold) were also 
identified as important influences by all participants. 
Focusing on the social values of a property that they thought important to prospective buyers, revolving 
fund managers identified amenity values (particularly the ability to live on the property), and aesthetic 
value (such as attractive views or vegetation types). Two participants identified the community context 
within which the prospective buyer would be living (e.g. within a local community that supports 
conservation), and the property’s ‘conservation story’, which they described as something that gives 
potential buyers a context and understanding about the conservation benefits they are contributing to by 
purchasing the property (e.g. providing a crucial connectivity link), as influential and beneficial attributes 
for property on-sale. 
Trade-offs affecting property selection 
There were five common trade-offs identified in the transcripts as affecting property selection, and these 
are illustrated with a selection of quotes from the interviews regarding specific properties (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. The trade-offs between factors for selecting properties for revolving funds. 
Trade-off 
category  
Property examples 
Conservation 
and property 
turnover 
“It’s the aesthetic, the intrinsic and external characteristics of a property, that make it appealing to the 
particular target real estate market… and that is within a price point, where it’s also able to be revolved …, 
bearing in mind that we need to make sure that we revolve these properties quickly so that the capital is back 
in the revolving fund in order for us to reinvest.” (Participant 5) 
 “We do have a couple of problem properties, in terms of resale… and [for] one of them it was recognised at the 
time of purchase as a significant challenge for resale. But with [a] very short timeframe [to purchase], and the 
availability of a very large, significant property in the highest priority bioregion in the state, in a place where 
purchase opportunities come up very rarely, the decision was taken to purchase despite the risk. We do get 
regular, if infrequent enquiries about that property, … it’s been sitting there for 6 years now. Certainly in the 
current market if we sell it we’re going to lose a significant amount on it, but it is a very significant conservation 
outcome, and we will eventually find a buyer.” (Participant 3) 
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Trade-off 
category  
Property examples 
Conservation 
and financial 
viability 
“We got a 30% discount [off the purchase price of this] property, [in] a rural area, 360 ha, four lots, cleared land 
…full of koalas… Graziers would love to be able to clear it and have another go at grazing, whereas we’ve 
removed those [rights] … [and] value it as a rural lifestyle concern”. (Participant 2) 
 “An example is a property we [were considering for purchase] that was ... habitat [for a threatened bird], 
adjacent to a state park, and [the threatened bird] had been seen there on the property. It was partially bush, 
partially cleared. It was really on the [city] fringe there it could have gone either way in terms of conservation. 
We did all the right things in terms of valuation, and set … our [purchase] target [at] 80% of value and then it 
went for 110% of valuation, so it went over our budget. But later on, people were saying, even board members, 
we should have just gone for it.” (Participant 1) 
 “There was another one…a bat cave, and it was a paddock, it was right on the cliff past [this location], and it 
had this cave for a rare bat, and that was another thing where the CEO at the time just said we should have just 
gone for it, and bought it, because it was just such a compelling conservation story, you could justify holding it 
in your revolving fund [for an extended period] or even selling it for less. So… [we] can justify losses with the 
revolving fund, for conservation benefit.” (Participant 1) 
 “Once you get past that first bit, and you say well this has got appeal, it’s attractive, ultimately it’s securing the 
property for a price that will allow you to do what is required to prepare it for sale again, and still maintain 
some margin, or profitability, or at the very least break even. And a lot of the times, you know properties with 
good conservation values don’t proceed because you can’t get to that point with the vendor.” (Participant 4) 
 “We bought one at [this location] that was right at top value, probably timed badly too, when the market was 
doing quite well, not when the market was going down, so we had to wait for the market to come back up 
before we could sell it, and we sold it at a discount.” (Participant 1) 
 “[We] had very good solid evidence to suggest that the property … was worth [this amount], and he had very 
good solid evidence to suggest that the property at [this location] was worth [this amount], and straight after 
we purchased them, the market took a nose dive and didn’t recover for 5 years. And so in retrospect … we paid 
way too much for those properties and it’s been a real struggle to sell them and recover our money.” 
(Participant 3) 
Conservation 
and amenity 
value 
“[Sometimes] you get to places and you find a lovely little high point with a view out to the coast with only a 
short distance to travel from the road frontage, that you can immediately see how you’re going to market it. 
And you can immediately see the appeal... [There are] practical considerations like we don’t buy too many 
properties on… steep, south facing slopes because you know they might have nice views to the south but they’d 
be so cold and dark that you know you’ve got a real risk in resale because you can’t offer people a sunny house 
site.” (Participant 3) 
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Trade-off 
category  
Property examples 
 “We bought a property with high tensile power lines cutting through the entrance so at an angle right through 
the property, and so people would look at it and … see the power lines and [say], ‘I don’t want to buy that’. That 
took forever to sell, which is a shame, it was a good, cheap property that achieved a fair bit of conservation but 
it just took years to sell. And really it was sold at a discount even then so it was sold very, very cheap.” 
(Participant 1) 
 “We had one at [a location], nice property, 200 ha, but it was all on the side of a mountain... [with] a steep, 
winding driveway that gets washed away after big rains, and … peri-urban... but if you can’t drive up there at 
night in the rain, what’s the point? Access [to the property] is key. It was never going to be cleared, wasn’t 
under threat. At risk? No. So should it have been a revolving fund property? No. “ (Participant 2) 
Conservation 
and 
development 
“It might have enough space for a little hobby farm, or it might just be … a domestic zone, and then the majority 
of the property has really quite good quality vegetation and it’s got those lifestyle components, or that sort of 
private national park kind of feel about it.” (Participant 5) 
 “So the covenant design is also everything, and needs to be well thought about so that when a property’s 
returned to market it’s a design that’s practical for the incoming buyer and that it’s practical for maintaining 
the property value where we’re able to, so that we’re going back into the market and able to revolve it.” 
(Participant 5) 
 “We had one property recently, it was beautiful, perfect for this kind of thing, and it was coastal. All the dunes 
were intact and then over the back of the dunes it went out to some flat country that was sort of agricultural, 
had been grazed, perfect to set up a little house or something. Near, really close to a town, desirable, so you’ve 
got your own dune system and you’ve got access to this pristine beach. But it was zoned coastal, coastal 
conservation, which meant that any [development] application was likely going to get knocked back [by the 
municipal council], even though in some cases with council you can argue that you know you’re going to protect 
the land, … but in this case they were pretty adamant … So you have to walk away.” (Participant 4) 
Conservation 
and 
landholder 
management 
“[During the resale process we] go through the whole covenant, the agreement, to explain what it is, explain 
the underlying principle of it, and the ongoing management requirements for the people. [We are] upfront and 
open with them because the more you tell [the potential buyers], the more they understand and the more 
comfortable they’ll get with it at the end of the day.”  (Participant 2) 
 “[We avoid] a particularly troublesome stewardship block, or something like that, that you know is going to 
present ongoing management problems for the [future] owner” (Participant 2) 
 “[During the acquisition process we] would sort of ask … ‘is this manageable for a future owner?’. [We] don’t 
want to have someone buying this property and then having all these difficulties in doing the conservation.” 
(Participant 1) 
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The trade-offs identified were: 1) conservation and property turnover (the need for revolving funds to 
continuously acquire and sell property to achieve conservation gains); 2) conservation and financial viability 
(where properties are on-sold at an acceptable financial return to the fund (preferably cost recovery or at 
profit, although properties that could lead to a financial loss or long resale time are still considered if they 
have exceptional conservation value)); 3) conservation and amenity value (finding properties with 
conservation values but also amenity or aesthetic values); 4) conservation and development (finding 
properties with conservation values that are suitable for residential development); and 5) conservation and 
landholder management (finding properties with a suitable level of management effort). 
The property selection problem 
Information from the interviews was synthesised into an influence diagram depicting the factors affecting 
property selection (Figure 6). There are two main components to the diagram, with the first focusing on 
participants’ responses to property suitability, which fell into three clear categories: 1) conservation value 
(the property’s contribution to the reserve system, landscape scale attributes, and threats), 2) financial 
value (the costs of acquisition and ongoing support, resale time and resale price), and 3) social value 
(amenity values and community context). The second component focuses on factors I propose are relevant 
when determining how much to pay, drawing from the interviews and the literature: the property’s 
suitability, the funds available for purchasing, internal guidelines on following independent valuations of 
the property’s market value, and exogenous factors such as the desire to avoid inflating land prices in the 
region (which may make future purchases more difficult). 
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Figure 6. Influence diagram of the revolving fund purchasing decision. Solid boxes represent factors influencing the suitability of 
the property, dashed boxes represent factors influencing the decision of how much fund managers are willing to pay for the 
property. Exogenous factors in the decision of how much to pay may include, for example, the current trend in the property market 
or the manager’s desire to avoid inflating land prices in the region (which may make future purchases more difficult). 
 
I identified three main risks in revolving fund property selection, derived from participant responses: 1) the 
inability to recover the costs of acquisition and protection, and resale; 2) the inability to on-sell the 
property, or within a reasonable timeframe, and; 3) the inability to meet conservation goals (Table 9). Each 
of those risks had a number of potential causes, and managers mentioned a number of ways to mitigate 
these risks. For example, the inability to recover costs upon property resale could arise from the covenant 
having a larger than anticipated impact on property value. In response, managers mentioned adapting the 
covenant design (e.g. providing adequate space for recreational activities, a house and/or hobby farming, 
provided ecological assets remained adequately protected).  
  47 
Table 9. The risks affecting revolving fund property selection, their causes and potential mitigation strategies. 
Risk to revolving fund 
sustainability and/or 
effectiveness 
Potential causes Potential mitigation strategies 
Unable to recover 
costs (low resale 
prices) 
Purchasing above market value Independent assessments of property value with covenant / 
easement, and setting this as upper limit on acquisition price 
 Larger than anticipated impact on 
resale proceeds from the covenant or 
easement 
Ensure appropriate covenant / easement design for each 
property, including a balance between conservation, amenity 
and recreational values (e.g. residential and/or hobby 
farming areas) 
Monitoring and recording impact of covenant / easement on 
market value of conservation properties for further 
evaluation 
 Weak demand in property market Regular assessment of the extent of demand for conservation 
properties 
Unable to on-sell 
property, or 
unreasonable resale 
times 
Purchasing properties that are 
unattractive to conservation buyers 
(e.g. too expensive, too far from 
population centres, wrong size, unable 
to build, difficult or expensive 
management, poor aesthetics, poor 
amenity values, unfavourable social 
context) 
Regular assessment of the extent and type of demand for 
conservation properties* 
Ensuring properties have an appropriate balance between 
conservation and amenity values (e.g. access, the ability to 
build a house, community context), including 
covenant/easement design 
Assessing management effort and alignment with buyers’ 
capacity (e.g. size, weed control) 
 Negative perceptions of voluntary 
protection agreements (e.g. the 
obligations contained within covenants 
or easements) 
Communication and public engagement over voluntary 
protection agreements 
 Small market for conservation 
properties (extended resale times, 
market fluctuations) 
Active searches for and marketing to conservation buyers 
Unable to meet 
conservation goals 
Low purchase frequency due to over-
emphasis on financial returns or fund 
sustainability 
Mapping of areas where conservation and fund sustainability 
objectives coincide 
Consideration of accepting financial loss for some properties 
(establishing clear criteria for which this is acceptable) 
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Risk to revolving fund 
sustainability and/or 
effectiveness 
Potential causes Potential mitigation strategies 
 Low purchase frequency due to limited 
supply of suitable conservation 
properties 
Active searches for conservation properties 
 Emphasis on resale potential means 
some ecosystem types or properties 
with high conservation values would 
not be suitable 
Consider other conservation tools (e.g. acquire or voluntary 
covenant / easement) for high conservation value land not 
suitable for revolving fund (e.g. ecologically sensitive 
properties, those with high management requirements) 
 Ecological impact from residential 
development 
Designing the covenant / easement agreement in a way that 
limits the impact on important conservation areas 
* this could take the form of identifying social landscapes conducive to the revolving fund approach, for example rural areas 
transitioning from traditional agriculture to amenity landscapes (e.g. Barr 2008) 
Discussion 
Finding sustainable ways to increase the amount of private land protected for biodiversity is a challenge for 
many conservation organisations. Revolving funds offer potential as a sustainable conservation tool, but 
choosing properties appropriate for this approach is central to their success. Drawing directly from the 
experience of managers from each of the major revolving funds operating in Australia, I identified the 
factors and trade-offs that influence their property selection decision-making. Here I discuss these further 
with a view to improving the application of revolving funds. 
Conservation and property turnover 
This study shows a variety of factors that managers consider when choosing revolving fund properties. In 
terms of conservation objectives, revolving fund managers are seeking properties with significant 
conservation value (i.e. threatened species, under-represented ecosystems, or landscape conservation 
attributes), with the intention of contributing to broader conservation efforts. However, beyond 
conservation values the purchasing decision requires complex trade-offs between multiple interacting 
objectives, many of which centre on property turnover. This is evident through the managers’ focus on 
resale time, and also through social factors that they believe are important to prospective buyers 
(especially amenity and aesthetic values of a property). 
This attention to resale is not surprising, considering that a key driver of conservation gains from revolving 
funds is frequent turnover (continuous acquisition and resale) (e.g. Binney and Whiteoak, 2010). However, 
in response, managers are searching for properties that match their conservation priorities but provide 
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assurance that they can be on-sold, which likely limits the types of properties that are purchased. 
Potentially, properties with a low likelihood of being resold within a reasonable timeframe may receive a 
lower priority than those that can. Depending on the conservation objectives of the program this may not 
be a problem, but it is likely that some properties with high conservation value will occur outside of areas 
with buyer demand. Regularly assessing where demand exists for conservation properties, and ensuring 
this aligns with the organisation’s conservation objectives, could be beneficial, and some managers 
mentioned regular contact with real estate agents to evaluate market demand, and in some instances 
engaging them to help sell properties. Where opportunities to acquire properties with exceptional 
conservation value appear outside of these areas, managers may need to consider accepting extended 
resale times (or consider other conservation mechanisms). 
Conservation and financial viability 
Generally, managers appear to be selecting properties likely to deliver a profit or cover the costs to the 
fund, with a view to maintain fund sustainability. However, for a conservation tool, buying properties that 
are expected to recover costs is likely to preclude the acquisition of properties with higher conservation 
values that are unlikely to recover costs. Managers did state their willingness to accept a financial loss for 
properties with high conservation value, but it is not clear how often or how much loss is acceptable, or for 
which types of conservation values. In this research, managers highlighted instances where cost precluded 
the acquisition of properties with exceptional conservation values, where in hindsight, managers felt a 
financial loss may have been acceptable (Table 8). Whilst using revolving funds for protection may not be 
appropriate for all properties, it would be beneficial for managers to ensure they have criteria to identify 
when it is acceptable for the fund to make a loss (thresholds of conservation values for example). 
Relating to fund viability, the responses from managers show they are making acquisition decisions as 
opportunities arise in a dynamic, fluctuating property market. There appears to be uncertainty about resale 
prices and/or times, and the current demand and the future supply of suitable properties – the latter a 
common issue in conservation property acquisition (McDonald-Madden et al. 2008b). Moreover, placing a 
protective covenant on title potentially reduces it financial value due to reduced development rights, which 
is particularly problematic for fund sustainability as high conservation value land can be expensive 
(Newburn et al. 2005). In response, managers mentioned that they are engaging property valuers to 
estimate a property’s ‘covenanted value’ and often using that as the upper limit on acquisition prices, a 
risk-averse strategy that likely limits the financial impact on the fund. However, there may be other 
mechanisms contributing to fund sustainability, such as the covenant having a limited impact on the market 
value of a conservation property, or the organisation’s effectiveness in marketing these properties to 
conservation-minded buyers, or that these types of properties attract those willing to pay a premium for 
this type of property. In some cases covenants may have a low impact on financial value, although the 
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effect is uncertain (Winfree et al. 2006). Aside from risk averse purchasing, the mechanisms behind fund 
sustainability are currently unclear and would be worthy of future research. 
Conservation and amenity values 
Managers raised amenity values and aesthetics from the buyer’s perspective as important decision factors 
(amenity value was also the most frequently mentioned factor throughout the interviews; see Appendix D; 
Table A 7). Some programs also appear to consider amenity more broadly, including the social/community 
context that prospective buyers will be situated within, and a property’s conservation story (Table 7), 
although it was not clear from the results what an appropriate mix of amenity and conservation values 
might be for revolving funds. Revolving fund managers identified aesthetic reasons (e.g. a cold and dark 
house site, the presence of power lines), or problems accessing the property (e.g. a steep, winding, 
unstable driveway; Table 8) as reasons why some properties have been difficult to on-sell. This highlights a 
potential misalignment between conservation and resale considerations. Further research exploring the 
types of amenity values important to the buyers of revolving fund properties, and their relationship to 
conservation values, would be valuable. This information could also be used to align program 
communications with the value orientations of prospective buyers (Kusmanoff et al. 2016). 
Conservation and development 
Evident in the managers’ reference to amenity value (Table 7) and the property examples (Table 8), is the 
influence of residential potential in property selection. Seen by managers as a way to increase the 
likelihood of resale, it appears that properties without the potential for a dwelling would only be selected in 
rare cases. The trade-off here is that development potentially affects the conservation gains of revolving 
funds, as establishing a dwelling likely has some localised ecological impacts. Presumably there are 
properties where the establishment of a dwelling is not suitable (e.g. highly sensitive ecological 
communities). Managers’ responses suggest they minimise these development impacts by using the 
covenant to restrict damaging activities to appropriate areas of the property and permanently protecting 
the ecologically important areas. 
Another important consideration for managers is how the covenant will affect resale, including how 
potential buyers perceive the nature, extent, cost, and location of the land use restrictions and any 
associated management obligations (Comerford 2013). The effect of the covenant on resale is uncertain 
and not well understood. Some participants mentioned they manage this through covenant design that 
aligns conservation and development concerns (e.g. an attractive house site in an existing cleared area), 
and to some extent by explaining the covenant conditions to prospective buyers. Whilst revolving funds 
allow for establishment of a dwelling, the approach appears to provide conservation organisations with a 
way to limit development to appropriate areas of the property. Moreover, this is happening on properties 
that by the managers’ own assessment have development potential (predominantly residential, but also 
sometimes agricultural), and are thus at risk of losing ecological values. Understanding development 
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impacts and what would have happened on past revolving fund properties without such an intervention 
would be a useful part of evaluating the effectiveness of this tool. 
Conservation and landholder management 
Managers are also considering the management effort that future owners would need to undertake, and 
how that would be perceived by prospective buyers. Both of these relate to resale, where properties with 
high management requirements (e.g. fencing, intensive weed control, large property sizes) could be harder 
to on-sell. As well as affecting resale, management requirements are also important considerations for the 
ongoing conservation value of the property, and potentially the compliance and enforcement effort needed 
from the conservation organisation to ensure management obligations are met (Rissman & Butsic 2011; 
Lindsay 2016). Whilst adding a protective agreement means that the property will likely receive beneficial 
conservation management by landholders that it otherwise may not receive, in some cases it may be 
unsuitable for private owners even if the property satisfies other revolving fund criteria (e.g. where 
experienced management is required; see Parker 2004). These types of properties may be better protected 
through approaches such as acquisition-to-hold (Pasquini et al. 2011) or incorporation into the public 
conservation estate (Fitzsimons et al. 2008). 
A shared learning approach 
Revolving funds are a relatively novel form of private conservation, where the influence of resale sets it 
apart from other approaches to covenants or easements. Given the desired attributes sought by managers 
(Figure 6), it is likely that only a small proportion of available properties are immediately suitable for 
revolving funds, and in most cases managers will need to trade-off between conservation and other factors 
to keep the fund operating. The multiple factors and trade-offs involved, uncertainty over resale outcomes, 
and limited literature on revolving funds suggest it is challenging for managers to evaluate the implications 
of individual purchases, particularly given time and resource constraints. This likely limits the effectiveness 
of revolving funds. 
The small number of revolving fund programs, and similarities in the process and objectives between 
programs, suggest a shared learning approach could be a useful way to refine decision-making. There are 
already occasional, ad-hoc conversations between managers of Australian revolving funds, and extending 
this into a more formalised approach could be beneficial. Programs could share their property selection 
experience to improve responses to the common trade-offs and refine the decision tools (often 
implemented via spreadsheets) that some programs have developed. This could include, for example, 
strategies on how to move properties that are proving difficult to on-sell (Table 9). In addition, the 
sequential nature of revolving fund decisions makes them ideal candidates to implement approaches 
developed for adaptive management (Grantham et al. 2010). During the interviews, managers mentioned 
that within their organisations they are already using previous experience to inform future decisions (albeit 
in varying capacity). Using the knowledge shared amongst programs, managers could refine their 
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purchasing decisions, monitor and share the outcomes from individual transactions, and use an adaptive 
process to continuously improve property selection. The information gained from this shared, adaptive 
process could also provide broader insight into the successes and challenges of revolving funds as a 
conservation tool to guide future implementation. 
Key questions for further research 
Combining the experience and knowledge of revolving fund managers in Australia has provided an insight 
into the mix of conservation, financial and social factors that influence the way they select properties. 
Whilst some trade-offs between these factors have been identified, the extent to which they interact, or 
which mix determines the most suitable properties, is not yet clear. In many cases, amenity values may be 
more important for successful resale than conservation values, or contribute greater certainty over 
financial returns. Developing structured approaches to help managers and programs with these trade-offs 
could be beneficial. Further, systematic analysis of past transactions across multiple funds could help 
answer questions, such as: (i) Do the characteristics of ‘suitable’ properties identified in this study align 
with the outcomes of historical purchases, and does this differ between jurisdictions? (ii) Which types of 
properties sell more quickly, or are more likely to recover costs and how does this interact with property 
market conditions? (iii) What is the impact of a covenant or easement on resale potential (either positive or 
negative)? 
The study did not attempt to evaluate the conservation gains provided by revolving funds but this is also an 
important area of future research. What are the ecological characteristics of past revolving fund properties 
(e.g. Pejchar et al. 2007) and how does that correlate with different measures of revolving fund 
effectiveness? What are the ecological gains compared to the counterfactual where no protection is 
applied? What are revolving funds contributing to broader conservation efforts, and is this different to 
regular covenants or easements? 
Conclusions 
Combining the experience of managers from all five major revolving fund programs in Australia, this study 
has identified a wide variety of influences affecting property selection. Whilst some of these influences may 
vary in different contexts, the trade-offs required to keep the funds operational are likely to be similar. 
Managers have developed constructive responses to these trade-offs and I have shown how sharing this 
experience could assist in future implementation. Although a relatively novel conservation tool, revolving 
funds show potential as a sustainable and effective approach when properties have both conservation and 
resale value, and may provide opportunity for conservation where land prices make outright purchase 
without resale infeasible. However, as a market-based approach, the central influence of property resale on 
the conservation gains made by revolving funds likely constrains the applicability of this tool to certain 
types of properties, meaning its role needs to be considered as part of a broader conservation policy mix.  
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Revolving funds appear worthy of further consideration amongst the existing public and private approaches 
to conservation. 
  
Chapter 5
Protecting nature on private land using revolving funds: Which properties are suitable?
Nature Conservation Trust of NSW revolving fund property at Mount Wareng, NSW, Australia 
(Photo credit: NCT NSW)
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Chapter 5 
5 Protecting nature on private land using revolving funds: Which properties are 
suitable? 
Abstract 
The protection of biodiversity on private land is an important and growing part of global conservation 
efforts. Revolving funds are used by conservation organisations to buy, on-sell and permanently protect 
private land with important ecological values. By reinvesting any proceeds from sales in additional 
properties, revolving funds offer a potentially cost-effective way to protect biodiversity. Their success 
requires managers to choose properties that can be readily on-sold and recover costs, with the resale 
outcome of each acquisition having consequences for subsequent acquisitions. However, revolving fund 
property selection is a multi-dimensional decision, influenced by a range of ecological, social and financial 
considerations, and complex trade-offs. I developed a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model to identify: i) 
which factors are most influential on a property’s suitability for acquisition; and ii) how much to pay for a 
given property. Sensitivity analysis revealed that suitability is most heavily influenced by the threat to the 
property’s ecological values, the acquisition and on-going management costs, and the likelihood of finding 
alternative options for protection. Resale was heavily influenced by amenity values. Threat and alternative 
options were also influential on how much to pay, but most influential was account balance. My results 
suggest revolving funds may be particularly useful for protecting high conservation value land under high 
threat, though at times this may require managers to consider impacts on fund capital due to lower resale 
prices. Orientating revolving funds towards properties with these attributes could increase the contribution 
of this tool to conserving biodiversity on private land. 
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Introduction 
The protection of biodiversity on private land is an important and growing part of global conservation 
efforts. A number of policy approaches exist to permanently protect private land, some of which could be 
classified as Privately Protected Areas (PPAs) (Stolton et al. 2014). The dominant permanent protection 
approaches currently used for private land include acquisition (whereby the land is acquired from a 
landholder and remains owned and managed for biodiversity by a conservation organisation or 
government), and voluntary protection through establishing conservation covenants or easements 
(whereby the landholder voluntarily adds a permanent protection agreement to their land).  
In some countries conservation organisations use revolving funds to acquire private land with high 
conservation value and then on-sell it to new owners, in the process adding a permanent agreement such 
as a conservation covenant or easement (Brewer 2003; Fitzsimons 2015). The covenant or easement 
permanently restricts activities harmful to biodiversity, while any proceeds of the sale are re-invested to 
acquire and protect additional properties, continuing the cycle of protection (Cowell & Williams 2006). The 
revolving fund approach is similar to acquiring land with conservation value and transferring it to 
government ownership (‘pre-acquisition’), except the new landowner is typically a private party (Brewer 
2003). Revolving funds provide conservation organisations a potentially cost-effective way to actively 
intervene in the market to protect ecological values at a time when properties are under threat of 
development (Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008), by reinvesting the funds recouped in the sale of a property to 
buy another and so on. A conceptually simple model for conservation, revolving funds are presumably at 
their most effective when turning over properties with conservation value quickly and minimising costs to 
the fund. Hence the success of this tool is highly dependent on the selection of suitable properties, 
particularly those that can be on-sold. Revolving funds currently operate in the USA, Canada, Australia and 
Chile, with a combined capital pool of at least US$384m, which to date has protected over 684,000 
hectares (Chapter 2). 
A mix of approaches is thought to be an effective way to implement private land conservation (Doremus 
2003). Part of ensuring the efficient implementation of this mix involves identifying the situations and 
properties to which these approaches are best suited. Because of their ability for opportunistic purchasing 
and continuing reinvestment of funds, revolving funds have a unique and potentially important role in 
private land conservation, including the protection of land that may not be available via other approaches. 
Clarifying which properties are most suitable for revolving funds could help managers strategically select 
revolving fund properties, and through that, increase their contribution to private land conservation. 
Revolving fund property selection 
A series of interviews with revolving fund practitioners in Australia revealed a range of influences on 
property selection, foremost amongst these being the ability to re-sell acquired properties to new owners 
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(Chapter 4). Each potential property has multiple attributes that could affect its suitability for acquisition, 
with decision variables including: conservation values (e.g. threatened species or ecological communities, 
landscape connectivity values); financial values (e.g. purchase price, sale price, likely time to re-sell); and 
social values (e.g. amenity values such as distance from urban areas, visual attractiveness). However, the 
process of identifying and evaluating these attributes can be challenging and resource intensive for 
conservation organisations, and in general, the relative importance of these attributes, and how they 
interact to impact on suitability for revolving funds is not well understood. 
Beyond suitability, revolving fund managers face a second multi-dimensional and complex decision over 
how much to pay for any particular property. Purchasing costs for conservation properties can require large 
capital investments, leading to difficult acquisition decisions amidst fluctuations in the property market 
(McDonald-Madden et al. 2008b). Revolving fund programs would benefit considerably from purchasing 
properties at or below market value, but the willingness of landholders to sell can vary (Winter et al. 2005). 
Beyond purchase, revolving fund managers need to consider the money likely to be returned to the fund 
upon on-sale (“resale price”), accounting for any change in land value that might result from adding a 
permanent conservation easement or covenant, which can vary considerably between different properties 
(Anderson & Weinhold 2008). This highlights the importance of designing the covenant or easement in a 
way that maintains property value, where practicable. Alongside cost recuperation, there is uncertainty 
over the time it will take to on-sell the property (“resale time”) (Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008). Long resale 
times ties up capital, and for revolving funds impacts future purchases and thus future conservation gains 
made from this approach. Also relevant are the management and holding costs whilst the property is in the 
organisation’s possession (Hunter & Kohring 2009), as are the costs of providing on-going stewardship 
support for landholders after resale (Adams et al. 2012). Finally, the considerations and decisions often 
have to be made rapidly when properties appear on the open market (McDonald-Madden et al. 2008b; 
Fitzsimons & Looker 2012). A graphical representation of the decision problem is provided in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Illustrative decision tree outlining the revolving fund purchasing decision. Based on interviews with practitioners from 
five revolving fund programs in Australia (Chapter 4). 
 
Probabilistic reasoning approaches to decision-making, such as Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), can be 
useful for these complex, uncertain problems. BBNs provide a structured way to integrate limited and 
disparate information sources, including both quantitative and qualitative information, and are useful for 
modelling systems characterised by inherent uncertainty (Aalders 2008; Voinov & Bousquet 2010). They 
have been used to understand a range of conservation issues (see Aguilera et al. 2011 for a recent review), 
including the identification of suitable areas for conservation and development to avoid conflict (McCloskey 
et al. 2011), conservation management interventions (Newton et al. 2007), landholder adoption of 
conservation management (Ticehurst et al. 2011; Torabi et al. 2016) and guiding reserve system 
acquisitions (Schapaugh & Tyre 2012). 
Revolving fund property selection in Australia 
In Australia there are five major revolving fund programs of various sizes operated by land trusts (one each 
in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria – Chapter 4), with the broadly 
similar purpose of increasing the amount of private land protected by conservation covenants. They 
operate in similar ways: identifying, assessing and purchasing private freehold land in rural and regional 
landscapes with conservation value, before then on-selling it with a condition that the new owners enter 
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into an in-perpetuity conservation covenant. The programs typically focus on properties in the lifestyle 
property markets and in some programs, agricultural properties with conservation values. Before purchase, 
revolving fund staff assess a property’s suitability, negotiate a purchase price with the vendor, and then 
make a recommendation to a board or governing committee who make the final purchasing decision. The 
majority of properties initially identified are not purchased, either because they are found to be unsuitable 
(ecologically or financially), or because they are sold before negotiations are finalised. Collectively, these 
programs have protected more than 150 properties covering 145,000 hectares across Australia. The 
similarity in operations between these programs, the number of properties revolved and area protected, as 
well as the breadth of operations, provides an opportunity to draw on the collective expertise of revolving 
fund managers and gain insights into what makes a property suitable for this approach. 
Using the experience of revolving fund programs in Australia, I built a probabilistic reasoning model (a 
Bayesian Belief Network) to integrate and systematically explore all the factors relevant to revolving fund 
property selection. From this model of managers’ reasoning I sought to answer the following questions: i) 
how do these factors interact to affect the suitability of a property for revolving fund purchase?; ii) which 
factors are most influential on property suitability?; and iii) which factors are most influential on how much 
managers are willing to pay for a given property? A key driver of this study was to provide guidance on 
property selection for new programs or those without systematic decision making processes, and provide 
programs with systematic processes the opportunity to review their operations based on the findings. I use 
the findings to explore the types of properties that may be best for managers to target and the factors to 
focus on in property assessments, with the objective of increasing the efficacy of these programs. 
Material and methods 
Bayesian Belief Networks 
A BBN is a directed acyclic graphical representation of a system that can be used to examine a network of 
interactions between different variables (Voinov & Bousquet 2010; Chen & Pollino 2012). BBNs consist of 
parent (input) and child (output) nodes that represent important variables in a system, with related nodes 
connected by links (Aalders 2008; Korb & Nicholson 2011). Each node has a set of ‘states’, representing 
categories of values within the variable. The interaction between nodes is defined using Conditional 
Probability Tables (CPTs), which are set for each child node and define how the child node responds to 
changes in probabilities of the parent node/s states. Once the BBN has been defined, users can enter 
quantitative or qualitative information (‘evidence’) into the parent nodes as it becomes available, and then 
assess how that evidence changes the probability distribution of the child node/s of interest. One particular 
advantage to BBNs is they provide the user with a probability distribution rather than a single number, 
providing a greater understanding of how the system is likely responding to evidence. 
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Conceptual model 
I built an initial BBN conceptual model (Chen & Pollino 2012) of the revolving fund property selection 
decision problem in Netica (Norsys 1992-2014) based on an influence diagram developed from interviews 
with revolving fund managers. This conceptual BBN model contained the main factors that managers had 
identified as influential in property suitability and when deciding how much to pay (see Appendix E). 
Revising, parameterising and assessing the model 
I held a one-day workshop in July 2015 that included three practitioners from three out of the five major 
revolving fund programs currently operating in Australia. The invited practitioners were selected due to 
their experience and knowledge of revolving fund operations, and had previously participated in semi-
structured interviews about revolving fund property selection (Chapter 4). 
The context for the workshop was a common revolving fund property assessment problem. Practitioners 
were asked to assume they had a list of potential properties that had already been through initial checks 
(e.g. size, price, location), and were needing to combine all relevant information and make two primary 
decisions: 1) whether or not to recommend the property for purchase, and 2) how much to pay for it. 
Participants were shown the conceptual BBN and invited to discuss the model components and structure as 
a group. Participants were then asked to draw on their collective experience to refine the nodes, links and 
general structure of the network to make a generalised model of revolving fund property selection, 
including the addition of any missing factors. Some intermediate nodes were added during the process to 
assist with the conceptualisation of the decision and the elicitation of the CPTs. Following the guidance of 
Marcot (2006), I kept the number of parent nodes for any single child node to three or less, and the 
number of node states and model layers to five or less. Once the structure of the model was finalised, 
participants identified the categories (e.g. low, medium and high) and relevant values (e.g. presence of 
nationally listed threatened species or ecological communities) for each node. 
I then elicited from participants the values of the CPTs. For each child node, each participant was handed a 
worksheet containing an empty CPT to fill in individually, resulting in three independently parameterised 
BBNs. I conducted a live preliminary interrogation of the BBN to explore how the ‘Property suitability’ and 
‘How much to pay’ nodes were affected by selecting different types of property attributes, and to check 
that the model produced results representing the practitioners’ beliefs. 
Following the workshop, I migrated the BBN into the R statistical environment v3.0.2 (R Core Team 2016), 
using the gRain (Højsgaard 2012) and gRbase (Dethlefsen & Højsgaard 2005) packages. I created a 
consensus BBN model using the structure from the final workshop BBN, and the mean CPT values from the 
three different networks elicited during the workshop. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
I then undertook a global sensitivity analysis of the consensus BBN, to assess the relative influence of each 
of the model factors on the ‘Property suitability’ and ‘How much to pay’ nodes. For this analysis, I randomly 
allocated probability values to each parent node in the BBN and recorded the resulting probability values in 
each of the child nodes. I then compared the randomised network results to that of the neutral network 
(i.e. that with equal probability values for parent node states), using the distances between the high and 
low values for each node, where: 
          √                      
and H is the value of the high state in the node, L is the value of the low state in the node, b is the node in 
the neutral network, and g is the node in the global sensitivity analysis network. 
I ran the model 10,000 times and recorded the distance values, afterwards standardising the distance 
values for each node across all model runs. Setting child node distances as the dependent variable, and all 
parent node distances as independent variables, I then used linear regressions to compare the distance 
between the results of the randomised model runs and those of the neutral network, for each of the child 
and intermediate nodes. The resulting coefficient values were used as an indicator of the relative influence 
(‘sensitivity’) of each parent node on the child and intermediate nodes. 
Scenario evaluation 
Following the sensitivity analysis I used different property types as scenarios to explore the interaction 
between conservation and property resale. For this I varied conservation and resale characteristics to 
create best- and worst-case property scenarios, as well as mixed-cases of low conservation values and high 
resale prospects, and high conservation values and low resale prospects. 
Results 
The consensus Bayesian Belief Network 
The consensus BBN model is composed of 16 nodes, nine of which are parent nodes, five are intermediate 
nodes, and two are decision nodes (Figure 8). The names, types, states and descriptions for each node are 
provided in Table 10. Within the network, managers linked property suitability directly to: its conservation 
value; its financial impact on the fund; and the likelihood of protecting it through other (non-revolving 
fund) approaches. A property’s conservation value is derived from a combination of its site ecological 
values (e.g. presence of threatened species and/or communities); landscape values (e.g. connectivity and 
additions to the protected area network); and the threat to the persistence of these ecological values (e.g. 
from residential/agricultural/commercial development, land use change). A property’s financial value to 
  61 
the fund is determined by its ability to be on-sold, here represented by its expected resale time and resale 
price, as well as the anticipated costs of acquisition and on-going management once the property has been 
on-sold (e.g. administration, support for landowners). Resale time and price are linked to the marketability 
of the property, itself consisting of the amenity values of the site (e.g. the availability of utilities and a 
house site, fencing and road access, aesthetic appeal), wider amenity values (e.g. proximity to local town, 
schools) and market conditions (e.g. increasing or decreasing activity in the local real estate market). The 
question of how much to pay is directly linked to the suitability of a property, but also to the amount of 
money available in the fund (account balance).
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Figure 8. The consensus BBN model of revolving fund property selection. Green boxes represent conservation factors, yellow boxes social factors, blue boxes financial factors, orange box represents 
other options for purchase, and purple boxes represent the suitability and how much to pay decisions. CAR = enhancing the comprehensiveness, adequacy or representativeness of the reserve 
system.
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Table 10. Description of nodes in the BBN model of revolving fund property selection 
Node Type Description BBN states State description 
Site 
ecological 
value 
Parent A measure of the ecological 
values present on the site, 
represented by: the presence 
of threatened species or 
communities 
Low No presence of threatened species or communities 
Medium Presence of either threatened species or 
communities 
High Presence of both threatened species and 
communities 
Landscape 
value 
Parent A measure of the property’s 
landscape conservation values, 
represented by: the property’s 
contribution to enhancing the 
comprehensiveness, adequacy, 
or representativeness (CAR) of 
the protected area network, or 
its broader landscape context 
values (e.g. connectivity, 
buffering of protected areas 
etc.) 
Low Neither CAR criteria nor landscape context values 
Medium Meets CAR criteria or landscape context values 
High Meets both CAR criteria and landscape context 
values 
Ecological 
threat 
Parent An estimate of the threat the 
property is under (e.g. from 
residential, agricultural or 
commercial development, land 
use change) 
Low Less than 30% chance that the property’s ecological 
values will be lost 
Average 30-70% chance that the property’s ecological values 
will be lost 
High Greater than 70% chance that the property’s 
ecological values will be lost 
Conservation 
value 
Interme
diate 
An aggregate node, providing 
an overall estimate of the 
property’s conservation value 
Low Property has low conservation value 
Medium Property has medium conservation value 
High Property has high conservation value 
Acquisition 
and on-going 
costs 
Parent An estimate of the costs of 
purchasing the property and its 
on-going management for the 
conservation organisation, 
relative to other revolving fund 
properties 
Low Costs are less than 80% of average 
Average Costs are 80-120% of average 
High Costs are greater than 120% of average 
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Node Type Description BBN states State description 
Expected 
resale time 
Interme
diate 
An estimate of the time it will 
take to on-sell the property  
Short Less than 12 months 
Average 12-24 months 
Long Longer than 24 months 
Expected 
resale price 
Interme
diate 
An estimate of the price at 
which the property will be on-
sold to new owners 
Low Less than 90% of purchase costs 
Average 90-110% of purchase costs 
High Greater than 110% of purchase costs 
Financial 
value 
Interme
diate 
An aggregate node, providing 
an estimate of the property’s 
return on investment – 
combining the expected resale 
price and time (resale value) 
and the acquisition and 
ongoing costs 
Loss -15% return on investment 
Neutral -15-15% return on investment 
Profit Greater than 15% return on investment 
Marketability Interme
diate 
An estimate of the property’s 
marketability/appeal to the 
conservation property market 
Low Property has low marketability 
Medium Property has medium marketability 
High Property has high marketability 
Market 
conditions 
Parent An estimate of how the local 
real estate market is currently 
trending (demand, property 
prices etc.) 
Decreasing Property market is trending down 
Stable Property market is stable 
Increasing Property market is trending up 
Site amenity 
value 
Parent A measure of the property’s 
amenity values, represented 
by: the presence of utilities 
(power, water) and house site, 
road access, and aesthetic 
appeal 
Low One or less of utilities, access or aesthetics 
Medium Any two of utilities, access or aesthetics 
High All three of utilities, access or aesthetics 
Wider 
amenity 
value 
Parent A measure of the amenity 
values beyond the property, 
represented by: the property’s 
proximity to town, 
conservation-minded social 
context of the surrounding 
Low One or less of wider amenity criteria 
Medium Two of wider amenity criteria 
High All three wider amenity criteria 
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Node Type Description BBN states State description 
community, and proximity to 
lifestyle activities (e.g. 
recreation, eateries, wineries) 
Options for 
protection 
Parent An estimate of the likelihood 
that the property will be 
protected through non-
revolving fund means 
Low Less than 10% chance of other options 
Medium 10-50% chance of other options 
High Greater than 50% chance of other options 
Account 
balance 
Parent The amount of funds currently 
available for purchasing 
properties 
Low Less than 33% total funds remaining 
Medium 33-66% of total funds remaining 
High Greater than 66% of funds remaining 
Suitability Decision Decision node showing the 
property’s suitability for 
revolving fund purchase 
Low Property is of low suitability for revolving fund 
purchase 
Medium Property is of medium suitability for revolving fund 
purchase 
High Property is highly suitable for revolving fund 
purchase 
How much to 
pay? 
Decision Decision node providing an 
estimate of how much 
managers would be prepared 
to pay for the property, as it 
relates to the property’s 
market value 
Below 
market 
value 
Less than 90% of market value 
Market 
value 
90 to 100% of market value 
Above 
market 
value 
Greater than 100% of market value 
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Sensitivity analysis results 
The results of the global sensitivity analysis for the decision nodes are shown in Figure 9, with the co-
efficient estimates (x axis), by parent node (y axis).  
Looking at parent nodes only, for suitability (Figure 9a) the three nodes with the greatest influence were 
ecological threat, options for protection, and acquisition and on-going costs, respectively. In general, the 
results also showed a diminishing influence of nodes with distance, therefore the nodes in Figure 9a and 
Figure 9b are grouped together by their distance from the decision nodes (e.g. two layers back, three layers 
back) to facilitate comparison of sensitivity at equal distances. Restricting to just the nodes two layers away 
from suitability, ecological threat had by far the greatest influence, double that of acquisition and on-going 
costs, and more than three times that of landscape value. 
The top three parent nodes influencing the how much to pay node (Figure 9b) were account balance (with 
by far the greatest influence, more than all other nodes combined, but it is also the closest parent node), 
followed by ecological threat (three layers back) and other options for protection (two layers back). 
Restricting to nodes three layers away, ecological threat had twice the influence of landscape value, and 3.5 
times the influence of acquisition and on-going costs. 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
 
Figure 9. Barplots of the sensitivity analysis for the a) suitability node and b) how much to pay node. Bars show the co-efficient 
estimates from the linear regression, for parent nodes above the decision nodes. Dashed lines separate nodes at different layers, 
and grey numbers indicate the number of layers away the parent node is from the decision node. Larger bars indicate greater 
influence, and error bars show standard errors on the coefficient estimates. 
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For the intermediate conservation value node, ecological threat was by far the most influential parent 
node, almost 2.5 times the influence of landscape and site ecological values combined (Figure 10a). Of the 
three parent nodes, site ecological values had by far the smallest relative influence on conservation value. 
For financial value (Figure 10b), the acquisition and on-going costs node had by far the greatest influence, 
more than three times that of the next largest influence (site amenity values), although the acquisition and 
on-going costs node is only one layer away. The influence of market conditions and wider amenity value 
was less than a fifth of that of site amenity values. 
The ability to re-sell the property is central to property selection. For resale time and resale price, looking at 
the parent nodes two layers away (Figure 10c and Figure 10d), site amenity was by far the most influential 
for both of these nodes, more than 4.5 times the influence of market conditions and wider amenity values 
combined. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
Figure 10. Barplots of the sensitivity analysis for the a) conservation value node, b) financial value node, c) resale time node and 
d) resale price node. Bars show the co-efficient estimates from the linear regression. Dashed lines separate nodes at different 
layers, with grey numbers indicating the number of layers away from the child node. Larger bars indicate greater influence, and 
error bars show standard errors. 
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Scenario evaluation results 
The scenario evaluation (Table 11) showed that the most suitable properties, according to managers’ 
beliefs, are those with high conservation values and high resale prospects (‘Best-case’), whereas those least 
suitable were those with low conservation values and low resale prospects (‘Worst-case’). The suitability of 
properties with low conservation value and high resale prospects (‘Mixed-case 2’) was not far behind the 
Worst-case, with a high likelihood that these properties would be of low suitability. Properties with high 
conservation value, but low resale prospects (‘Mixed-case 1’), showed a high likelihood of being low to 
medium suitability. 
Across all property types the scenario evaluation showed that managers would most likely pay at or below 
market value, though if the properties are of high suitability (‘Best-case’ and ‘Mixed-case 1’) there is a small 
likelihood that managers might consider paying above market value. Those properties with low suitability 
(‘Worst-case’ and ‘Mixed-case 2’) would be unlikely be pursued for purchase, and showed no likelihood of 
managers paying above market value. 
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Table 11. Scenario evaluation of the expected suitability for potential revolving fund properties, and how much to pay for them, using the consensus BBN. Table cells indicate the node state was 
set to 100% probability, with other states for that node set to 0. For example, the High state for Site ecological value in the ‘Best-case’ scenario indicates setting the Site ecological value node states to 
High (100), Average (0), Low (0). – indicates neutral node setting (equal probability for all states). 
 
Variable Probability of suitability Probability of how much to pay 
Property scenario 
Site 
ecological 
value 
Landscape 
value 
Ecological 
threat 
Acquisition 
and on-
going costs 
Site 
amenity 
value 
Wider 
amenity 
value 
Market 
conditions 
Options 
for 
protection 
Account 
balance Low Medium High 
Below 
market 
value 
At 
market 
value 
Above 
market 
value 
Best-case (high 
conservation 
value, high resale 
prospects) 
High High High Low High High Increasing Low High 8.8 19.8 71.4 36.5 53.5 9.98 
Worst-case (low 
conservation 
value, low resale 
prospects) 
Low Low Low High Low Low Decreasing High Low 99.5 0.4 0.13 99.9 0.1 0 
Mixed-case 1 
(high 
conservation 
value, low resale 
prospects) 
High High High High Low Low Decreasing Low High 56.4 32.3 11.3 64.7 31.3 4.01 
Mixed-case 2 
(low conservation 
value, high resale 
prospects) 
Low Low Low Low High High Increasing High Low 86.2 9.74 4.03 97.2 2.81 0 
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Discussion 
Choosing appropriate properties is central to the on-going efficacy of revolving funds, and amongst the 
many properties available that managers can purchase, only some are suitable. But the suitability of a 
property is made up of multiple factors, including ecological and financial characteristics. Whilst some 
programs have decision-making processes to assist with determining suitability, there remains uncertainty 
over how property attributes interact to affect suitability. Using the experience of practitioners, I 
developed a probabilistic reasoning model to systematically step through the revolving fund property 
selection problem and identify the factors most influential on property suitability. With a focus on 
developing guidance for those operating (or considering operating) revolving funds, I use the findings to 
explore the relationship between these factors and property selection. From this I explore the potential 
property niche for revolving funds in protecting private land. 
Property suitability 
Amongst the multiple factors interacting to affect a property’s suitability for revolving funds, the model of 
managers’ beliefs shows ecological threat as the primary influence. Here managers referred to the 
likelihood of losing the property’s ecological values to land use change (e.g. commercial, residential, 
agricultural development). The importance of threat aligns well with the capacity of this tool to actively 
intervene in the market as opportunities arise and purchase properties at risk of losing their ecological 
values under a new owner (Whelan 1997). This is not to say that other conservation factors are not 
important, and it is likely that the presence of threatened species and/or the properties contribution to the 
reserve network would also be important. Nonetheless, accepting that threat is important, to allow for 
strategic targeting of at-risk conservation properties it would be worthwhile during property assessment 
for managers to consider if properties are in high-threat areas (Byrd et al. 2009). That may include the 
identification of future development and land use patterns, for example using predictors of habitat 
conversion to agricultural use (Stephens et al. 2008) and/or basic economic and demographic information 
(Radeloff et al. 2012), and incorporating these into site selection processes (e.g. Newburn et al. 2005). This 
assessment would also need to consider the viability of these properties into the future if land use change 
is likely to occur around them. 
The second largest influence on suitability was the likelihood of applying other options for protection. The 
reasoning here was that having alternative permanent protection options available would reduce the 
reliance on the revolving fund as the only option. These other approaches include voluntary protection 
agreements (such as covenants and easements), direct acquisition and holding (Parker 2004), and 
potentially pre-acquisition and transfer to government (Hunter & Kohring 2009). Whilst revolving funds can 
recover at least part of their costs through property on-sale, it is likely that the cost, risk and uncertainty 
involved in the revolving fund process (particularly resale time and price) that drives managers to explore 
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alternative options. Depending on the property’s ecological values, it may also be that alternative options 
(e.g. purchase to hold, offering incentives for covenanting) could result in better long-term outcomes. It 
also highlights how revolving funds can be used opportunistically to intervene where there are no other 
protection options available. However, whilst ideally options would be considered throughout the 
assessment process, identifying the likelihood of implementing other approaches within time and 
resourcing constraints would likely prove challenging. Developing strong partnerships and cooperating with 
other conservation organisations is one way managers could reduce these challenges and identify 
alternative protection opportunities as they arise (Bode et al. 2011). 
The costs to the conservation organisation of acquisition and on-going management also had a distinct 
effect on suitability. Given that the on-going sustainability of revolving funds is largely driven by the 
cumulative financial impact of individual purchases, the high influence of these costs is unsurprising. 
Purchasing expensive property (relative to the fund size and other revolving fund properties) would reduce 
the funds available for managers to purchase and protect additional properties until that property is on-
sold, and may also attract a lower number of potential buyers. Properties with high management costs 
would increase overall transaction costs for the organisation, and potentially impact on saleability. 
Incorporating estimates of management costs into property assessments would be beneficial, both to the 
organisation and to the new owners once the property is on-sold. Reducing acquisition costs is difficult as 
these are largely set by the vendor, but one way may be to survey landowners and identify areas where 
willingness to sell is high (Knight et al. 2011a). 
The ability to re-sell properties is central to revolving fund effectiveness, and thus property suitability. 
Represented in the model by resale time and price, my findings indicate site amenity as the primary 
influence on resale, which managers linked to the presence of three specific property attributes: utilities, 
road access and aesthetics. The importance of amenity reflects how these managers are operating their 
funds, such as ensuring that properties have potential for a dwelling (Hardy et al. 2017b) and/or hobby 
farm pursuits, or finding areas of the property suitable for continuing agricultural production, as a way to 
increase resale prospects. The scenario evaluation showed properties of low resale value having low 
suitability, even if the conservation values were high. Surprisingly, the sensitivity analysis showed social 
values (i.e. site amenity and wider amenity) having less influence on suitability relative to other decision 
factors (i.e. conservation value, ecological threat and, financial impact). Yet social factors are important for 
resale, and the structure of the model may be constraining their potential influence (i.e. in the consensus 
model the social nodes are furthest from the decision nodes). It is therefore likely that social values are 
more important in the decision than shown through the sensitivity analysis. A more accurate quantification 
of which attributes make conservation properties easier to re-sell could help reduce uncertainty over resale 
(see for example Johnson et al. (2007)). These could be identified through surveys of conservation buyers, 
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and accessing high quality information on the local real estate market (Armsworth & Sanchirico 2008), 
including regular updates about the conservation property market (e.g. from agents and property valuers). 
How much to pay 
Having identified a property as suitable, managers must then decide how much to pay, which involves 
balancing financial and conservation objectives, and uncertainty over resale times and prices. On this the 
model showed account balance (the funds available for purchasing) having the greatest influence (relative 
to the property’s market value), where having a low proportion of funds available (i.e. most funds are tied 
up in acquired properties) reduced the likelihood of managers paying market value. This leads to two main 
issues of interest. First is the effect of the overall capital size of the revolving fund, which is potentially an 
important driver of the types of properties that are acquired. Given the importance of property turnover, it 
is possible that managers may be less inclined to buy property of high cost relative to the overall size of the 
fund to avoid tying up a large proportion of the fund in a small number of properties. This may occur even 
for highly suitable properties. Second is the effect of managing the dynamic relationship between financial 
sustainability and conservation objectives. As pointed out by managers, having too much capital in the fund 
means the money is not being spent on conservation, and conversely, too much tied up in acquired 
properties potentially risks missing opportunities to acquire suitable properties as they arise. These two 
issues point to shifting investment risk profiles relative to account balance, where more money creates 
greater potential to buy high suitability properties even if there’s a chance of financial loss, and when 
there’s low money, less capacity to wear a loss (maybe even reducing the likelihood of buying any 
property). This relationship could mean that when the account balance is high, and few suitable properties 
are available for purchase, managers may become less selective in their decisions in order to make 
conservation gains (Schapaugh & Tyre 2012). Although there is no evidence of this amongst the programs 
considered here, maintaining clear criteria over what is suitable, and either implicit or explicit guidelines on 
what to pay relative to market value, could help practitioners avoid this issue. 
As it was for suitability, ecological threat was influential on the decision of how much to pay. The model 
showed a greater likelihood of managers paying market value for properties under threat, and the scenario 
evaluation suggesting that paying market value is predominantly considered for properties with high 
suitability (of which ecological threat is an influential component). This fits well with discussions during the 
workshop, where managers indicated that most revolving fund properties are bought at or below market 
value. The challenge here is that properties of high vulnerability and quality (i.e. under threat) can be more 
expensive relative to other properties in the area than sites of low vulnerability and quality (Newburn et al. 
2005). Moreover, there will likely be a reduction in financial value through adding a protection agreement 
that restricts land use and development (e.g. covenant or easement). Thus when it comes to resale, 
managers may need to consider re-selling at a financial loss to the fund to secure high quality conservation 
value properties. Whilst impacting fund sustainability, the process is likely more cost-effective than other 
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permanent protection approaches, although a comparative analysis looking at return on investment would 
be worthy of future research. Again, setting clear criteria defining when it would be appropriate to accept a 
low resale price would be beneficial. In some instances, it may be that some properties are simply too 
expensive (i.e. drop in resale price) for the conservation benefit (Merenlender et al. 2009). 
Also influential on how much managers are willing to pay was the likelihood of using other options to 
protect the property. With other options unlikely to be available, the model showed managers were more 
likely to pay at market value. A key point here is that a central component of revolving fund effectiveness is 
resale – if the property is unlikely to be resold, it is unlikely to be suitable for acquisition, even if it is 
unlikely to be otherwise protected. This could be difficult if there is a low likelihood of being protected 
through other options, but where the property has high ecological values, and low suitability value for the 
fund. Clear resale criteria (e.g. resale time, price) would help here, combined with a transparent decision 
process, and managers would need to be prepared to turn down properties if they are unconvinced the 
property can be on-sold – even if they are unlikely to be otherwise protected. For borderline cases, if these 
types of properties are acquired, managers may need to factor in longer resale times to recover costs, or 
accept a financial loss. This would also mean incorporating property management costs whilst the property 
is in the organisation’s ownership (Armsworth et al. 2011). 
A property niche for revolving funds in private land conservation? 
Revolving funds are unlikely to be suitable in all situations, and identifying suitable properties could help 
managers target where they are most effective. My model combines the knowledge and experience of 
managers across different revolving fund programs, with similar operations and objectives. Using insights 
from this BBN I can suggest that broadly, managers consider the most suitable properties to be those: i) 
with high conservation value; ii) under high threat; iii) with a high likelihood of resale (particularly in areas 
of high amenity value). 
However, beyond linking suitability to areas with high amenity values, it remains unclear where in the 
landscape the tool is likely to be most effective. With some exceptions, the predominant focus for these 
programs is on lifestyle property markets, but there may be other potential markets worth consideration. 
For example, some of the highest conservation value land is in agricultural areas, where the shift to 
productive land uses threatens remnant ecological values. The high land values (driven by productivity) 
often prohibit acquisition, and landholders themselves are often averse to conservation agreements. 
Compared to other approaches, using revolving funds in these areas could be an efficient use of funding, 
even with a financial loss to the fund upon resale, and some programs are already actively considering 
these types of properties. Alternatively, managers could look to peri-urban areas, where acquisition 
without resale can also be prohibitively expensive, and it is also often difficult to get landholders to agree 
to a voluntary permanent agreement (meaning there are few alternatives available for protection). But 
these areas often have high amenity values which could assist resale, perhaps with the potential to attract 
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price premiums from prospective buyers (Hannum et al. 2012). However, prices in these areas may be 
driven by speculation (see also England 2015) and residential development and subdivisions, which with a 
restrictive covenant or easement could mean resale values somewhat lower than purchase prices, or 
extended resale times waiting for appropriate buyers. Moreover, these areas may not be appropriate due 
to the potential impacts on conservation assets from higher population densities. Identifying the most 
effective market for revolving funds would be worthy of further investigation. Wherever revolving funds 
are used, managers would need to remain aware that multiple property acquisitions in the same area could 
potentially raise land values (Armsworth et al. 2006), and thus reduce the number of properties that can be 
protected, although the effect may vary between locations (Butsic et al. 2013). 
Longer-term challenges 
The development of the BBN model has provided a systematic and structured way to map the property 
selection decision of revolving fund managers, and helped to identify some of the factors they believe are 
most influential on property suitability. Revolving fund programs operating in different contexts are likely 
to have different objectives or factors influencing property selection decisions, and these would be worth 
exploring. The approach outlined here could be followed by organisations running or considering using 
revolving funds in their conservation work. The software used here (Netica) is freely available, and once the 
model has been built to reflect the organisation’s property selection decision, managers could enter 
property-specific information to help evaluate potential property purchases.  Further to this, however, due 
to the sequential nature of this tool, questions remain about what happens over time if managers keep 
purchasing particular types of properties, for example, if they were to focus exclusively on properties with 
exceptional conservation significance. Is there a more effective strategic approach that managers could 
take? Is it more effective to prioritise properties with exceptional conservation values but lengthy resale 
times, or those with low conservation values but fast resale times and/or high resale prices? Perhaps a 
portfolio approach could be employed (Doremus 2003) as a way to diversify resale risk, and maintain fund 
sustainability? And how does this change with fund size? Would conservation values start to play a more 
important role in property selection for larger funds, and would this affect how much managers are willing 
to pay for individual properties? 
Conclusions 
Revolving funds are part of a mix of approaches available in private land conservation and offer 
conservation organisations an alternative to acquisition for holding (with associated on-going management) 
or voluntary permanent conservation agreements. The ability to re-invest proceeds from sales offers 
unique potential, and selecting appropriate properties that can be on-sold is central to their effectiveness. I 
have developed a structured probabilistic reasoning model of property suitability to better understand the 
relative influence of the multiple decision factors and help identify which properties might be most 
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suitable. Combining the main influences, the findings suggest the properties best suited to revolving fund 
acquisition may be those under high threat, with few alternative options for conservation and high 
likelihood of resale, which appears to be linked to areas with high amenity values. These attributes may 
make revolving funds particularly useful to protect high conservation value lands under high threat, though 
these may require managers to consider negative impacts on fund activity due to longer resale times or 
lower resale prices. In other contexts the main suitability influences may differ from those here, however 
the BBN process provides a useful framework for identifying these. Focussing revolving fund acquisitions on 
properties with influential characteristics could help reduce the number of properties to assess and allow 
more efficient implementation of this tool, allowing other approaches to focus on other types of properties 
and facilitating a more efficient and effective approach to conservation of important private land. 
  
Chapter 6 
Comparing acquisition strategies of revolving funds for private land conservation
Trust for Nature (Victoria) revolving fund property at High Camp, Victoria, Australia 
(Photo credit: Mat Hardy)
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Chapter 6 
6 Comparing acquisition strategies of revolving funds for private land conservation 
Abstract 
Protecting private land with conservation value is an important part of global conservation efforts. 
Revolving funds are a unique approach that conservation organisations can use to acquire private land with 
conservation value, and then on-sell it to new conservation-minded owners, in the process recouping costs 
and adding a permanent conservation agreement to protect ecological values. However, constrained by 
property turnover, the conservation gains achieved by revolving funds over time will be linked to the size of 
the fund and the type of property acquisition strategy used. Drawing on historical acquisition and sale data 
from all major revolving fund programs in Australia, I developed a quantitative simulation model to explore 
the potential conservation outcomes over time from a range of acquisition strategies (with varying focus on 
ecological benefits, financial returns, and mixes of the two) and initial fund sizes ($1m, $5m and $20m). 
From a simulated pool of 20,000 properties, with 160 of these becoming available for acquisition each year, 
and uncertainty over acquisition and resale prices, I explored outcomes under two scenarios, which varied 
the minimum conservation threshold required for acquisition. I found that using a lower threshold of 
conservation value for properties that would be considered for revolving fund acquisition resulted in 
greater overall conservation gains over time than the choice of strategy. Using a higher threshold of 
conservation value delivered fewer overall gains, but greater gains from properties of highest conservation 
value. The outcomes of the acquisition strategies varied, with the greatest variance for the $1m fund, but 
for all fund sizes the strategies that included resale value delivered consistently higher overall conservation 
gains, but also relied on revolving a greater number of properties. I also explored the return on investment 
across the strategies and scenarios, with the larger ($20m) fund delivered the greatest conservation return 
on investment (ROI) for overall conservation gains, and for high conservation value gains. The $20m fund 
also had the least varied ROI amongst strategies of all fund sizes. The results suggest that particularly for 
small fund sizes, restricting acquisitions to only those properties with high conservation values may 
constrain the overall conservation gains achieved. However, this approach could help better deliver high 
conservation value gains. The conservation gains achieved by revolving funds may differ considerably 
depending on the strategy used by managers, particularly for smaller funds. Increasing the size of revolving 
funds may allow for their greater contribution to conservation outcomes on private land, but only if the 
supply of and demand for conservation properties exist. 
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Introduction 
Increasing the amount of private land protected for biodiversity is an important part of global conservation 
efforts. Growing in prominence are Privately Protected Areas (PPAs), which use legal or other effective 
means to protect biodiversity on privately owned and/or managed land (Stolton et al. 2014). One of the 
dominant approaches to protecting biodiversity on private land has been for a conservation agency to 
acquire and manage it for conservation (‘acquisition’). Acquisition remains an important approach, but 
decisions about which properties to acquire often need to be made under uncertainty (McDonald-Madden 
et al. 2008b, 2008a) and the expenses associated with this approach (purchase and subsequent 
management) can constrain the amount of land that can be acquired. This has led to recent attention on 
making land acquisitions more cost-effective (Auerbach et al. 2014), including assessing opportunities using 
Return on Investment (ROI) approaches (Murdoch et al. 2007; Grantham et al. 2008). 
One approach that conservation organisations can use to increase the cost-effectiveness of acquisitions is 
through the use of revolving funds. Revolving funds are already used in four countries to acquire private 
land with conservation significance and then on-sell it to new owners (‘conservation buyers’), in the process 
adding a protective legal agreement to the property title, such as a conservation covenant or easement 
(Chapter 2). The permanent agreement binds new and future landowners to manage the land for 
biodiversity into the future, and the proceeds from the sale are returned to the fund and then used to 
acquire and protect additional properties. Like the acquisition approach, revolving funds can take 
advantage of opportunities to purchase as they arise and avert the threat of development (Withey et al. 
2012). Because of this, they can also increase the extent of the conservation estate by protecting properties 
that may not be priorities for inclusion in the public protected area network (Carter 1998). This allows 
revolving funds to have flexibility to acquire properties that may not be suited for the public conservation 
estate or to address gaps in government funding (Lerner et al. 2007). But uniquely, revolving funds provide 
a way to recover at least some of the costs of land protection and this recycling of money can make the 
impact per dollar greater than the traditional acquisition-and-hold approach. 
Central to the effectiveness of revolving funds is the acquisition of properties that appeal to conservation 
buyers, but the resale potential can often be uncertain. Whilst balancing conservation priorities with 
financial considerations, managers need to incorporate market and social values to facilitate on-sale, which 
often leads to acquiring properties with the potential for development of a residence (Chapter 4). 
Estimating property suitability for revolving funds is complex, made up of a number of interacting factors, 
with managers seeing the most influential being the property’s conservation values, costs of acquisition 
and on-going management, and values that impact on the potential for resale (such as site amenity values) 
(Chapter 5). Often, at the time of property acquisition managers are faced with considerable uncertainty, 
not least of all over how long the property will take to re-sell (resale time) the price at which it will be sold 
(resale price), and the difference between the resale price and all other expenses (resale value). 
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At any one time a revolving fund manager may be faced with a number of suitable properties from which to 
choose. This is true for any approach to conservation acquisition, but is further complicated for revolving 
funds as the outcome of each acquisition impacts the funds available for subsequent acquisitions, both 
whilst the property is held and also when and for how much it is on-sold. When developing revolving fund 
acquisition strategies, managers may consider prioritising properties with particular characteristics, for 
example: low acquisition and ongoing costs (e.g. the costs to the conservation organisation of supporting 
the new landowners), high conservation significance (e.g. threatened species, or complementing a public 
reserve network), those with a high likelihood of return on resale (i.e. recovering the costs of the 
transaction within a reasonable time frame), or some combination of these. However, each of these 
strategies comes with trade-offs between property turnover and conservation value that over time could 
substantially alter the conservation gains achieved. For example, focussing on acquiring properties with the 
highest conservation significance may result in good conservation outcomes for individual properties, but 
reduced rates of property turnover for the fund, especially if there are limited numbers available for 
purchase, or if they have low appeal to conservation buyers and are harder to on-sell at an adequate resale 
value. On a strategic level, the question for managers becomes: how should they be selecting properties to 
purchase that are likely to provide the best conservation outcomes over time? 
Related to the effectiveness of any acquisition strategy is the size of the revolving fund. Relative to property 
values, the fund size will affect the types of properties managers can buy (e.g. size, price, ecological 
quality), where they can buy, and how many properties they can hold at any one time (especially relatively 
expensive properties). It will also affect the capacity to absorb fluctuations in property prices and long 
resale times should they be needed for high conservation value properties with low resale potential. The 
effectiveness of an acquisition strategy may also change with fund size, especially over longer time periods. 
For example, a smaller fund may do better deliberately focussing on properties with high resale potential to 
build up the size of the fund, whereas larger funds may do better focussing on properties with high 
conservation significance, or taking a portfolio approach to acquisition and selecting a mix of different 
property types. 
To understand the impact of revolving fund acquisition strategies on conservation outcomes, here I outline 
the development of a revolving fund simulation model, parameterised with historical property data from all 
major revolving fund programs in Australia to explore the impact of different acquisition strategies. The 
model has a pool of properties of which a proportion become available for potential acquisition by the 
revolving fund program each year. Running the stochastic model over 100 realisations, I used a range of 
different strategies to select which properties are acquired, and which were then on-sold as the simulation 
progressed. I explore the conservation outcomes arising over a period of 100 years, for three fund sizes 
from six revolving fund strategies. I examine the outcomes under two scenarios, varying: minimum 
conservation value required for consideration for acquisition and uncertainty over the resale price and 
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acquisition prices. Through the study I seek to answer the following main questions: i) what are the impacts 
for conservation of using different strategies for selecting properties for acquisition, over different time 
horizons; ii) how does initial fund size affect the conservation outcomes under different acquisition 
strategies; and iii) how does restricting acquisitions to high conservation significance properties affect long 
term conservation gains? 
Methods 
Development of the simulation model 
I developed a non-spatial, sequential revolving fund simulation model in R v3.3.2 (R Core Team 2016) to 
explore the capacity of different revolving fund acquisition strategies to deliver conservation gains. The 
general steps of the model are shown diagrammatically in Figure 11 and described in more detail below. A 
list of the terms used to describe the model is provided in Table 12. 
 
Figure 11. Schematic diagram showing the revolving fund model design, showing the sequence of initialisation, acquisition and 
sales. 
  
1. Generate list of 
properties and 
their 
characteristics 
2. A subset of 
properties become 
available of 
purchase 
3. Properties are 
ranked and 
selected for 
purchased 
depending on 
available funds  
4. Attempt to sell 
any held 
properties from 
previous putchases 
5. Fund balance 
and conservation 
gains updated 
from purchased 
and onsold 
properties 
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Table 12. Summary of terms used in the revolving fund simulation model 
Term Name Description Value 
ai Area of the property i The total area of the property i with conservation value, 
in hectares 
Sampled from 
distribution based on real 
data
#
 with a mean 167 ha 
(sd. 263 ha) 
abt Available budget in time-
step t 
The fund balance available to be spent on acquisitions in 
year t, based on the current balance of the fund and bt 
Varies each time-step 
ap Available properties The number of properties available for acquisition at 
each time-step 
160 per time-step 
btt Budget proportion in time-
step t 
A sampled proportion used to determine the proportion 
of available funds that are to be spent in year t 
Varies each time-step, 
sampled from a uniform 
distribution, between 0.5-
0.9 
ci Acquisition costs of the 
property i 
Price paid to acquire the property i Sampled from 
distribution based on real 
data
#
, mean 
AUD$282,649 (sd. 
$290,881) 
csi Conservation score of the 
property i 
A measure of the ecological values of property i, using 
information on site values, landscape values, and threat 
of development 
Sampled from 
distribution, based on 
real data
#
, with mean 
1.93 (sd. 0.4), out of a 
potential maximum of 3 
ct Conservation threshold The minimum conservation value for a property to be 
considered for acquisition 
Set per scenario, based 
on conservation score of 
either 1.5 or 2.5 
cvi Conservation value of the 
property i 
A measure of the conservation value of the property i, 
multiplying the property’s conservation score by its area 
Sampled from 
distribution based on real 
data
#
, mean 483.33 (sd. 
669.4) 
eci Estimated acquisition cost 
of the property i 
An estimate of the acquisition cost of property i, 
representing the managers’ uncertainty over what this 
will be at the time it becomes available for acquisition  
Sampled from normal 
distribution, mean c (sd. 
uc) 
erpi Estimated resale price An estimate of the resale price of property i, representing 
the managers’ uncertainty about the actual resale price 
Sampled from normal 
distribution, mean rp (sd. 
uc) 
fbt Fund balance in time-step t Represents the fund balance in year t In AUD 
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Term Name Description Value 
Ht Held properties in time-
step t 
The number of properties held by the conservation 
organisation, after acquisition but before on-sale, at year 
t 
 
ir Interest rate The interest rate to be applied to any unspent funds 4.1 percent per annum^ 
oc Ongoing costs Costs per year for each property held by the conservation 
organisation, e.g. property maintenance costs 
$3,000 per property, per 
year 
P Acquired properties The number of properties acquired by the conservation 
organisation 
 
rmi Resale multiplier for 
property i 
Proportion of purchase price regained upon resale, for 
the property i 
Sampled per property 
from distribution based 
on real data
#
, mean 1.12 
(sd. 0.35) 
rpi Resale price for property i Sale price realised when the property i is on-sold Property purchase price 
multiplied by rm 
rti Resale time for property i The time at which the property i is on-sold Sampled per property 
from distribution based 
on real data
#
, mean 2.46 
years (sd. 1.76) 
St Sold properties at time-step 
t 
The cumulative total number of properties on-sold by the 
conservation organisation, in year t 
 
t Time-step Representing each year simulated in the model From 1:100 time-steps 
(years) 
tc Transaction costs Costs of acquiring and revolving each property, fixed for 
all properties 
$10,000 per property 
ut Set of revolved properties 
(all) at time-step t 
The set of all properties revolved in year t  
u’t Set of revolved properties 
(high conservation value) at 
time-step t 
The set of all properties revolved with a conservation 
score greater than 2.5, in year t 
 
uc Uncertainty parameter A representation of the managers’ level of uncertainty, 
applied to property acquisition costs, resale times and 
resale prices 
0.3 
^ the Reserve Bank of Australia’s ten year average cash rate 2005-2016; # further information available in Appendix F (Figure A 2) 
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The simulation data 
I used historical acquisition and sales data from the five major revolving fund programs currently operating 
in Australia to parameterise the simulation model of revolving funds. These programs are run by the Nature 
Conservation Trust of New South Wales, Trust for Nature (Victoria), Queensland Trust for Nature, Nature 
Foundation South Australia, and the Tasmanian Land Conservancy. Together these programs have revolved 
more than 150 properties covering more than 145,000 hectares (Chapter 4), typically focussing on similar 
types of properties – those with high conservation value (usually threatened species or communities, or 
those under-represented in the protected area network), and often with potential for a dwelling. An in-
perpetuity conservation covenant is added to the property title during the on-sale process (usually as a 
condition of sale) to protect biodiversity values. I sampled from distributions derived from the historical 
acquisition and sales data of these five programs, covering 245 properties in total, including 115 properties 
that had been assessed but not acquired. On average, the properties in the historical dataset are 167 
hectares in size, with an acquisition price of $283,000 and a resale time of 2.45 years. Distributions for this 
data are provided in Appendix F (Figure A 2). I selected three initial fund sizes for the simulation, consisting 
of $1m, $5m and $20m, to represent the approximate current fund sizes of the programs operating in 
Australia (which range from $1m to $10m, with an average of $5.5m – see Chapter 4, Table 6), and an 
exploratory large fund size to explore the effect of increasing fund sizes. 
Steps in the simulation 
1. Generate a list of potential properties from historical revolving fund program data 
For each realisation, the model is initialised with a list of 20,000 properties with characteristics specified by: 
acquisition cost, transaction cost, resale price, resale time, conservation score, property size, conservation 
value (further details in Table 12). These properties are simulated and do not correspond to a real 
landscape, but represent an estimate of the number of conservation properties suitable for revolving funds 
within a State. The characteristics of each simulated property are determined by sampling from 
distributions based on the historical revolving fund data. 
For a given property i, ci is the acquisition cost, tci is the transaction costs involved in acquiring and on-
selling the property, and oci is the ongoing costs per year whilst the property is held by the conservation 
organisation before it is sold, rpi is the resale price and rti is the resale time (the number of years it talks to 
on-sell the property). The biodiversity conservation score of the property is given by csi, which was 
determined using the conservation value component of the property suitability developed in Chapter 5. 
Varying between a minimum of 1 and maximum of 3, this score accounts for the ecological values of a 
property, including its site values (presence of threatened species or communities), wider landscape values 
(e.g. connectivity, contribution to the reserve system), and the threat of losing its ecological values. For 
example, a property with a score of 3 would correspond to the presence of threatened species and 
communities, landscape connectivity and context value, and under high likelihood of losing its ecological 
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values to development. The size of the property is given by ai (in hectares), and the conservation value of 
the property (cvi), is given by 
              
eqn 1 
As there can be significant uncertainty in the final acquisition price (ci), and resale price (rpi) prior to 
acquisition, I calculated an estimated acquisition price (eci), and resale price (erpi). For example, I sampled 
the estimated resale price from a normal distribution using the property’s sampled resale price as the mean 
and using the uncertainty parameter uci (Table 12) as the standard deviation, representing the managers’ 
uncertainty over how much the property will sell for based on historical transactions. Because of the large 
uncertainty over resale time, I did not include it within the acquisition strategies. 
2. Acquisition cycle – properties become available for acquisition and are prioritised 
After initialising the list of properties, the model enters the acquisition cycle. At the beginning of each time-
step t (representing a year) a set number of properties (ap) become available for acquisition (this was set to 
160, estimated to be the likely number becoming available out of a region of 20,000 properties), randomly 
allocated from the property list (that have not been previously revolved). Each year, a proportion of the 
current fund balance (fbt) becomes the allocated budget that can be spent on acquisitions (abt) (Table 12). 
This is set at the beginning of each year, and determined by sampling between the upper and lower limits 
of btt (Table 12), representing the varied proportion of revolving funds often spent each year (due to the 
constraints on programs finding sufficient properties each year with conservation value and likelihood of 
resale, and at appropriate acquisition prices, to spend all available funds). 
To emulate the prioritisation decisions made by managers, at the beginning of each acquisition cycle I 
ranked the properties available for acquisition by the allocated acquisition strategy. The strategies are used 
to rank available properties by financial and ecological factors as described below. Properties are then 
acquired in order until the allocated funds for that year are exhausted. 
3. Acquisition cycle – suitable properties are acquired if funds are available 
Properties are then subject to two assessment criteria before they are considered suitable: (1) the property 
must have conservation value that meets a threshold ct (which varies with scenario), measured at the 
property level and representing the conservation criteria that managers would set as a minimum 
acceptable standard; and (2) the money must be available in the fund before the property can be acquired. 
For the properties that meet these criteria, they are ranked by the acquisition strategy (see below) and 
then purchased in rank order with the acquisition and transaction costs subtracted from the fund balance 
until all available funds were exhausted. Where properties were found suitable but funds for acquisition 
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were unavailable, they were placed back into the property list and can become available for acquisition at a 
later time-step. 
4. The sales cycle – held properties are sold according to resale time 
Following the acquisition cycle the model then enters a selling cycle, where the acquired properties that 
have reached their resale time rti (set per property during the initialisation stage, sampled to follow the 
distribution of historic revolving fund resale times) are then sold for their allocated resale price rpi (again, 
sampled from historic data). Both rti and rpi are set during the initialisation stage, sampled from 
distributions derived from historic revolving fund data (see Appendix E; Figure A 2). After the property has 
been sold (‘revolved’) the resale price is then added back into the overall fund, minus the transaction costs 
(estimated at $10,000 per property, based on discussions with fund managers). Revolved properties 
remained protected to the end of the simulation and were unable to become available again for purchase, 
reflecting the permanence of the in-perpetuity protection on these properties (Hardy et al. 2017a). This 
sale process is repeated for all properties that have reached their resale time at the current time-step. At 
the beginning of the next time-step, interest was added to any unspent funds from the previous year ir 
(Table 12), and the ongoing costs of any revolving fund properties still held but not yet sold by the 
organisation subtracted from the fund balance. Thus, the fund balance (fb) at a given time t is determined 
by the balance at the previous time-step, the costs of managing any held properties, the properties 
purchased and those sold in the current time-step, and interest applied to any remaining funds: 
           ∑    
    
 ∑   
    
 ∑    
    
  ∑    
    
       
eqn 2 
where Ht represents the properties held by the fund that have not yet been on-sold at time t, St represents 
the properties have been on-sold at time-step t, and Pt represents the properties that have been acquired 
time-step t. 
5. Save outcomes 
Following the sales cycle, results of the acquisition and sales process are recorded, before then re-entering 
the acquisition and selling cycle in the next time-step. 
Steps 2-5 are repeated until the model reaches the maximum specified time. The entire model starts again 
from step 1 for each of the purchasing strategies, each fund size, and each scenario. The model was run 100 
times over a period of 100 years. For each strategy, fund size and scenario I calculated the mean values 
over the 100 realisations for the fund balance, cumulative conservation gains from revolved properties, the 
number of properties revolved, and conservation score. 
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The acquisition strategies 
I explored six acquisition strategies that were constructed following detailed interviews with fund managers 
as to how they make their acquisition decisions, as well as other strategies for comparison (e.g. selecting 
properties randomly). The strategies modelled consisted of the following (see Table 12 for variable 
definitions): 
i) ‘Cost’, where acquisition priority was given to the cheapest properties available (incorporating 
estimated acquisition, transaction and ongoing costs). Under this strategy, the available 
properties were ranked using based on:           (lowest to highest) 
ii) ‘Conservation significance’, where acquisition priority was given to available properties that 
had the highest conservation value, ignoring their cost.  Under this strategy, the available 
properties were ranked using based on     (highest to lowest) 
iii) ‘Resale value’, where properties available for acquisition were prioritised according to the 
highest estimated resale value (accounting for the manager’s uncertainty over resale price at 
the time of acquisition). Under this strategy the properties were ranked from highest to lowest 
based on: 
    
              
 
eqn 3 
iv) ‘Resale value (benefit:cost)’, where available properties were prioritised based on a 
conservation Return On Investment (ROI) analysis (Boyd et al. 2015) that combines 
conservation value estimated resale price and property costs. Under this strategy properties 
were ranked from highest to lowest using: 
            
                
 
eqn 4 
v) ‘Portfolio’, where for the first third of the annual available funds to spend, available properties 
were prioritised (and purchased) by the ‘Conservation significance’ strategy, for the second 
third of the year’s available funds the remaining available properties were prioritised (and 
purchased) by the ‘Resale value (benefit:cost)’ strategy, and the final third of the year’s 
available funds, remaining properties were prioritised (and purchased) by the ‘Resale value’ 
strategy.  
vi) ‘Random’, where the available properties were selected for acquisition at random until 
available funds were exhausted. 
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These strategies are used to rank the available properties, which are then acquired in the corresponding 
order until the available funds for that time-step is exhausted. The acquisition process then continues with 
the next property on the list, until the end of the available properties that meet suitability criteria is 
reached or the available funds are exhausted. Any unused funds are returned to the fund balance for 
allocation in the next time-step (i.e. year). 
The simulation scenarios 
To understand the performance of the six different acquisition strategies, I used three different initial fund 
sizes ($1m, $5m and $20m) across 2 scenarios (Table 13). From this point fund sizes only increase through 
property sales and not from supplementary sources (e.g. donations). The scenario specifies a conservation 
threshold (i.e. a minimum conservation value that properties must have before being considered for 
acquisition). These were set to 1.5 (‘low threshold’) and 2.5 (‘high threshold’), to represent the effect of 
focussing on properties with exceptional conservation value (often the focus for these programs – Chapter 
4; e.g. contributing to a comprehensive, adequate and representative reserve system, with threatened 
species and/or communities, and/or with landscape conservation value), and the effect of using less 
restrictive criteria (e.g. acquiring properties with a small proportion of high conservation value vegetation 
relative to the area of the property, or those with extensive but low conservation value vegetation). 
Table 13. Summary of scenario details 
Scenario 
number 
Scenario name Conservation 
threshold ct 
1 Low threshold 1.5 
2 High threshold 2.5 
 
Evaluating the results 
As a measure of the effectiveness of the acquisition strategies I assessed the conservation gains achieved 
under different strategies across the three fund sizes. I used two measures of conservation gain: the total 
cumulative conservation gains (cv) from all properties revolved through time (‘overall conservation gain’), 
and the cumulative conservation gains of properties with high conservation value (those with a 
conservation score of 2.5 or above) (‘high conservation value gain’). I assessed the numbers of properties 
that each strategy revolved to reach its gains, and the change in fund balance over time. Further I examined 
the cumulative area protected and cumulative conservation score (gain irrespective of area). 
Lastly I calculated the conservation return on investment (ROI) r for each strategy using the cumulative 
conservation gain at the final time-step of the model (year=100), across each initial fund size fb. The initial 
fund size was used in this calculation as this was the initial investment cost made to set up the revolving 
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fund, with no further funds added during the simulation. Thus the ROI was determined by the cumulative 
conservation gains for the entire simulation and the initial fund size: 
   
∑       
     
 
eqn 5 
where u is the set of all properties revolved throughout the 100 year simulation. 
And similarly for the high conservation value gain ROI rh, where: 
    
∑        
     
 
eqn 6 
where u’ is the set of all properties revolved throughout the 100 year simulation with a conservation score 
greater than 2.5. 
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Results 
Overall conservation gains 
With a low conservation threshold, the Resale value strategy led to the greatest overall conservation gains 
after 100 years for the $1m fund size (Figure 12a). For the $5m and $20m funds, the Portfolio, Resale value 
and Resale value (benefit:cost) strategies led to considerably greater overall conservation gains than the 
other acquisition strategies (Figure 12c and e). The divergence between strategies occurred later in the 
$1m fund (after approximately 40 years) than for the $5m or $20m fund sizes (approximately 25 and 14 
years respectively). For all fund sizes, the cost strategy led to the least overall conservation gains, and the 
relative performance of the Conservation significance strategy shifted substantially with fund size, 
performing best for the $20m fund (Figure 12e and f). 
In contrast, using a high conservation threshold for the properties considered for acquisition resulted in 
substantially less variation in overall conservation gain between strategies for all of the fund sizes (Figure 
12b, d and f). The greatest variation occurred for the $1m fund size, with the Resale value, Resale value 
(benefit:cost) and Portfolio strategies delivering the greatest overall conservation gains (Figure 12b). There 
was a reduced difference between strategies for the $5m fund size (Figure 12d), and for the $20m fund 
size, the difference was further reduced in terms of overall conservation gain between any of the strategies 
(Figure 12f). 
In general, overall conservation gains were substantially larger when a low threshold was used for 
considering properties for acquisition, compared to the high threshold scenarios, irrespective of fund size. 
Though in this case the cumulative conservation gain can be obtained by having some properties with low 
conservation scores.  
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Figure 12. The cumulative overall conservation gains over time for revolving fund acquisitions and sales. Results are shown for 
the $1m fund (a,b), $5m fund (c,d) and $20m fund (e,f). The low threshold scenario is represented by the plots on the left (a, c, e) 
and the combined low and high threshold scenarios by the plots on the right (b, d, f). Cumulative values are shown for the low 
threshold scenario (a, c, e) and the cumulative conservation gains at the end of simulation for the combined low and high threshold 
scenarios (b, d, f). Note the difference in y-axis scales between low and high threshold plots. Shaded bands and error bars represent 
the standard deviation, and thick lines represent mean values across all runs.  
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High conservation value gains  
I then looked at the performance of the strategies where conservation gains were only calculated for high 
conservation value properties (i.e. those with a conservation score greater than 2.5). For the low threshold 
scenario, the relative performance of each of the strategies in terms of high conservation value gains 
(Figure 13a, c and e) were similar to those of the overall conservation gains (Figure 12a, c and e). Over the 
100 year period, the Resale value strategy led to the greatest gains for the $1m fund (Figure 13a), and 
Portfolio led to the greatest gains for both the $5m (Figure 13c) and $20m funds (Figure 13e). Resale value 
and Resale value (benefit:cost) strategies led to the next greatest gains for the $5m fund, and Resale value 
(benefit:cost), Resale value and Conservation significance strategies for the $20m fund. The strategies 
diverged earlier for the $20m and $5m funds (after approximately 10-15 years) than they did for the $1m 
fund (approximately 30-40 years). For all fund sizes, the Cost and Random strategies led to the least high 
conservation value gains, and the relative performance of the Conservation significance strategy shifted 
substantially with fund size, performing best for the $20m fund. 
For the high threshold scenario, the Resale value and Resale value (benefit:cost) strategies led to the 
greatest high conservation value gains at the end of the simulation for the $1m fund (Figure 13b), with 
similar relative performance to the overall gains (Figure 13b). There was increasing convergence between 
the gains delivered by the different acquisition strategies from the $1m (Figure 13b) to $20m fund Figure 
13f), with negligible difference in gains at the end point of the simulation between strategies for the $20m 
fund. This suggests that at each time-step all available high conservation value properties were bought by 
the $20m fund, regardless of strategy. 
For the Resale value, Resale value (benefit:cost) and Portfolio strategies in the $1m fund, the low and high 
threshold scenarios (i.e. the minimum conservation standard required for acquisition) lead to very similar 
high conservation value gains over time (Figure 13b) with Portfolio and Resale value (benefit:cost) showing 
potentially greater gains for the low threshold.  
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Figure 13. The conservation gains from high conservation gain properties for revolving fund acquisitions and sales, for the $1m 
fund (a and b), $5m fund (c and d) and $20m fund (e and f). The low threshold scenarios are represented by the plots on the left 
(a, c, e) and the combined low and high threshold scenarios by the plots on the right (b, d, f). Cumulative values are shown for the 
low threshold scenario (a, c, e) and the end values are used for the combined low and high threshold scenarios (b, d, f). Shaded 
bands and error bars represent the standard deviation, and thick lines represent mean values across all runs. 
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The number of properties revolved and fund balance over time 
For the low threshold scenario, the Resale value strategy revolved the greatest number of properties across 
all fund sizes (blue bars in Figure 14a, Figure 14c and e), but substantially more than other strategies for the 
$1m fund size (Figure 14a). The Portfolio strategy had the next greatest number of properties revolved, 
respectively, for all fund sizes, followed by the Resale value (benefit:cost) and Random strategies. The 
Conservation significance and Cost strategies had the fewest properties revolved across all fund sizes. 
For the high threshold scenario, all strategies revolved a more similar number of properties (orange bars in 
Figure 14a, c and e), particularly for the $5m (Figure 14c) and $20m fund (Figure 14e) sizes. All fund sizes 
and strategies had substantially fewer properties revolved compared to that of the low threshold scenario. 
The Cost strategy for the $1m and $5m funds revolved less in the low threshold than the high threshold 
scenarios. 
The Resale value strategy led to considerably greater fund balances over time across all fund sizes for the 
low threshold scenario, followed by the Portfolio strategy (Figure 14b, d and f). The Resale value strategy 
starts diverging at approximately 30-40 years for all fund sizes. For some of the strategies, especially Cost 
and Conservation significance, the fund balance stays small or goes to zero, suggesting that these strategies 
are not self-sustaining.  
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Figure 14. The number of properties revolved (a, c, e) and fund balances (b, d, f) for the $1m fund (a, b), $5m fund (c, d) and 
$20m fund (e, f). Plots provide the values at the end of simulation for the low threshold and high threshold scenarios (a, c, e), and 
the cumulative change in fund balance over time for the low threshold scenario (b, d, f). Shaded bands and error bars represent the 
standard deviation, and thick lines represent mean values across all runs. 
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Overall conservation gains and the number of properties revolved, and fund balance 
Figure 15a and b show how the number of properties revolved varies with the cumulative overall 
conservation gain for the $5m fund size at the final time-step of the simulation. For the low conservation 
threshold scenario (Figure 15a), the Resale value and Portfolio strategies led to the greatest overall 
conservation gain, although the Resale value strategy revolved almost 2,000 more properties while 
delivering a similar conservation gain to the Portfolio strategy. The Resale value (benefit:cost) strategy led 
to similar overall conservation gains but with significantly less properties revolved. In contrast, there was 
considerably greater convergence between strategies in the number of properties revolved and overall 
gains in the high threshold scenario (Figure 15b), with the Portfolio and Resale value (benefit:cost) 
strategies producing the greatest conservation gains. The Resale value strategy had a slightly smaller 
conservation gain than Portfolio, while still revolving a greater number of properties. Substantially fewer 
properties were revolved in this scenario than in the low conservation threshold scenario. Running these 
scenarios without uncertainty over acquisition price or resale price showed similar trends and are 
presented in Appendix F (Figure A 5). 
Comparing conservation gain and fund balance at the end of the simulation for the $5m fund size, there 
were clear differences between strategies in the low threshold scenario (Figure 15c). The Resale value and 
Portfolio strategies had the highest conservation gains, but Resale value had considerably higher fund 
balance. For the high conservation threshold scenario, the conservation gain between strategies was more 
similar (Figure 15d), as was fund balance. 
For all fund sizes, the high threshold scenario produced fewer overall conservation gains than the low 
conservation threshold scenario, and also resulted in considerably lower fund balances and numbers of 
properties revolved at the end of the simulation. Though again, with the low threshold the conservation 
gains can result from large numbers of properties with a low conservation score.  
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Figure 15. Scatter plot showing the cumulative conservation gain and the number properties revolved (a and b), and cumulative 
conservation gain and fund balance (c and d) using values at the end of the simulation (all for the $5m fund size). The low 
threshold scenario is represented by the plots on the left (a, c) and the high threshold scenario by the plots on the right (b, d). 
Hollow symbols represent individual model realisations, and the filled symbols represent mean values across all realisations. Note 
the difference in y-axis scales between the low threshold and high threshold plots.  
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Figure 16. Plots comparing the return on investment values at the end of the simulation for the $1m, $5m and $20m fund sizes. 
Cumulative conservation gain is shown in plots (a) and (b), and high conservation value gain is shown in plots (c) and (d). All plots 
use values at the end of the simulation, with error bars representing standard deviation. Low threshold scenarios are represented 
by plots on the left side (a, c) and high threshold scenarios are represented by plots on the right side (b, d). Note the difference in y-
axis scales between the low and high threshold plots. 
 
The effect of fund sizes on conservation gains 
Figure 16 shows the ROI from each strategy across fund sizes, by scenario, using the initial fund size and 
conservation gains at the final time-step. The $20m fund always delivered a greater ROI regardless of 
strategy or scenario. For the low threshold scenario, the $20m fund led to substantially greater ROI on 
overall conservation gains than the $1m or $5m funds across all strategies (Figure 16a). In contrast, the 
high conservation value gains were more similar between the $5m and $20m fund sizes in the Resale value 
(benefit:cost), Portfolio and Resale value strategies for the high threshold scenario (Figure 16b). Across 
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most strategies, the low threshold scenario delivered substantially higher return on investment for overall 
gains than the high threshold scenario. 
The $20m fund also provided the greatest ROI for high conservation value in the low threshold scenario 
across all strategies, performing best with the Portfolio, Resale value (benefit:cost) and Resale value 
strategies, although the $5m fund delivered a similar ROI with these strategies (Figure 16c). The ROI for the 
$1m fund varied the most between strategies out of all fund sizes, delivering its best under the Resale value 
strategy. As it did for overall gains, the Cost strategy delivered the lowest ROI. In the high threshold 
scenario, all strategies led to similar ROI for the $20m fund, suggesting that all available properties were 
purchased at each time-step. The Portfolio and Resale value (benefit:cost) from the $5m fund delivered 
similar results to the $20m fund (Figure 16d), and Resale value again provided the best ROI for the $1m 
fund. Unlike the overall conservation gains, the ROI for high conservation value gains was in general greater 
in the high threshold scenario than in the low threshold scenario. 
Discussion 
The ability of revolving funds to recover the costs of acquiring and protecting private land with 
conservation value offers organisations a potentially self-sustaining way to permanently protect 
biodiversity on private land. However, there are a number of acquisition strategies that revolving fund 
managers could pursue for prioritising acquisitions, and over time these could lead to substantially 
different conservation gains. Here I developed a model to explore the potential conservation gains that 
could arise over time from six different strategies, across three initial fund sizes. The model illustrated that 
the choice of strategy can have a substantial impact on the conservation gains provided by revolving funds, 
and that this impact can vary with different fund sizes. It also showed that conservation thresholds (on 
whether a property is considered for acquisition) can substantially alter overall conservation gains of the 
revolving fund. With an emphasis on assisting revolving fund managers and private land conservation 
policymakers, here I explore how the results from this study could be used to guide the implementation of 
revolving funds to increase the amount of conservation gained through these programs. 
The effect of strict conservation criteria on conservation gains 
The most notable effect on overall conservation gains was that arising from the conservation threshold 
which was used to set a minimum standard for the conservation value of acquired properties. The effect of 
conservation threshold was more pronounced on overall outcomes than strategy choice. The model 
showed that overall conservation gains (the mix of low and high conservation value properties) were 
considerably higher with the low conservation threshold scenario compared to the high threshold (Figure 
12 and Figure 16). This result most likely arises because the broader criteria increases the supply of suitable 
properties and allows more properties to be revolved, making more frequent use of fund capital. And often 
there would be more lower conservation value properties in the property market (also seen in the 
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distribution of conservation value in the program data (see Appendix F; Figure A 2)). For overall 
conservation gains, focusing only on high conservation value properties appears to substantially constrain 
the tool, likely because there are fewer high conservation value properties available. Thus for managers, 
setting a low threshold may work to increase the number of revolved properties. Within the broadened 
criteria, managers could still prioritise properties with the highest conservation significance, which can be 
more effective for incremental reserve implementation (Meir et al. 2004), whilst keeping the tool turning 
over properties and protecting biodiversity. The lower threshold may also work to increase the demand for 
conservation properties (i.e. not requiring high management skills, or allow for more space for recreational 
non-conservation uses). However, this finding relies on the assumption that summing the conservation 
gains from multiple lower quality properties can lead to a higher gain than fewer high conservation value 
properties (due largely to the higher volume of revolved properties and resultant area – See Appendix F; 
Figure A 7). This assumption only holds if the conservation gain is assumed to be linearly additive, where 
protecting large volumes of lower conservation value properties is as effective for conservation as 
protecting a small number of large, high value properties (which may not always be a reasonable 
assumption (Hodgson et al. 2011)). And because often revolving fund properties have the potential for 
development of a residence, it must also hold that the ecological implications of facilitating development of 
these lands are beneficial (Milder 2007). In the model I assumed that development does not impact the 
conservation value of the property. It may be worth managers exploring the less restrictive conservation 
criteria and considering the acquisition and sale of properties with only small areas of high conservation 
value relative to the overall size of the property, but with careful thought to what the benefit would be 
(Figure 17). There are different ways of calculating gain that might be worth exploring in future research, 
for example by using a benefit function that does not assume conservation gains of different value to be 
linearly additive (Arponen et al. 2005) or benefit-loss targeting to account for potential losses if the 
property is not protected (Newburn et al. 2005, 2006). 
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Figure 17. An illustrative example of a potential revolving fund property where only a small proportion of the property would be 
covenanted. The red outline indicates the potential purchase, yellow indicates a nationally significant ecological community, and 
blue represents existing reserves. Much of the potential property has been cleared for agriculture. Revolving this property as a 
working farm, whilst protecting the ecologically significant parts, could lead to important conservation gains. 
 
Setting strict criteria for acquisitions can help to ensure that protection is delivered to properties with the 
highest conservation value. Considering only those properties with high conservation value, the model 
showed that in general the high threshold scenario delivered greater high conservation value gains than the 
low threshold scenario, across all strategies and fund sizes (Figure 13 and Figure 16). This arose because the 
entire annual available acquisition funds under the high threshold scenario was spent targeting only high 
value properties, compared to a smaller proportion under the low threshold scenario. Interestingly, for the 
$1m fund the lower threshold produced only slightly lower, but largely comparable high conservation value 
gains to that of the high threshold scenario under the better performing Resale value, Resale value 
(benefit:cost) and Portfolio strategies (Figure 13b). This effect was not seen for the $5m or $20m fund sizes 
(which showed clear differences between high and low threshold scenarios), and may have been due to the 
relative increase in fund balance arising from these strategies, and the subsequent increase in capacity to 
acquire a greater number of high conservation value properties, compared to that of the small fund in the 
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high threshold scenario. Nonetheless, in general the high threshold delivered greater high conservation 
value gains than the low threshold, suggesting that there is benefit in setting strict criteria – if these are the 
conservation values of concern. 
The difference between the scenario results for overall conservation gains and those for the high 
conservation value gains highlights the challenge that revolving fund managers face when choosing 
conservation priorities. In some cases, overall gains may be sufficient (e.g. when increasing the area 
protected of any conservation significance is the objective). But in other situations, pursuing strict 
conservation criteria might be important (e.g. critically endangered species or communities). For revolving 
funds, answering the question of how to balance overall conservation gains with high value gains likely 
depends on the nature of the real estate market within which the fund is operating, the conservation 
objectives of the organisation and the ability of other conservation tools (e.g. purchase to hold or covenant) 
to focus on properties of different conservation significance. If there are sufficient conservation buyers and 
properties that fit the criteria, then the criteria could be higher than if there were few properties, or few 
buyers. If pursuing high conservation value properties is the objective of the revolving fund program, then 
the strategy used by managers to select properties is less important because each strategy likely buys the 
same properties. In this situation, managers would need to recognise that considerably greater overall 
gains (at least insofar as how I have calculated gains here) could be achieved if the threshold is reduced (i.e. 
the criteria broadened). 
The effect of acquisition strategy on conservation gains 
The revolving fund approach is an incremental process to conserving private land, with conservation 
achieved over a period of time (Chapter 2). Yet within this, the sequential dimension of revolving funds 
makes it difficult to evaluate how different acquisition strategies will perform through time. Particularly 
over longer timescales, the choice of acquisition strategy appears a major factor determining the 
effectiveness of the revolving fund approach. Across different conservation thresholds and fund sizes, the 
model showed that the relative effectiveness of revolving fund acquisition strategies can shift considerably 
with time. It showed that early on the difference between strategies is smaller, with all strategies 
performing similarly, leading to a bigger difference between strategies later in the simulation (Figure 12 
and Figure 13, and also Appendix F; Figure A 3 and Figure A 4). Property prices can fluctuate significantly 
over time, which was not captured within the model, and could lead to greater differences between 
strategies earlier on. The model also showed that the effect of strategies can differ between fund sizes, 
with the $20m fund delivering larger gains earlier than the $1m fund. For managers, these results show the 
clear importance of timeframe and fund size when assessing strategies for acquisition. However, whilst the 
assessment of ecological values used empirical data and accounted for the threat of development to the 
property (part of a property’s conservation score in the model), an important consideration in reserve site 
selection (Costello & Polasky 2004), the model assumes that each ‘revolve’ is a conservation gain (i.e. that 
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the conservation gains would not have occurred without the revolving fund protection). It also assumed 
that the conservation values on the property are always maintained, and that these will be protected by 
the covenant through time. It also assumes that the ecological values of each property remain steady 
through time whether they are protected or not. Future extensions of this work should consider how 
acquisition decisions may need to change through time to account for the decline of ecological values on 
unprotected properties (Pressey et al. 2007), including for shifting priorities under climate change 
(Alagador et al. 2014). 
In general, the results suggest that the strategies considering resale value (Resale value, Resale value 
(benefit:cost) and Portfolio) will lead to considerably greater overall conservation gains over time than the 
others explored here. Whilst during the implementation of the fund there will be financial losses from 
property transactions, ultimately the focus on resale value leads to the acquisition of properties that 
increase fund size, albeit at different rates depending on the chosen strategy (see Figure 14 and Appendix 
F; Figure A 5). In turn this enhances the fund’s capacity to buy, sell and protect more properties. In 
combination, these results demonstrate how purchasing capacity is a key component of revolving fund 
effectiveness, and that it may be worth managers considering resale value as a key component of their 
property assessments and strategic decisions. To achieve this, managers would have to prioritise properties 
with characteristics that increase resale values. This may mean buying properties with large areas of little 
conservation value and/or high amenity value, or with small areas of high conservation value, that appeal 
to a broader market than straight conservation properties, or potentially engaging in subdivisions, 
particularly those with a conservation focus (Carter 2009). This approach may also mean some properties 
with high conservation value are not considered as suitable for revolving fund acquisition if their resale 
value is low – which could make it difficult to contribute to broader conservation objectives (e.g. 
contributing to a comprehensive, adequate and representative conservation reserve system). Maximising 
return may also lead to inflated property prices which could trigger feedbacks detrimental to future 
revolving fund acquisitions (Armsworth et al. 2006), an issue of particularly relevance for larger funds. 
Understanding property markets is critical here, as well as finding an appropriate approach to measuring 
resale value. Part of this involves understanding the benefits of conservation values for potential 
landholders (e.g. native vegetation – see Polyakov et al (2014)), the impact on property value from the 
permanent protection agreement (Cho et al. 2017), as well as identifying which amenity values to measure, 
and finding reliable and consistent ways to measure them. An additional exploration could consider the 
difference in benefit of prioritising shorter resale times compared to resale values, or considering financial 
losses upon resale for properties with exceptional conservation value (which could be supplemented from 
donations or other sources). 
Similarly the most effective strategies for high conservation value gains were those that focused on resale. 
The Resale value strategy led to the greatest high value gains for the $1m fund (Figure 13b), and the 
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Portfolio, Resale value (benefit:cost) and Resale value strategies for the $5m fund (Figure 13d) and $20m 
fund (Figure 13f), although for the $20m fund the high threshold scenario, all strategies performed 
similarly, likely due to all strategies buying similar properties each time-step. Any of the strategies delivered 
very similar gains for the $20m fund (Figure 13f). And although the high conservation threshold scenario 
had less properties revolved, less cumulative conservation score and area protected (see Appendix F; Figure 
A 7) and led to smaller fund balances, it protected more properties with high conservation value (Figure 
13b, d and f). Having a larger fund allowed the acquisition of all high conservation value properties as soon 
as they became available, although the prioritisation may have led to acquiring in a different order. For 
smaller fund sizes, choosing strategies that consider resale values could provide a way to build the fund 
balance and increase the overall purchasing capacity of the fund (also see Appendix F; Figure A 4). 
Although resale value appears as an important factor for delivering conservation gains for revolving funds, 
in practice, relying solely or partially on resale to produce conservation gains may be a riskier approach as 
the resale strategies require greater turnover of properties. For example, here I demonstrated that 
particularly for the $1m fund, choosing either the Resale value or Portfolio strategies could lead to 
substantially greater conservation gains over time compared to other strategies (Figure 12b and Figure 
13b). But this required considerably greater numbers of properties to be revolved to achieve those 
conservation gains. The most substantial difference was for the $1m fund under the low threshold scenario, 
where the Resale value strategy revolved more than four times the amount of properties revolved under 
the Portfolio strategy (Figure 14a). The challenge for pursuing the resale-focused strategies is twofold: (i) 
finding a sufficient supply of properties suitable for acquisition (including suitable resale values), and (ii) 
balancing this with property turnover, which is driven by the demand for conservation properties. 
Depending on where the tool is used, there may not be enough suitable properties available for acquisition 
(especially through time), or large enough demand to sell properties at the required price, within a 
reasonable timeframe. The model assumes that properties are available every year (160 per year in this 
study) and that the historical demand for conservation properties would continue through time. I have 
based this model on data of properties already considered as suitable for revolving funds, thus a subset of 
the properties that exist in the real estate market. It is likely that including the broader property market 
would change the distributions of property characteristics (e.g. size, acquisition price, conservation values), 
the proportion of suitable properties that become available for acquisition each year, and the resale times 
and prices of conservation properties. Thus in practice there is likely more variance in the availability of 
suitable properties, and how many buyers would acquire a conservation property, although increasingly 
landowners have multiple landholdings, and some conservation properties may be suitable for income 
generation (e.g. ecosystem service payments). 
A further challenge for managers is that the resale process is uncertain. Each acquisition comes with 
uncertainty over the acquisition price, resale price and resale time, and estimates of resale value at the 
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point of acquisition can be uncertain. Because resale-focused strategies are buying and selling greater 
volumes of properties, there is an increased likelihood that some of the acquired properties will have 
lengthy resale times or low resale prices take longer to revolve, which in turn would slow turnover. To 
account for resale uncertainty, the model used estimated values of acquisition price and resale price to 
guide acquisition prioritisation, which included up to 30 percent variation on the actual prices. Also, 
uncertain here are resale times, which presumably present higher uncertainty than acquisition price or 
resale price. Even though in the model property resale times were sampled from a distribution derived 
from historical data, resale time was not included in any of the acquisition strategies to prioritise 
acquisitions, as I assumed that in most cases managers would wait for the required resale price rather than 
sell at a predetermined time, and that there was large uncertainty in estimating how long it would take to 
on-sell a property. However, given the commonly multi-year resale times, the trade-off between resale 
price and resale time, and their relative effect on conservation gains, would be worthy of future research. 
The risks and uncertainty of resale highlight an important dilemma that revolving fund managers need to 
address when selecting their acquisition strategies; between acquiring and on-selling as many properties as 
possible, and setting an appropriate conservation threshold. Acquiring a property of exceptionally high 
conservation value may contribute more gains than multiple lower conservation value properties, even if it 
takes longer to sell, or attracts a low resale price. Diversifying acquisitions through a mixed acquisition 
strategy might be one way managers can deal with this dilemma, varying the types of properties acquired 
(Doremus 2003). I explored one version of portfolio acquisition strategy (that combined Conservation 
significance / Resale value (benefit:cost) / Resale value), but it would be worth exploring others, for 
example trialling different strategies (including shifting to different strategies through time), and/or 
proportions of available funds each year, and/or that diversified the types of properties as much as possible 
(e.g. distance from population centres, vegetation types and extent, mixed-use properties as well as solely 
conservation properties). It is worth noting however is that this model is not explicitly spatial and does not 
account for land market feedbacks – this could be something revolving fund managers should be vigilant of, 
as it could make acquisition in the same areas continually more expensive over time (Armsworth et al. 
2006), although the effect on land values may be modest and may not always have a large impact on 
conservation gains  (Butsic et al. 2013). 
The effect of fund size on conservation gains 
The money available to revolving fund programs is a key limitation on the number of properties that can be 
acquired and held at any one time, often meaning that only a subset of the suitable properties on offer can 
be acquired. This constraint makes the interaction between fund size and choice of acquisition strategy 
central to which of the available properties are bought, and therefore the current and future conservation 
gains that will be achieved. Here I saw two particular features of revolving funds of interest to policy 
makers. The first was that at the end of the 100 year period, the conservation return on investment 
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(comprising the conservation returns relative to the initial fund size) for overall conservation gains was 
considerably greater for the $20m fund than it was for the $1m and $5m funds (Figure 16). This would be 
expected given that larger funds would have greater capacity to buy and sell more of the available, suitable 
properties than smaller funds (potentially to the point in this model where all suitable properties can be 
acquired by a large fund). The second feature was that there was greater variation in overall conservation 
gains between strategies for the $1m fund compared to that of the $20m fund (Figure 12b, d and f), 
suggesting that the choice of acquisition strategy may matter more for smaller funds. It is also likely that 
larger funds would be better placed for greater risk taking for properties with potential for low resale prices 
or long resale times. For managers these results suggest that working to increase the fund size is a 
worthwhile venture. Although often difficult, there may be opportunity to do this through seeking private 
or government investment, or acquisition loan arrangements (Lennox et al. 2017). 
An additional consideration is how fund size affects high conservation value gains (i.e. properties with the 
highest conservation value). From the measure I used here, in general it appears that larger funds could 
also provide greater high conservation value return on investment. The $20m fund consistently provided 
the greatest high conservation value gains across all strategies, and thresholds (see Figure 16). There was 
some overlap between the high conservation value gains of the $20m fund and those of the $5m fund 
under the Resale value (benefit:cost) and Portfolio strategies (Figure 16). Most likely this occurred because 
the proportion of high conservation value properties within the overall pool of properties is relatively small, 
and regardless of fund size, all funds are prioritising and buying similar properties. One particular benefit of 
the larger fund sizes is the greater certainty that high conservation value gains will be delivered, regardless 
of the strategy chosen. From what I have modelled here, it appears that for revolving fund programs that 
focus predominantly on protecting the highest conservation value properties, increasing the size of the 
fund may be of benefit. The protection of high conservation value properties in areas with high land prices 
is probably more effective with larger funds, which have greater capacity to acquire multiple properties at 
higher prices relative to smaller funds. Often these types of properties occur in peri-urban areas, and given 
the likely importance of amenity values in revolving fund property selection (Chapters 4 and 5), acquisition 
in these areas could arguably increase the resale prospects. However, the context of where revolving funds 
are being applied is likely to be of importance. Where few high value properties are available, increasing 
the size of the fund may have limited benefit as there may be spare capital in the larger funds that is at risk 
of not being used to its full potential. Nonetheless, even in cases where this occurs, the fund can 
accumulate interest for use in future acquisitions. 
What does this mean for revolving fund programs, and private land conservation policy? 
As has been exemplified here, of substantial importance is identifying clear objectives for revolving fund 
programs. Objectives around land acquisition can have considerable effect on the amount of land 
protected and the total costs of acquisition (Adams et al. 2011). For revolving funds, the most effective 
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acquisition strategy appears to depend largely on i) the size of the fund, ii) the time horizon under 
consideration, and iii) the conservation values of interest. From what I modelled here, the question of 
strategy appears to matter most if either i) the revolving fund is small; or ii) the conservation threshold is 
low. In some cases, for example the $1m fund in the first 20 years, the choice of strategy may not so be 
important. The most effective strategy will strongly depend on the specific conservation goals and context 
of the fund. The time horizon is also an important consideration, as it is for other forms of private land 
conservation (see, for example, Clements et al. 2016). If managers are focussed on short time frames, then 
the choice of strategy appears not to matter as much as when evaluating over longer time frames. 
In addition, the organisations operating revolving funds are often using this tool as part of a broader suite 
of conservation activities (Chapter 2) and could use other approaches to protect a property, if it is not 
suitable for a particular revolving fund strategy. Properties may be unsuitable and may not revolve for 
operational reasons (e.g. not saleable, excessive resale times, low resale prices) or unsuitable for private 
individuals to own, maintain and potentially live (e.g. size, management requirements, ecological 
sensitivity), and might be better protected through other means if possible. These other means could 
include stewardship payments to existing or new landholders, suasion measures, or acquisition to hold 
where necessary. Whilst these issues may not always preclude the use of revolving funds to protect these 
properties, they would have to be offset by resale gains elsewhere to maintain property turnover and 
financial sustainability or supplementary top up to the fund. It may also be useful to consider making 
greater use of the flexibility of revolving funds to initially acquire and hold important private lands as a way 
to manage lengthy public acquisition processes, later transferring the property to the public conservation 
estate (sometimes referred to as ‘pre-acquisition’) as has already happened in some jurisdictions (e.g. 
Fitzsimons & Davies 2005; Fitzsimons et al. 2006). 
Future research 
Future research could include comparison of the revolving fund approach with other private land 
conservation approaches. The method could also be developed further into a spatial revolving fund model 
to explore questions such as: i) Does distance from major cities matter?; ii) Are peri-urban or regional areas 
better, or perhaps a mix?; iii) Can we identify hotspots where revolving funds are going to be most 
effective? This would require a much more sophisticated economic model than the one used here. The 
model could also be developed further exploring the acquisition and on-sale of properties with a mix of 
conservation and productive land uses, where only the areas with conservation value are protected in the 
revolve (this would also broaden the suite of suitable properties). Exploring multi-objective optimisation 
approaches to revolving fund acquisition could also be beneficial, maximizing the efficient use of available 
funds (rather than having them accruing interest in a bank account and not being used to acquire 
properties/conservation gains). It would also be useful to consider the additionality of conservation gains 
offered through revolving funds, where in some cases the conservation values of a property may be 
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maintained through time even if it was not acquired, protected and on-sold. This would be an important 
extension but would require additional data on the threats faced by potential revolving fund properties. 
Finally, it would be useful to compare how revolving funds perform relative to and in conjunction with 
other approaches to permanently conserve private land, taking account of their capacity to re-use funding. 
Conclusions 
This is the first work to assess the impact over time of different acquisition strategies for private land 
conservation revolving fund programs. Here, I showed that over time different approaches to property 
prioritisation can have differing effects on the conservation gains made by revolving funds, driven by the 
interaction between the number of properties revolved, the conservation values of these properties, and 
the impact on fund balance from each acquisition and sale. Managers should consider the selection of an 
acquisition strategy with consideration to their fund size. From what I have modelled, strict criteria for 
property selection (in this case conservation threshold) may substantially reduce the overall amount of 
conservation that can be achieved, although it may produce greater high value gains. The model also 
showed how conservation threshold used may have a greater impact on overall outcomes than strategy 
choice, and that the choice of strategy may be more important for smaller funds. Moreover, the turnover 
(acquisition and resale) of properties appears central to the effectiveness of this tool, itself driven in large 
part by fund size, the conservation values of individual properties, and the supply of and demand for 
suitable properties. For private land conservation policy, the findings illustrate the potential contribution 
that revolving funds could make to permanently protecting private land with conservation value. Assuming 
the supply and demand for conservation properties exists, revolving funds can offer a self-sustaining way to 
create privately protected areas (PPAs), and can be used to target properties with high conservation value. 
Finding ways within the private land conservation policy space to increase the supply, demand and 
turnover of properties for revolving funds could allow for considerably greater conservation outcomes on 
private land. 
  
Chapter 7
Structuring the revolution: How decision-theoretic approaches could assist the implementation of 
conservation revolving funds
Queensland Trust for Nature revolving fund property at Mission Beach, Queensland, Australia 
(Photo credit: QTFN)
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Chapter 7 
7 Structuring the revolution: How decision-theoretic approaches could assist the 
implementation of conservation revolving funds 
Introduction 
Of major concern worldwide is the continuing loss of biodiversity. Despite international attention to the 
biodiversity crisis, including through the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD 1992), conservation efforts 
to date have proven insufficient to stem the decline, and international targets to expand the extent of 
protected areas are in danger of not being met (SCBD 2014; Butchart et al. 2015). Important biodiversity 
exists on private land, and its protection is widely recognised as an important contribution to global 
conservation efforts (Langholz & Krug 2004). This includes through the expanding use of Privately Protected 
Areas (PPAs) (Stolton et al. 2014) which will be important for meeting the Aichi targets for expanding the 
protected area estate (Venter et al. 2014; Maciejewski et al. 2016). 
A range of approaches exist for protecting private land, but because landholders and land uses can change 
frequently, permanent protection approaches are often preferred. There are two dominant permanent 
protection approaches exist, either through acquiring the land and managing it for conservation 
(‘acquisition’), or establishing a voluntary agreement (e.g. conservation covenant or easement) that binds 
landholders to manage their land for conservation. However, the amount of conservation that can be 
achieved by these approaches is often constrained by expense (acquisition) (Michael 2003) or the number 
of landholders willing to participate (voluntary agreements) (Comerford 2013). 
Revolving funds offer conservation organisations a proactive and cost-effective way to increase the amount 
of permanently protected land (Binney & Whiteoak 2010). By acquiring, reselling and adding in-perpetuity 
agreements, revolving funds can recover costs and efficiently increase the extent of protected private land. 
Little research currently exists on revolving funds, and it is not well understood how they are implemented 
by private land conservation practitioners. Exploration of the benefits and challenges of using revolving 
funds has been limited, and evaluation of their effectiveness or how they contribute to conservation is 
largely absent. 
The process of acquiring private land for conservation purposes is complex and uncertain (McDonald-
Madden et al. 2008b), further complicated by the need to re-sell it, potentially impacting on the 
effectiveness of the revolving fund approach. Decision theoretic approaches are useful for these types of 
problems, and can be tailored to assist practitioner decision-making. They have been previously applied to 
other problems in conservation, but not yet to revolving funds. This thesis has developed and applied a 
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range of decision-theoretic approaches to revolving funds to improve the implementation of this tool, and 
potentially increase its contribution to private land conservation. 
Summary of the research 
Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, the aim of this research was to develop an understanding of how 
decision-theoretic approaches could assist in the application of private land conservation revolving funds. 
The overarching research question this thesis addresses is the resource allocation challenges faced in the 
use of revolving funds for private land conservation, and how decision-theoretic approaches can help 
address these challenges. 
In Chapter 1, I introduce private land conservation, the revolving fund approach and its Australian context, 
which much of the research in this thesis is focussed on. Chapter 2 presents the first systematic review of 
scholarly and grey literature on revolving funds across a range of disciplines, collates information on 
revolving funds operating globally, and identifies the range of benefits and challenges of using the revolving 
fund approach. I found more than $384m available in revolving funds worldwide, and over 684,000 
hectares protected, although these are likely to be under-estimations due to difficulty in obtaining data. I 
find that the capacity of revolving funds to replenish costs through property resale is one of a number of 
unique attributes that enables them to protect land that can be difficult for other approaches to protect. I 
also find that revolving funds face unique challenges, are beset by complex decisions, and are reliant on 
turnover, supply and demand of conservation properties. The results suggest revolving funds are likely a 
useful approach to private land conservation where land values make land protection out of the reach of 
other approaches, particularly where: i) conservation values are compatible with and are attractive for 
private ownership, ii) acquisition or agreements are infeasible, and iii) on-sale can recover costs. Revolving 
funds potentially free up capital for other programs to protect land not suitable for revolving funds. 
In Chapter 3, I have for the first time collated all the available data at a national scale on the permanence of 
conservation covenants from all major covenanting programs in Australia (the legal mechanism used by 
revolving funds to protect land). I found that amongst the 6,818 multi-party covenants in Australia, only 8 
had been released from title. Seventy-one known cases of covenant breach were identified, however data 
were hard to obtain and there are likely more breaches than reported. Some emerging issues for 
covenanting organisations around third party trespass, successor owners and elderly owners. The results 
suggest conservation covenants are, largely, an enduring protection mechanism, particularly covenants 
with multiple parties to the agreement. There are challenges in collecting, collating and sharing this sort of 
information, but ongoing monitoring and reporting, particularly of high risk sites, will be important to 
ensure the permanence of these agreements. 
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An important part of building our knowledge of revolving funds is understanding and documenting the 
experience of revolving fund practitioners and how they use this tool. Drawing from practitioners in 
Australia, I have provided the first collation of practitioner experience to understand what influences their 
selection of revolving fund properties (Chapter 4). I found that whilst conservation factors are important, 
financial and social factors are highly influential as well – with resale a primary determinant. There are 
challenging trade-offs present in the property selection decision, particularly over balancing between 
conservation, financial, amenity and other factors (e.g. providing for the development of a residence whilst 
also protected ecological values). Managers have developed responses to alleviate and manage these 
trade-offs, however the complexity involved in property selection is likely constraining the implementation 
of this tool. A shared learning and adaptive approach to property selection could help deliver improved 
conservation gains. 
In collaboration with Australian revolving fund practitioners, I developed the first probabilistic reasoning 
approach to support property selection decisions (Chapter 5) for revolving funds. Through the development 
of this model I found threat, costs and other options for protection most influential on property suitability, 
and threat, options and account balance on how much to pay. Amenity factors have an important role to 
play, through their influence on resale time and price. The results suggest that managers may need to 
accept a financial loss for sites with high conservation value (i.e. that under threat) but low resale value. 
Revolving funds may be particularly useful in high threat, high land value areas (e.g. agricultural lifestyle or 
peri-urban areas), but to achieve conservation gains here it is possible managers may face longer resale 
times or lower resale prices. 
Finally, using historical revolving fund transaction data from all five major programs in Australia, I 
developed a simulation model that explores the long-term outcomes arising from a variety of different 
revolving fund acquisition property strategies (Chapter 6). The alternative strategies explored included 
prioritising properties based on conservation values, financial values, and combinations of these. The 
strategies were explored across different fund sizes, and thresholds in conservation value – used to 
determine the minimum standard at which properties would be considered for purchase. I found that 
whilst strategy is important, conservation threshold has a greater influence on the overall amount of 
conservation achieved than strategy. Greater overall conservation gains were achieved from adopting a low 
threshold, but greater gains resulting from properties with high conservation values were achieved using a 
high threshold. Larger funds led to greater overall and high conservation value gains, but more so with a 
low conservation threshold. Relative gains can shift through time, but strategies that incorporate resale 
factors do better than other strategies, but may also require greater property turnover. The results 
highlight the importance of setting clear program objectives and aligning fund size with the relevant 
property market. 
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Research contribution 
Each chapter of this thesis contains novel research that builds knowledge of revolving funds and an 
understanding of how decision-theoretic approaches could assist in their application.  
Specifically, the key research contributions of this thesis are: 
 Identifying the use of revolving funds around the world, their achievements to date (US$384m in 
funding available, and a total of 684,000 hectares protected), and the benefits and challenges 
behind their use 
 Finding that conservation covenants in Australia are an enduring protection mechanism 
 Identifying the key trade-offs between conservation and property turnover, financial viability, 
residential development, amenity values, and landholder management present in revolving fund 
property selection decisions 
 Developing a systematic approach to revolving fund property selection, helping to identify which 
types of properties to target, and how much to pay for them 
 Exploring the long-term effects of different property selection strategies for revolving funds, 
including the effect of different fund sizes, and the conservation outcomes different property 
selection strategies  
In addition, this thesis has contributed to the methodological advancement of interdisciplinary 
conservation science research, as outlined below. 
An interdisciplinary framework for exploring links between social, ecological and economic dimensions of 
private land conservation 
In this research, I have explored what could be referred to as an interdisciplinary, ‘triple bottom line’ 
framework, that incorporates ecological/conservation dimensions as well as social and economic 
dimensions. The methodological framework has drawn on a range of different methodologies – interviews, 
expert elicitation, and quantitative modelling – all focussed on addressing the same issue of how decision-
theoretic approaches could assist in revolving fund implementation. It has helped to build our 
understanding of a conservation tool that works at the intersection between ecological, social and 
economic values, and as such is inherently interdisciplinary itself. The interdisciplinary approach has driven 
a holistic, if complex research focus, attempting to build social-ecological thinking into private land 
conservation decision-making. As a research approach this interdisciplinary framework has proven useful 
for understanding the trade-offs present between these very different types of values in the application of 
revolving funds, and how these relate to the ongoing effectiveness of this tool for conservation. But partly 
because it is interdisciplinary, it has also proven challenging to bring all these dimensions together to 
understand revolving fund decision-making and how it works as a conservation tool. 
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Using a decision-focussed approach / methodology 
The research has focussed on practitioner decision-making, using data from Australian revolving funds, 
interviews with practitioners, expert elicitation, and developing existing and self-developed tools to 
understand and address these decisions. As a methodological approach, looking through this decision-
focussed lens I have illuminated detail on the complexity of revolving fund decisions, which have a range of 
ecological, social and financial factors that need to be considered. In the previous chapters and below I 
have shown how structuring these decisions could help in the implementation of this tool. The decision-
focussed approach has also led to the development of tools (the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN – see 
Chapter 5), and the revolving fund simulation model (see Chapter 6) and information that will assist 
application of revolving funds. But the approach has also shown that it is challenging to include social 
factors (such as amenity or aesthetic value) into decision-theoretic approach, consistently and generically. 
Research at the science/policy interface 
This research is situated within the science/policy interface with a large and deliberate emphasis on 
practical application and working with practitioners from all major revolving fund programs in Australia. By 
documenting existing practitioner knowledge and experience, and developing tools to guide evidence-
based thinking, I have produced practical, application-focussed research that will help bridge the 
science/implementation gap and facilitate the on-ground application of revolving funds. Including 
practitioners in this research has been essential to understand the real-world challenges or revolving funds, 
but also how the research outputs might be applied in the operation of revolving funds. It has also provided 
further definition on the circumstances in which revolving funds might fit into the conservation policy mix, 
and has helped to understand how revolving funds could be used more generally in private land 
conservation (for example, where acquisition without resale is prohibitively expensive). 
Synthesis 
Below I explore the broader findings of the research, its contribution to understanding revolving funds as a 
conservation tool, and how the methods developed here could assist in the tool’s application and further 
research. I also discuss the limitations of these methods, how they could be integrated, and how they could 
be incorporated into a structured, adaptive decision-making framework to enhance the contribution of 
revolving funds to conservation. 
Revolving funds are facilitating the conservation of biodiversity on private land 
PPAs are an important part of global conservation efforts (Stolton et al. 2014; Bingham et al. 2017). Finding 
ways to increase the number of PPAs is an ongoing challenge for policy makers and practitioners, often due 
to financial or landholder constraints (Smith et al. 2016; Torabi et al. 2016). Revolving funds provide an 
efficient way to increase the number of PPAs by purchasing and on-selling private land with a permanent 
conservation agreement, recovering at least most of the costs in the process (Binney & Whiteoak 2010).  
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The findings of this research suggest that revolving funds present an opportunity to assist conservation 
organisations in the delivery of private land conservation. Revolving funds are focussing on private land 
with important conservation values (Chapter 4) and are contributing to the total number of and area 
covered by PPAs (almost 684,000 hectares – Chapter 2). In Australia, this research has found 132 properties 
and 140,000 hectares protected by revolving funds (Chapter 4), forming a relatively small number of the 
approximately 5,000 properties and >8.9 million hectares likely considered PPAs in Australia (Fitzsimons 
2015). Through the collection and synthesis of breach and release data from all major covenanting 
programs in Australia, it appears that the protection mechanism that revolving funds use is largely enduring 
(Chapter 3).  
However, evaluating the true conservation gains that can be attributable by revolving fund activities, like 
many approaches to conservation, is challenging. This requires prediction of a counterfactual to understand 
gains attributable to the revolving fund activities, relative to what would have happened in the absence of 
the revolving fund intervention (Ferraro 2009). The counterfactual is particularly important given the focus 
by managers on protecting properties that are under threat of losing their ecological values, and which 
through the revolving fund process often requires managers to consider allowing limited residential or 
agricultural development (Chapter 4). It should also be noted that his evaluation issue applies to all forms 
of conservation, including public protected areas, and is an important area for future research.  
Implementing revolving funds requires complex trade-offs 
A large part of this research has focussed on the property selection decision. It has revealed that alongside 
conservation factors, financial and amenity considerations are also highly influential – primarily due to their 
influence on ability to resell the property (Chapter 4). Further exploring the relative importance of these 
factors on property suitability through a probabilistic reasoning approach (a Bayesian Belief Network; 
Chapter 5), I showed that managers saw ecological threat, acquisition and ongoing costs, and options for 
protection as the main influences on suitability, but further confirmed amenity values playing a key role in 
resale value. The decision over how much to pay found similar dominant influences. In combination, these 
results suggest that from a fund manager’s perspective, the properties most suitable for revolving funds 
appear to be those with a mix of values (not just conservation values), with i) high conservation value; ii) 
under high threat; and iii) with a high likelihood of resale (especially where on-sale is likely to recover costs 
within a reasonable timeframe – e.g. properties with high amenity values) (Chapter 2, Chapter 4, Chapter 
5). 
The multiple facets of property selection reveal the complex decisions faced by revolving fund managers. In 
some cases, these factors may align, but it is likely that in most cases managers will be faced with trade-offs 
between them. These trade-offs were identified and explored further in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. For example, 
managers may need to trade-off between exceptional conservation value and amenity values to facilitate 
resale, or the management effort required from the landholder to maintain the property’s ecological 
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values. Similarly, they may need to trade-off between conservation gains and facilitating the construction 
of a dwelling, which may enhance resale prospects but likely has some ecological impacts. Also present is 
pressure to keep the fund turning over properties to generate financial sustainability, and in some cases, 
managers may need to consider substantial financial loss or lengthy resale times to protect particularly 
important sites, or accept that these properties are unsuitable and may be better protected through other 
approaches (e.g. acquisition to hold). The trade-off between resale and conservation was explored further 
in the BBN scenario evaluation (Chapter 5), revealing the strong influence of resale alongside conservation 
values. It is also likely that many properties require multiple trade-offs, leading to considerable uncertainty 
over the outcome of each decision. In combination, this illustrates the complex interactions involved in 
revolving fund property selection that is likely constraining the effectiveness of revolving fund programs. 
In Chapter 6, I explored a range of trade-offs in the strategic decisions required for the implementation of 
revolving funds. Using a measure of conservation gain as the conservation value of a property multiplied by 
its area, I found that the acquisition strategy chosen by managers can greatly influence outcomes over 
time, with resale-focussed strategies leading to substantially greater overall conservation gains through 
time than the others modelled. But this relies on rapid turnover of properties, which often presents 
considerable risks to managers due to uncertainty over resale, particularly the time it will take to on-sell the 
property, and the price that it can be sold at with a restrictive agreement in place. But perhaps more 
influential is conservation threshold (i.e. the minimum conservation values a property must hold before 
being considered for revolving fund acquisition), which in the model substantially impacted conservation 
gains. Programs may be able to get bigger overall conservation gains from adopting a lower threshold than 
from shifting prioritisation of acquisitions, which results from getting larger numbers of lower value 
conservation properties. With a high threshold, there were fewer properties revolved and less overall gain, 
but a greater number of high conservation value properties (e.g. those with significant conservation 
values). This finding held across the different fund sizes. The model also showed how different initial fund 
sizes through time can deliver considerably different conservation return on investment (ROI). Larger fund 
sizes were able to deliver greater ROI by acquiring greater numbers of properties each year, but particularly 
those with high conservation value, than smaller funds. 
The result of all this is that alongside property-by-property decisions, fund managers also need to choose 
an acquisition strategy that is appropriate for their fund size, and that suits their program objectives. The 
research presented in this thesis underlines the central role of clear objectives in revolving fund programs. 
Foremost it highlights that managers should carefully consider the types of conservation values that the 
fund is aiming to protect (e.g. small areas of high conservation value sites or large areas of lower 
conservation value sites, or some combination). 
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Revolving funds as part of a social-ecological system 
A prominent theme arising from this research is the importance of the relationship between people and 
property as a driver of conservation gains for revolving funds. Revolving funds rely on property turnover to 
make conservation gains, which has led to a strong influence from managers on resale in property selection 
(Chapters 4 and 5). Of particular interest here is that in order for resale to occur, buyers must see the value 
of revolving fund properties, which is likely a combined social and economic process based on perceptions 
of environmental values. 
To facilitate resale, the revolving fund process requires managers to connect people with property. Future 
purchasers of covenanted properties are unlikely to have prior connection or attachment to the land they 
are buying, which is often a strong motivator for entering into a permanent conservation agreement 
(Farmer et al. 2015; Selinske et al. 2015). Furthermore, they are potentially doing this at their own financial 
risk (if they buy the property, it may be more difficult to recover the investment with the permanent 
restriction in place, although the effect of these restrictions on property values is currently unclear 
(Winfree et al. 2006). For the conservation-minded buyer, part of this is likely driven by the property’s 
natural values. This is probably answered somewhat by managers searching for properties with significant 
conservation values, and potentially with a compelling ‘conservation story’ (i.e. it will make a substantial 
contribution to conservation) (Chapter 4). But it appears that properties with conservation value, but 
without amenity or aesthetic values, are substantially less likely to be on-sold. Instead these may need to 
be conserved through other approaches (such as acquisition-to-hold). To facilitate resale, managers are 
looking beyond conservation values, actively assessing the suitability of potential properties from the 
buyer’s perspective, with particular attention to amenity or aesthetic values. This has developed into a 
strong focus on properties that as well as holding conservation value, are likely to be seen by potential 
buyers as desirable places to live – i.e. properties with residential potential, amenity and aesthetic values 
(Chapter 4, Chapter 5). This suggests that managers are leveraging the more amenity orientated values of 
the property to connect people to property, and facilitate resale. Through this, managers could be seen as 
establishing a new relationship between the buyers of conservation property and the revolving fund 
property itself. 
The relationship between conservation buyers and properties goes beyond resale, to longer-term 
considerations that impact the effectiveness of revolving funds. As we saw in Chapter 3, the new owners of 
conservation properties (in this case with conservation covenants), as well as elderly owners and third 
party trespassers, present real challenges for the maintenance of conservation values on private land. 
Whilst very few covenants have been removed, issues of breaches and third party actors show that 
landholders are central to the ongoing management and ecological viability of these conservation 
properties. Without adequate landholder support and monitoring, these ecological values could be under 
threat (e.g. from collecting firewood, dumping rubbish, recreational vehicles etc.), particularly with 
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constraints on landholder time, resources or capacity to manage conservation properties. Part of the 
challenge is the difficulty in monitoring and recording breach and release information, due largely to 
limited resourcing in the administering organisations. A difficult task for conservation organisations is 
intervening before issues develop into breaches, and facilitating private land conservation as a process 
where landholders are motivated and satisfied stewards of their property’s natural values (Selinske et al. 
2015). 
By acquiring properties that they believe buyers will be interested in, revolving fund managers are 
attempting to pre-empt a stewardship relationship with the initial buyer of the property. Part of 
establishing and maintaining this relationship relates to the property itself. Using the experience of 
practitioners, I have unpacked some of the factors influencing the selection of properties (Chapters 4 and 
5). What makes a property attractive for purchase from the buyers’ perspective remains unclear, but it is 
likely that providing allowance for recreational use in covenant design is important (see Farmer et al. 2016). 
Beyond the property itself, the landscape context the property is situated within is also likely important. 
Managers acknowledged their consideration of the broader context through their reference to ‘community 
context’ (Chapter 4) and the wider amenity attributes of a property (e.g. proximity to town, lifestyle 
activities) (Chapter 5). This fits well with the transitioning social landscapes in some parts of Australia from 
agricultural to rural amenity, particularly in areas of close proximity to population centres (Barr 2005). 
Nonetheless, securing a conservation covenant on title is only the first step in achieving permanent 
conservation on private land. The challenges of successor owners, the capacity of landholders for ongoing 
land stewardship (see Knight et al. 2011b; Selinske et al. 2017), and third party trespass remain as issues for 
revolving fund properties just as they do for other covenanted properties (Hardy et al. 2017a). 
The acquisition and sale of revolving fund properties is occurring within complex social-ecological systems 
(SESs). Social-ecological systems are those that “respond to, and influence a wide range of ecological, social 
and political processes” (Cumming et al. 2015). Presumably not all SESs will be suitable for the revolving 
fund approach, and exploring the types of SESs within which they are likely to work best or be the most 
effective approach would be a valuable area for future research. The application of a social-ecological 
framework could help identify locations where there is higher likelihood of successful application of 
revolving funds (Ostrom 2009). This information could then be incorporated into conservation planning 
processes to improve revolving fund operation (e.g. Ban et al. 2013). 
Decision-theoretic approaches could assist revolving fund decisions 
Two key parts to revolving fund decisions have received particular focus in this thesis: i) the property-by-
property selection problem, and ii) the acquisition strategy selection problem. These decisions operate in 
conjunction with each other but on different levels, whereby the acquisition strategy (e.g. how 
conservation value is prioritized relative to other factors) could be used to guide the types of properties 
that managers focus on in their day-to-day property selection decisions (e.g. focus acquisitions in areas 
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with high conservation significance). The research has shown that for both of these decisions, stepping 
through in a systematic process can identify key influences and factors in decision-making, and that these 
can then assist in exploring the potential outcomes that might arise from decisions. 
The interviews with Australian revolving fund practitioners (Chapter 4) and the collaborative development 
of the probabilistic reasoning approach (a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN); Chapter 5) helped to reveal the 
structure of the property selection decision, the key factors involved, and their interactions. The BBN 
approach lends itself well to drawing out how practitioners perceive the property by property decision, 
which is dynamic, opportunistic, and often needs to be made relatively rapidly. The BBN developed here 
could also assist managers in day to day decision-making, whereby the model can be updated with 
qualitative or quantitative evidence about each property as it becomes available. Moreover, the approach 
usefully provides a probability distribution rather than a single answer (here for property suitability (high, 
medium or low) and how much to pay (above market value, at market value, or below market value)), 
helping managers to explore these two important decisions before the acquisition is made.  
But the probabilistic reasoning approach faces several challenges: First, the decisions need to incorporate 
amenity and aesthetic factors, but knowing what to measure, how to measure this consistently between 
properties (and potentially programs), and the relative impact on the decision is poorly understood. This 
applies also for the community context, and the likelihood of using alternative protection options to 
protect a given property. Nonetheless, the BBN offers categorisation of these values that is derived from 
expert experience and is relatively simple and user-friendly, increasing the likelihood it could be used in 
decision-making. Second, the BBN provides a general framework, but there might be other reasons for 
purchase that are not captured in the model (e.g. a particularly ‘compelling conservation story’ (see 
Chapter 4)). Third, the BBN focuses on selecting properties that are likely suitable, but in future work it 
would be useful to develop a screening process that occurs prior to revolving fund assessment, identifying 
the type of private land conservation approach that the property is most suitable for. Lastly, the approach 
developed here does not consider what will happen over time from using the same focus for decisions 
repeatedly, when a range of different property types might deliver better outcomes over time (e.g. 
incorporating those that are most likely to return a profit and build up the purchasing capacity of the fund 
along with selecting properties of high conservation value). This issue is of particular interest for revolving 
fund decision-making given the sequential nature of this tool. 
Drawing from historical revolving fund transaction data, the simulation model developed in Chapter 6 has 
helped to assess the impact over time of prioritising different types of properties. The approach has proven 
useful for exploring the sequential dimension of revolving funds, specifically the relative consequences of 
acquisition strategies. As the experience of revolving fund programs grows, the model could be revised and 
rerun to explore alternative acquisition strategies. But the approach is limited in a number of ways. First it 
assumes ongoing supply of and demand for conservation properties, and that ecological values on both 
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protected and unprotected properties remain constant through time. Second it presently omits the social 
factors driving property resale (and the potential changeability of these over time), which as described 
above is a key part of revolving fund success. Each property is unique, and is unlikely to be equally 
attractive to all prospective buyers, but as it is for the BBN, incorporating these social factors into a 
decision-theoretic approach is difficult. Nonetheless, the approach highlights the importance of setting 
clear program objectives, as they relate to the long-term consequences of strategic decisions, as well as 
property by property selection decisions. 
Structuring decisions to help guide revolving fund implementation 
Complex, multi-dimensional decisions arise frequently in environmental decision making. One way 
revolving fund managers could work through the property selection and strategic decision problems is to 
use the methods developed here within a Structured Decision Making (SDM) framework, paired with an 
adaptive learning process. 
Building on decision theory, SDM offers a transparent and explicit approach to decision-making, of 
particular value when making complex environmental decisions, incorporating theory and practice of 
psychology, ecology and facilitation (Gregory et al. 2012). The SDM process requires participants to actively 
consider the decision context, alternatives and their consequences, and the trade-offs involved before a 
decision is made (Gregory et al. 2012). Variations of the SDM process have been used in numerous 
conservation applications, including endangered species management (Gregory & Long 2009), ecological 
monitoring (Lyons et al. 2008), climate change and sustainable forest management (Ogden & Innes 2009). 
There are six broad steps in the SDM framework (see Figure 18). The first is to clarify the decision context 
and the second is to define the decision objectives and criteria. The third step involves identifying and 
developing decision alternatives, or options, and the fourth is to evaluate the potential consequences that 
may arise from each of the decision alternatives. The fifth step is to evaluate the trade-offs between these 
decision alternatives, before then selecting the most beneficial option and the sixth step is to implement 
the decision, whilst also monitoring the outcome. In many instances the process can be thought of as an 
iterative cycle, where the cycle can be repeated and decisions adapted as new decision problems arise. 
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Figure 18. Steps in the Structured Decision Making process (adapted from (Gregory et al. 2012)) 
The SDM framework could assist managers in the decision over which revolving fund acquisition strategies 
(i.e. prioritisation) would be most effective. The acquisition strategy decision SDM process is outlined in 
Table 14, with example questions also provided for each step. First, managers could identify the context for 
the acquisition strategy, considering for example the performance of the existing strategy, the current and 
anticipated market conditions for conservation properties, and whether there are certain types of 
properties that need protecting that are not currently being considered. The interviews in Chapter 4 have 
provided some current context, and have also helped the second step where managers would identify 
objectives for the strategy, and identify the criteria for selecting a strategy. Based on the responses from 
managers in this research, these may be, for example, to maximise the extent of protected areas, to 
maximise the protection of threatened species or communities, and to maximise fund sustainability. A 
timeframe over which to assess and implement the strategy would also need to be defined. Third, 
managers would assess the alternative strategies for acquisition. I have explored several acquisition 
strategies using the simulation model in Chapter 6 (e.g. resale value, conservation significance), but there 
could be more complex or detailed strategies that organisations wish to explore. Fourth, managers could 
assess the consequences for each decision alternative, potentially using the simulation model in Chapter 6 
and evaluating likely conservation gain or return on investment. Fifth, managers could then evaluate the 
trade-offs between the alternative strategies (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) and select the most beneficial decision 
alternative. Finally, managers would implement the decision and monitor the outcomes, updating and 
adapting the strategy as required. The BBN in Chapter 5 would be useful here, combined with the shared 
learning and adaptive process to property selection discussed in Chapter 4.  
1. Clarify decision 
context 
2. Define objectives 
and decision criteria 
3. Develop 
alternatives 
4. Estimate 
consequences 
5. Evaluate trade-
offs and select 
6. Implement and 
monitor 
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Table 14. SDM process for revolving fund strategic decisions and the relevant chapters in this thesis that address these processes 
SDM 
step 
Description Example questions Related 
chapters in this 
thesis 
1 Strategy context What has been the performance of previous strategy? 
What are the current and anticipated market conditions for conservation 
properties? 
What types of properties are not being protected by the current strategy 
that should be protected? 
Chapter 4 
2 Objectives and decision 
criteria for the strategy 
Is it to secure as much land as possible? Or high conservation value land? 
Or attract more landholders? Or build up the fund balance? 
And over what time period? 
Chapter 4 
3 Assess the alternative 
approaches for the 
strategy 
Which prioritisation approaches would best help us achieve our 
objectives? Focussing on building the fund balance? Or conservation 
significance? A mix? 
Chapter 6 
4 Estimate the 
consequences for each 
alternative 
What would likely happen under these alternative strategies? Chapter 6 
5 Evaluate trade-offs 
between the alternative 
acquisition strategies 
Which acquisition strategy leads to the best conservation outcome? 
Which acquisition strategy leads to the best financial outcome for the 
fund? 
Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5, and 
Chapter 6 
6 Implement the strategic 
decision, recording results 
How is the strategy tracking through time?  
Has the problem context shifted significantly and thus the strategy 
requires revising? 
Chapter 5, 
Chapter 4, and 
Chapter 3 
 
Combining decisions to guide revolving fund implementation 
The BBN and revolving fund strategy models answer different parts of revolving funds decisions. Combining 
the property selection model and strategy selection models would be beneficial. Managers could use these 
tools together, guided by a double-loop adaptive learning process, which takes the learnings from actions 
undertaken to meet specific goals, and then uses those learnings to reflect on and refine the goals and the 
assumptions behind them (Kofinas 2009). Following this process, the strategy model could be used to guide 
property selection decisions, and the experience from property selection decisions periodically reflected on 
and fed back into the strategic decision problem through an adaptive process Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Adaptive learning approach for revolving funds. Adapted from Kofinas (2009) 
In the single loop, property selection could be based on the revolving fund strategy that is thought to best 
meet current objectives (e.g. prioritising and selecting properties thought to have high resale value). These 
properties could be acquired, and on-sold, monitoring the progress and evaluating how successful these 
acquisitions have been. Adjustments could be made for subsequent selection decisions, in keeping with the 
fund objectives and chosen strategy. A probabilistic reasoning approach such as the BBN developed in this 
research would be useful here, helping to identify suitable properties and how much to pay for them, and 
updated with new evidence as properties are revolved to help guide subsequent decisions. 
In the second loop, the experience, learnings and outcomes from the individual property selection 
decisions could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the chosen strategy, following an adaptive 
management cycle (Nyberg et al. 2006; Lyons et al. 2008). This would include the assumptions behind why 
the strategy was chosen and the property types thought to best achieve this. Managers would then assess 
whether the strategy needs to change (e.g. change of strategic conservation objectives), and if necessary, 
the learnings from property selection could guide the refinement of fund objectives, and the appropriate 
acquisition strategy or strategies to achieve these objectives. These objectives would then guide the next 
cycle of property selection decisions. The revolving fund strategy model developed in this research would 
be useful here, helping to evaluate the potential conservation gains under a variety of acquisition 
strategies. 
Moreover, where possible this process could be aided by a shared learning approach. The interviews with 
revolving fund managers (Chapter 4) identified opportunity for a shared learning approach to property 
selection, where the experience of property transactions could be shared between programs to help 
managers with property selection and the inherent trade-offs in revolving fund transactions.  
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Future research 
There remain a number of significant gaps in our understanding of how revolving funds operate, that upon 
resolution could improve their implementation and contribution to private land conservation. The following 
are areas where opportunities exist for future research. 
A retrospective analysis of revolving fund purchases 
Using historical revolving fund data from conservation organisations, the research could explore what has 
been conserved to date via revolving fund programs, and evaluate how revolving funds are contributing to 
the conservation of biodiversity on private land. I have identified in this research what managers believe to 
be the characteristics of revolving fund properties that are important. The interviews, and BBN workshop 
have shown that in Australian revolving funds, a combination of factors are thought to be important for 
property selection and program success (particularly resale factors), but at this point it is unknown if these 
factors matches the properties that were selected out of those available as the funds have operated over 
time. The research could also further explore the relationships and interactions between conservation, 
social and economic factors, and their influence on resale/suitability, and across different regions or 
programs. It could also draw on the experience of other actors in revolving funds, such as conservation 
buyers, real estate agents, and property valuers. Which characteristics of revolving fund properties have 
actually facilitated property resale and led to successful revolving fund properties? What is the impact of 
distance from population centres on revolving fund effectiveness? Are there hotspots in the landscape for 
this approach? It would also be useful to look at the properties that were considered but not purchased, 
alongside those that were purchased. This data may not be available at present, but would be useful for 
programs to start collecting this data now for future evaluations. 
What is influencing property selection for conservation buyers? 
The interviews and decision workshop showed that a property with a good conservation story can increase 
the chances of a successful purchase – but can that be confirmed by those who have actually bought a 
property? Which stories work best? Or are decisions primarily motivated by financial or social factors? 
Which mix of characteristics make properties suitable? How does the social landscape change with ongoing 
use of revolving funds? Answering these questions could help finding ways to measure amenity/social 
values of private land conservation and revolving fund properties. Research addressing these questions 
could potentially be conducted via a questionnaire to or interviews with previous and current revolving 
fund property owners, as well as those who have bought other types of conservation property (binding 
protection, non-binding protection, and unprotected). 
Exploring the effect of amendments and variations of permanent agreements 
In my assessment of covenant permanence, it became apparent that whilst the agreement would often 
stay on title, in some cases conservation organisations were opting to amend or vary the covenant 
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agreement rather than release the covenant from title. But what remains unclear is the extent to which this 
occurs, or what drives these changes. What is being varied, is it obligations and/or area? And to what 
extent? What impact does this have on the effectiveness of the agreement? What natural values are 
affected? Who is asking for these variations and amendments, is it the original landholders who placed the 
covenant on title, or subsequent owners? Why are landholders requesting these amendments, and how 
can conservation organisations respond given the need to maintain constructive relationships with 
landholders? Are these challenges likely to increase with more revolving fund properties, and greater 
numbers of successor landholders? The results from this research could help clarify which properties are 
more suitable for private versus public protection. 
Extending the revolving fund simulation model 
The revolving fund simulation model developed in Chapter 6 has considerable scope for extension. An 
obvious extension would be to explore different mixes of strategies for portfolio acquisitions – which 
strategies provide the best mix? And what is the effect of changing strategies through time (e.g. starting off 
with prioritising resale value, then to portfolio purchasing, then shifting to conservation significance). It 
could also be useful to explore a real-world case study area, incorporating spatial elements of the revolving 
fund decision challenge, exploring a number of questions: What are the risks of land market feedbacks if 
this tool is used repeatedly in similar locations? This could also be extended into a multi-objective 
optimisation problem, using a pre-determined set of properties under a given scenario. If we care about 
conservation outcomes and financial sustainability, what would be the best acquisition approach to 
maximize both of these factors? 
A comparative analysis of private land conservation approaches 
Revolving fund programs appear to be providing a cost-effective approach to conservation on private land, 
particularly through their continuous cycling of scarce conservation funding. But how effective and efficient 
revolving funds are compared to other approaches is still an open question. Addressing this requires 
answering a number of questions such as: How does their return on investment compare to other private 
land permanent protection approaches? How could they fit in as a complementary approach amongst the 
range of other private land mechanisms being used, to provide an efficient overall mix? Are these different 
approaches changing the social landscape towards conservation, and if so, how and to what extent? Which 
conservation properties out there are not suitable for private ownership? And what are the strengths and 
weaknesses of private conservation compared to public approaches? The results from this research could 
help clarify the relative cost-effectiveness of different private land conservation approaches. 
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Conclusions 
Looking at revolving funds from an interdisciplinary perspective, this research has shown that revolving 
fund are currently contributing to the protection of private land with conservation value. The 
implementation of revolving funds is challenging, with property selection decisions often complex and 
uncertain, and this may be limiting the tool’s contribution to conservation. Revolving fund operation 
requires balancing between conservation, amenity and financial considerations, and finding a way to do 
this could lead to enhanced outcomes in private land conservation, including the creation of PPAs. The 
combined property selection methods, and SDM process, outlined in this research could guide decision 
making in this space to improve the operation of this approach. 
Like much private land conservation, the key to revolving fund appears to be understanding people in 
landscape. While revolving fund programs are a tool for permanent protection, they are about more than 
acquiring and holding the highest conservation value properties. These programs are about facilitating 
long-term protection of important ecological areas on private land, matching properties suitable for private 
ownership with willing landholders who are then obliged to manage them for their natural values. Often, 
properties are chosen because they have potential to build a dwelling. When used in this way, in effect, 
revolving funds are a form of controlled development, identifying important properties and acquiring and 
selling them to people who are willing to contribute to conservation and often live (similar to conservation 
development (Milder 2007)) on properties with conservation value. The implication for managers is that 
these programs are balancing between the operation of the tool (i.e. turnover) and the facilitation of 
properties with conservation values that private landholders want to buy. If the properties could be 
identified that match what conservation buyers want, there is opportunity for revolving funds to be an 
extremely effective conservation tool. 
For policy-makers, this research shows that as a conservation approach, revolving funds have great 
potential as a useful, cost-effective tool. Whilst they are unlikely to be suitable for protecting all private 
land with conservation value, they appear to be particularly beneficial for protecting properties with 
amenity and aesthetic values that have a high likelihood of being on-sold to new owners, even with a 
permanent, restrictive conservation agreement in place. The findings suggest that revolving funds can 
protect properties that other approaches are not well suited to, specifically those that are prohibitively 
expensive for acquisition without resale, or where landholders are unwilling to participate in private land 
conservation (provided they are willing to sell). Even with occasional financial losses on property 
transactions, they are still likely to be an extremely cost-effective approach. 
The dynamic and uncertain nature of the property market makes strategic planning difficult, and in some 
ways the tool is necessarily reactive and opportunistic, requiring properties to become available for 
purchase, and for purchasing decisions to be made in sometimes complex governance, donor and 
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organisational settings. But equally, the tool can be strategically targeted to focus on any conservation 
objective, for example a specific threatened species or community, or to enhance landscape connectivity. 
The flexibility of the tool allows for a fast response to threats to private land as opportunities to acquire 
important properties arise. This suggests that revolving funds may be best used as a complement to other 
private land conservation approaches. Given this, the role of revolving funds could be conceptualised as a 
direct response to development pressures in areas where important conservation values are under threat. 
Amidst the ongoing biodiversity crisis and where resources for conservation are constrained, finding cost-
effective ways of doing conservation that adapt to local contexts is crucial. Leveraging the existing property 
market, revolving funds provide a way to balance ecological, economic and social factors and produce 
permanent protection outcomes – with the added bonus of a means to recover costs. It is a relatively novel 
conservation tool and there is still much to learn about what conservation benefits this tool has delivered, 
and how it can be used to full effect. As shown here, the implementation process can be challenging and 
often uncertain, but the approach is already showing signs that it can successfully integrate conservation 
needs and facilitate people in landscape. With larger fund sizes and appropriate decision support, such as 
the frameworks and models developed in this thesis, revolving funds could be an extremely powerful and 
useful approach to creating PPAs, and is well worth further consideration by policy-makers as part of the 
private land conservation policy mix. With ongoing implementation, investment and refinement, revolving 
funds could represent an important opportunity in conservation funding and the delivery of private land 
conservation. 
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Appendix B 
Supporting information for Chapter 2 
Table A 1. Keywords used to identify articles and revolving fund programs that met the criteria for inclusion in the review. 
Keywords were searched in Web of Science, Google Scholar, Proquest, Scopus, and the Google web search engine. 
Approach Focus 
Revolving fund 
Revolving loan fund 
Pre-acquisition / preacquisition 
Conservation buyer 
Conservation development 
Buy/restrict/resell 
Purchase/covenant/on-sell 
Private land 
Nature 
Biodiversity  
Conservation 
 
Table A 2. Framework used to code the benefits and challenges of revolving funds identified in the literature review  
Category Sub-category Sub-category description Unique to 
revolving 
funds? 
Benefit Replenish, recover costs; 
recycle money 
Ability to recover costs, recycle money for additional purchases Yes 
Self-sustaining / self-reliant Program can continue without external funding Yes 
Speed of intervention Can intervene quickly as properties become available No 
Flexibility Programs is not constrained by bureaucratic hurdles, can purchase 
and sell as necessary 
No 
Building on existing 
mechanisms 
Utilises existing mechanisms for protection No 
Leveraging existing markets Utilises existing market rather than creating a new one No 
Reduced management costs 
(for organisation) 
Reduced management costs for conservation organisation No 
General cost effectiveness Generally cost-effective approach No 
Target important properties Can target properties of high conservation value; can be applied 
strategically to sites of high value or feasibility 
No 
Proactive / interventionist Can proactively intervene and protect without reacting to 
willingness of landholders, or act as opportunities arise, as property 
is under threat from sale 
No 
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Category Sub-category Sub-category description Unique to 
revolving 
funds? 
Shifting land use; finding 
sympathetic owner 
Shifts land use away from degrading uses No 
Developing the conservation 
property market 
Develops the market for conservation properties, brings buyers and 
sellers together 
No 
Creating community support 
for private land conservation 
Generates community support (e.g. assistance in identifying sites to 
buy) 
No 
Protecting expensive land Greater ability to purchase expensive land where costs can be 
recovered 
Yes 
Protecting land where 
conservation infeasible 
(landholder, politics) 
Can protect properties where landholders or politics make other 
conservation approaches difficult 
No 
Unlocks funding from 
government, various sources 
Can generate financial support from multiple sources No 
Complements other private 
land conservation efforts 
Complements broader mix of approaches to conserve private land No 
Challenge Complex, multi-faceted 
decision 
A complex decision with lots to consider No 
Limited information; 
uncertainty over timing or 
value of outcomes 
Limited information when making the decision; unsure when the 
property will be resold, or for how much 
No 
Sequential decision impact; 
longer term consequences 
Buying something today affects what can be bought tomorrow Yes 
Opportunity costs If a property is purchased, other purchases have to wait until the 
first one has sold, if at all 
No 
Opportunistic purchasing 
and emergency purchases 
Need to purchase as properties become available, and retain 
contingency in case exceptional properties come up for sale 
No 
Land market feedbacks - 
price 
Buying lots of properties in an area can drive up property values No 
Land market feedbacks - 
shifting development 
Buying lots of properties in an area can shift development to other 
(potentially more sensitive) areas 
No 
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Category Sub-category Sub-category description Unique to 
revolving 
funds? 
Public perceptions / 
reputation 
Participating in the property market could be viewed negatively by 
supporters 
Yes 
Property supply / availability 
/ willingness to sell 
Can only buy what is available; can only buy when people are willing 
to sell 
No 
Market demand for 
conservation properties 
Constrained by limited market for selling conservation properties Yes 
Dynamic market - changing 
demand and supply 
Demand and supply change over time, need to adjust purchases 
based on this 
No 
Making quick decisions Making fast decision before property gets bought by someone else No 
Limited staff resources / 
expertise 
Limited resources or expert resources to help with decision No 
Need for turnover Pressure to keep properties turning over Yes 
Need to recover costs Pressure to ensure property sale price is more than costs; recover 
costs from most if not all transactions 
Yes 
Fund capital Limits on purchasing due to overall fund size Yes 
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Table A 3. List and attributes of revolving fund programs used for land acquisition and protection. * indicates a program that is no longer operating. NA indicates information unavailable. ^ based on 
latest available information 
Country Name Organisation Fund type Lending to? Start 
date 
End 
date 
Fund size 
(USD 
approx.)^ 
Leverage 
value 
Properties 
on-sold / 
loans 
made 
Hectares 
protected 
Website / reference 
Australia Bush Bank * National Trust 
of Australia 
(WA) 
Internal Internal 2001 2011 $1,509,000 NA 11 NA https://www.dpaw.wa.gov.
au/images/conservation-
management/salinity/biodi
versity_incentive_programs
_2009.pdf  
Australia BushBank SA Nature 
Foundation SA 
Internal Internal 2002 - $1,046,000 NA 28 12,242 https://www.naturefounda
tion.org.au/what-we-
do/bushbank-sa  
Australia Conservation Property 
Fund 
Nature 
Conservation 
Trust of NSW 
Internal Internal 2002  - $7,472,000 NA 25 19,567 http://nct.org.au/what-we-
do/how-we-work/buy-and-
sell-rural-real-
estate/conservation-
property-fund.html  
Australia QTFN Revolving Fund Queensland 
Trust for Nature 
Internal Internal 2004  - $5,230,000 NA 17 104,000 http://www.qtfn.org.au/rev
olving-fund  
Australia TLC Revolving Fund Tasmanian Land 
Conservancy 
Internal Internal 2004  - $4,857,000 NA 28 2,928 http://tasland.org.au/prope
rties-for-sale/  
Australia Trust for Nature 
Revolving Fund 
Trust for Nature Internal Internal 1989  - $2,989,000 NA 57 6,834 http://www.trustfornature.
org.au/what-we-
do/revolving-fund/  
Canada & 
USA 
Ducks Unlimited 
Revolving Land 
Acquisition Program 
Ducks 
Unlimited & 
The 
Conservation 
Fund 
Internal Internal 2001 - $10,000,000 NA  n/a 8,188 http://www.conservationfu
nd.org/projects/ducks-
unlimited-canada 
 
http://www.ducks.org/cons
ervation/land-
protection/conservation 
Canada & 
USA 
Land Conservation 
Loan Program 
The 
Conservation 
Fund 
External Non-profit 
organisations 
1993  - $50,000,000 $175,000,000 301 56,656 http://conservationfund.or
g 
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Country Name Organisation Fund type Lending to? Start 
date 
End 
date 
Fund size 
(USD 
approx.)^ 
Leverage 
value 
Properties 
on-sold / 
loans 
made 
Hectares 
protected 
Website / reference 
Chile Patagonia Sur 
Revolving Fund 
Patagonia Sur Internal Internal 2007 -    NA NA  24,281 http://patagoniasur.com/su
bpage.php?sid=1&l=e  
USA Avista Revolving Trust 
Fund * 
Clark Fork-Pend 
Oreille 
Conservancy 
(fund previously 
managed by 
Inland NW LT) 
Internal NA NA -  $65,000 NA NA  NA  http://kaniksulandtrust.org
/ 
 
USA Bay Lands Revolving 
Fund 
Coalition for 
Buzzards Bay 
External Land trusts 1998 -  $845,000 NA NA  1,012 http://www.savebuzzardsb
ay.org/current-issues/land-
conservation/  
USA Big Sur Land Trust 
McMahan Revolving 
Acquisition Fund 
Big Sur Land 
Trust 
Internal Internal 2004 2014 $3,520,000 $4,780,000 8 477 http://www.bigsurlandtrust
.org/press-release-big-sur-
land-trust-sells-whisler-
wilson-ranch-1.htm  
 
http://www.guidestar.org/
ViewEdoc.aspx?eDocId=241
1958&approved=True  
USA Central Coast 
Opportunity Fund 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
Internal 
(primarily) 
Internal, and 
land trust, local 
and state 
governments 
2008 -  $18,500,000 NA NA  NA  repository.upenn.edu/cgi/v
iewcontent.cgi?article=104
8&context=mes_capstones  
USA Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation Revolving 
Loan Fund * 
Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation 
Inactive  NA NA -  $500,000 NA NA  NA  http://www.cbf.org/  
USA Colcom Revolving 
Fund for Local Land 
Trusts 
Western 
Pennsylvania 
Conservancy 
External Land trusts 2009 -  $800,000 $1,250,000 3 118 http://paconserve.org 
http://waterlandlife.org/28
1/colcom-revolving-fund-
for-local-land-trusts  
USA Colorado Open Lands 
Revolving Loan Fund 
Colorado Open 
Lands  
External Land trusts 2004 -  $325,000 $6,000,000 21 6,475 http://coloradoopenlands.o
rg/loans-for-conservation-
easements/  
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Country Name Organisation Fund type Lending to? Start 
date 
End 
date 
Fund size 
(USD 
approx.)^ 
Leverage 
value 
Properties 
on-sold / 
loans 
made 
Hectares 
protected 
Website / reference 
USA Conservation Buyer 
Program 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
Internal Internal 1993 -    NA 175 NA  http://www.nature.org/abo
ut-us/private-lands-
conservation/conservation-
buyer/index.htm  
 
http://www.nature.org/abo
ut-us/private-lands-
conservation/conservation-
easements/all-about-
conservation-
easements.xml 
USA Conservation Trust for 
North Carolina Land 
Acquisition Revolving 
Loan Program 
Conservation 
Trust for North 
Carolina 
External Land trusts 2001 -  $4,000,000 $13,400,000 36 3,379 http://www.ctnc.org/assist
/grants-loans/  
USA LeRay McAllister 
Critical Land 
Conservation 
Revolving Loan Fund * 
Quality Growth 
Commission, 
Utah State 
Division of 
Finance 
External Non-profit 
organisations, 
local 
government 
1998 2010 $3,589,033 $21,685,730 110 36,935 http://www.planning.utah.
gov/CriticalLands/loanfund.
PDF 
USA Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem Crown of 
the Continent and 
Idaho Panhandle 
Revolving Loan Fund * 
Resources 
Legacy Fund 
External NA 2004 2014 $7,000,000 $10,249,000 12 12,141 http://www.resourceslegac
yfund.org/  
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Country Name Organisation Fund type Lending to? Start 
date 
End 
date 
Fund size 
(USD 
approx.)^ 
Leverage 
value 
Properties 
on-sold / 
loans 
made 
Hectares 
protected 
Website / reference 
USA Land Preservation 
Fund 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
Internal Land trusts 1955 -  $166,000,00
0 
NA NA  NA  http://www.nature.org/abo
ut-us/private-lands-
conservation/conservation-
easements/all-about-
conservation-
easements.xml  
    
http://www.nature.org/abo
ut-us/our-
accountability/annual-
report/2015-financial-
report-with-report-of-
independent-auditors.pdf  
USA Lowcountry 
Conservation Loan 
Fund 
Coastal 
Community 
Foundation of 
South Carolina 
External Local 
organisations 
2002 -  $1,370,425 NA NA  NA  http://www.tcfgives.org/gr
antprograms_LCLF.htm   
 
McBryde M, Stein PR, and 
Clark S. 2005. External 
revolving loan funds: 
Expanding interim financing 
for land conservation. In: 
From Walden to Wall 
Street: Frontiers of 
conservation finance. 
Washington DC: Island 
Press. 
USA Maine Coast Heritage 
Trust Land Acquisition 
Revolving Loan Fund 
Maine Coast 
Heritage Trust 
Internal 
and 
External 
Land trusts, 
NGOs and 
Government 
1991 -  $3,500,000 NA NA  NA  http://www.mltn.org/resou
rces/conservation-
funding.php  
USA New Jersey Land 
Protection Fund * 
Open Space 
Institute 
External Conservation 
organisations 
2003 2010 $3,500,000 $9,200,000 16 4,408 http://www.osiny.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=Pro
gram_CFP_GeographicRegi
ons_NewJersey 
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Country Name Organisation Fund type Lending to? Start 
date 
End 
date 
Fund size 
(USD 
approx.)^ 
Leverage 
value 
Properties 
on-sold / 
loans 
made 
Hectares 
protected 
Website / reference 
USA Norcross Wildlife 
Foundation Land 
Protection Loan Fund 
Norcross 
Wildlife 
Foundation 
External Land trusts 1999 -  $3,000,000 $20,000,000 116 15,782 http://www.norcrosswildlif
e.org/grants-loans/loans/  
USA Northern Forest Land 
Protection Fund * 
Open Space 
Institute 
External Land trusts and 
conservation 
organisations 
2000 2008 $12,700,000 $21,250,000 13 364,000 http://www.osiny.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=Pro
gram_CFP_GeographicRegi
ons_NorthernForest  
USA Pacific Forest Trust's 
Conservation Capital 
Fund  
Pacific Forest 
Trust 
Internal Internal 2004 -  $7,000,000 NA NA  NA  https://www.pacificforest.o
rg/ 
USA Southern Appalachian 
Land Protection Fund 
* 
Open Space 
Institute 
External Land trusts 2005 2012 $4,250,000 $16,961,000 8 4,446 http://www.osiny.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=Pro
gram_CFP_GeographicRegi
ons_SouthernApps  
USA The Georgia Land 
Conservation 
Revolving Loan Fund 
Georgia 
Environmental 
Finance 
Authority 
External Land trusts, 
NGOs and 
Government 
2006 -  $55,000,000 NA NA  NA  http://glcp.georgia.gov/abo
ut-us  
USA Thomsen Land Fund 
for Cape Cod 
Compact of 
Cape Cod 
Conservation 
Trusts, Inc. 
External Land trusts 1992 -  $650,000 $4,426,329 44 187 http://thecompact.net/tho
msen-land-fund-for-cape-
cod/ 
USA West Hill Foundation 
for Nature, Inc. 
(Affiliated Funds) * 
Independent External NA  NA  -  $500,000 NA  NA  NA  Clark S. 2007. A field guide 
to conservation finance. 
Washington DC: Island 
Press. 
USA Western 
Massachusetts Land 
Protection Fund * 
Open Space 
Institute 
External Land trusts 2005 2010 $4,000,000 $3,265,000 9 585 http://www.osiny.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=Pro
gram_CFP_GeographicRegi
ons_WesternMass     
 
http://osi.convio.net/site/P
ageServer?pagename=new
s_pressID_143 
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Table A 4. Summary of revolving fund programs used to permanently protect private land. The majority of programs operate in 
the USA and on average have been running for 17 years. * no information available; # leverage value is the cumulative sum of all 
purchases or loans. 
Country of 
operation 
Number of 
programs 
operating (closed) 
Maximum years 
operating 
Total size of funds 
currently 
operating 
(average) in USD 
Leverage value
#
 
total (average 
proportion of fund 
size) 
Amount of land 
protected (ha) 
Australia 5 (1) 27 $21,594,000 
($4,318,800) 
* 145,571 
Chile 1 9 * * 24,281 
Canada and USA 
combined 
2 23 $60,000,000 
($30,000,000) 
$175,000,000 
(3.50) 
64,844 
USA 13 (10) 61 $344,756,425 
($13,664,294) 
$213,904,252 
(5.55) 
449,945 
All 21 (11) - $383,717,688 
($12,790,589) 
$307,497,059 
(5.32) 
684,641 
 
Table A 5. List of papers identified in the literature review 
Reference Article type 
Aretino B, Holland P, Matysek A, and Peterson D. 2001. Cost sharing for biodiversity conservation: A conceptual 
framework. Canberra: Productivity Commission Staff Research Paper, AusInfo. 
Grey 
Armsworth PR and Sanchirico JN. 2008. The effectiveness of buying easements as a conservation strategy. Conserv 
Lett 1: 182–9. 
Journal 
article 
Bateson P. 2001. Incentives for sustainable land management: Community cost sharing to conserve biodiversity on 
private lands. Canberra and Melbourne: Environment Australia and Environs Australia. 
Grey 
Binney J and Whiteoak K. 2010. The Tasmanian Forest Conservation Fund and associated programs: purpose, 
performance & lessons. Camberwell, Victoria: Marsden Jacob Associates. 
Grey 
Binning C. 2000. Creating private markets for nature conservation. In: Barlow T, Thorburn R (Eds). Proceedings of 
the Bushcare Grassy Landscapes Conference, 19-21 August 1999, Clare SA. Canberra: Environment Australia. 
Conference 
proceedings 
Binning C and Young M. 1997. Motivating people: Using management agreements to conserve remnant 
vegetation. Canberra: Environment Australia. 
Grey 
Binning C and Young M. 2000. Philanthropy: sustaining the land. Canberra: CSIRO. Grey 
Brewer R. 2003. Conservancy: The land trust movement in America. Hanover and London: University Press of New 
England. 
Book 
Brown W. 1993. Public/private land conservation partnerships in and around national parks. In: Endicott E (Ed). 
Land conservation through public/private partnerships. Washington DC: Island Press. 
Book chapter 
Carter M. 1998. A Revolving Fund for biodiversity conservation in Australia - Australian case study on biodiversity 
incentive measures. Canberra: Environment Australia. 
Grey 
Clark S. 2007. A field guide to conservation finance. Washington DC: Island Press. Book 
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Reference Article type 
Coggan A and Whitten SM. 2008. Best practice mechanism design and implementation: Concepts and case studies 
for biodiversity. Final report for the Australian Government Department of Environment, Water, Heritage 
and the Arts. CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems. 
Grey 
Cowell S and Williams C. 2006. Conservation through buyer-diversity : A key role for not-for-profit land-holding 
organizations in Australia. Ecol Manag Restor 7: 5–21. 
Journal 
article 
Cowell S, Cameron A, Sprod D, and Appleby M. 2013. Midlandscapes: matching actions to opportunities in 
landscape conservation in the Tasmanian Midlands. In: Fitzsimons J, Pulsford I, Wescott G (Eds). Linking 
Australia’s landscapes: Lessons and opportunities from large-scale conservation networks. Collingwood: 
CSIRO Publishing. 
Book chapter 
Cripps E, Binning C, and Young M. 1999. Opportunity denied: Review of the legislative ability of local government 
to conserve native vegetation. Canberra: Environment Australia. 
Grey 
Curran D. 2000. The conservation of biological diversity on private property in NSW. Environ Plan Law J 17: 34–59. Journal 
article 
Davidson S. 2006. Private conservations. Ecos 128: 18–24. Grey 
Edwards R and Traill B. 2002. Getting beyond field days: targeting extension to protect threatened ecosystems on 
private land. Ecol Manag Restor 3: 229–31. 
Journal 
article 
Emerton L, Bishop J, and Thomas L. 2006. Sustainable financing of protected areas: A global review of challenges 
and options. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, and Cambridge, UK and Insight Investment, London, UK. 
Grey 
Endicott E and Contributors. 1993. Local partnerships with government. In: Endicott E (Ed). Land conservation 
through public/private partnerships. Washington DC: Island Press. 
Book chapter 
Ewing K. 2008. Conservation covenants and community conservation groups: Improving the protection of private 
land. New Zeal J Environ Law 12: 315–37. 
Journal 
article 
Figgis P. 2004. Conservation on private lands: the Australian experience. Gland, Switzerland, and Cambridge, UK: 
IUCN. 
Grey 
Figgis P. 2003. The changing face of nature conservation: Reflections on the Australian experience. In: Adams WM, 
Mulligan M (Eds). Decolonizing nature: strategies for conservation in a postcolonial era. London: Earthscan. 
Book chapter 
Figgis P, Humann D, and Looker M. 2005. Conservation on private land in Australia. Parks 15: 19–29. Journal 
article 
Fitzsimons JA. 2006. Private Protected Areas ? Assessing the suitability for incorporating conservation agreements 
over private land into the National Reserve System : A case study of Victoria. Environ Plan Law J 23: 365–85. 
Journal 
article 
Fitzsimons JA. 2015. Private protected areas in Australia: current status and future directions. Nat Conserv 10: 1–
23. 
Journal 
article 
Fitzsimons JA and Carr C Ben. 2014. Conservation covenants on private land: Issues with measuring and achieving 
biodiversity outcomes in Australia. Environ Manage 54: 606–16. 
Journal 
article 
Fitzsimons J and Davies Z. 2005. Productive partnerships / Creative solutions - Trust for Nature and DSE working 
together. Conserv Bull: 4–5. 
Magazine 
article 
Fitzsimons J and Wescott G. 2001. The role and contribution of private land in Victoria to biodiversity conservation 
and the protected area system. Aust J Environ Manag 8: 142–57. 
Journal 
article 
Fitzsimons JA and Wescott G. 2005. History and attributes of selected Australian multi-tenure reserve networks. 
Aust Geogr 36: 75–93. 
Journal 
article 
Fitzsimons JA, Williams C, and FitzSimons P. 2006. Ecological attributes of strategic land acquisitions for addition to 
victoria’s public protected area estate 2004-2005. Vic Nat 123: 134–45. 
Journal 
article 
Freedman B. 2013. A history of The Nature Conservancy of Canada. Ontario: Oxford University Press. Book 
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Reference Article type 
Gattuso J. 2008. Conservation easements: The good, the bad, and the ugly. Natl Policy Anal 569. Grey 
Greiner R, Gregg D, and Miller O. 2008. Conservation covenants and conservation management agreements in the 
NT : A pastoralists’ perspective. Townsville, Queensland: River Consulting. 
Grey 
Guerin-McManus M. 2001. Conservation trust funds. UCLA J Environ Law Policy 20: 1–24. Journal 
article 
Gustanski J and Wright JB. 2011. Exploring net benefit maximization: Conservation easements and the public-
private interface. Law Contemp Probl 74: 109–43. 
Journal 
article 
Hunter L and Kohring M. 2009. Preacquisitions. In: Bates S (Ed). Selling and transferring land and conservation 
easements. Washington DC: Land Trust Alliance. 
Grey 
Iftekhar MSS, Tisdell JGG, and Gilfedder L. 2014. Private lands for biodiversity conservation: Review of 
conservation covenanting programs in Tasmania, Australia. Biol Conserv 169: 176–84. 
Journal 
article 
Land Trust Alliance. 2008. Conservation buyer transactions: Fact sheet. Available from http://www.wclt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Conservation_Buyer_LTA.pdf. 
Grey 
Lee G and Szabo S. 2000. The private lives of protected areas: private land in the National Reserve System. In: 
Craig JL, Mitchell N, Saunders DA (Eds). Nature Conservation 5: Conservation in production environments: 
Managing the matrix. Chipping Norton, NSW: Surrey Beatty & Sons. 
Book chapter 
Lindstrom CT. 2005. Income tax aspects of conservation easements. Wyoming Law Rev 5: 1–57. Journal 
article 
Lockwood M, Hawke M, and Curtis A. 2002. Potential of revegetation incentives to meet biodiversity and salinity 
objectives: a study from the Goulburn Broken Catchment. Aust J Environ Manag 9: 79–88. 
Journal 
article 
Manning AD and Lindenmayer DB. 2009. Paddock trees, parrots and agricultural production: An urgent need for 
large-scale, long-term restoration in south-eastern Australia. Ecol Manag Restor 10: 126–35. 
Journal 
article 
Markus N. 2009. On our watch: The race to save Australia’s environment. Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University 
Press. 
Book 
McBryde M, Stein PR, and Clark S. 2005. External revolving loan funds: Expanding interim financing for land 
conservation. In: Levitt JN (Ed). From Walden to Wall Street: Frontiers of conservation finance. Washington 
DC: Island Press. 
Book chapter 
McCahon S. 2012. Conservation covenants in Victoria: A report based on oral history interviews, to advance the 
understanding of landowner motivations for conservation covenants on private land 
http://www.communitymatters.govt.nz/vwluResources/WCMFReport11McCahon/$file/WCMFReport11McC
ahon.pdf. Viewed 15 Sep 2016. 
Grey 
McMahon ET and Pawlukiewicz M. 2002. The practice of conservation development: Lessons in success. 
Washington DC: Urban Land Institute. 
Grey 
McQueen M. 2002. Local markets shape land trusts ’ Conservation Buyer programs. Exchange 21: 13–6. Grey 
Merenlender AMM, Huntsinger L, Guthey G, and Fairfax SKK. 2004. Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: Who 
Is Conserving What for Whom? Conserv Biol 18: 65–75. 
Journal 
article 
Meyer SR, Johnson ML, and Lilieholm RJ. 2012. Land conservation in the United States: Evolution and innovation 
across the urban–rural interface. In: Laband DN, Lockaby BG, Zipperer WC (Eds). Urban–Rural Interfaces: 
Linking People and Nature. Madison: American Society of Agronomy, Soil Science Society of America, Crop 
Science Society of America. 
Book chapter 
Milder JC. 2007. A framework for understanding conservation development and its ecological implications. 
Bioscience 57: 757–68. 
Journal 
article 
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Reference Article type 
Milder JC and Clark S. 2011. Conservation development practices, extent, and land-use effects in the United 
States. Conserv Biol 25: 697–707. 
Journal 
article 
Milder JC, Lassoie JP, and Bedford BL. 2008. Conserving biodiversity and ecosystem function through limited 
development: An empirical evaluation. Conserv Biol 22: 70–9. 
Journal 
article 
Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council. 2005. Directions for the National Reserve System. Canberra. Grey 
O’Leary B and Paris C. 2000. Bush for Wildlife. In: Barlow T, Thorburn R (Eds). Proceedings of the Bushcare Grassy 
Landscapes Conference, 19-21 August 1999, Clare SA. Canberra: Environment Australia. 
Conference 
proceedings 
Pejchar L, Morgan PM, Caldwell MR, et al. 2007. Evaluating the potential for conservation development: 
Biophysical, economic, and institutional perspectives. Conserv Biol 21: 69–78. 
Journal 
article 
Productivity Commission. 2004. Impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations. Canberra. Grey 
Pulsford I, Howling G, Dunn R, and Crane R. 2013. No Title. In: Fitzsimons J, Pulsford I, Wescott G (Eds). Linking 
Australia’s landscapes: Lessons and opportunities from large-scale conservation networks. Collingwood: 
CSIRO Publishing. 
Book chapter 
Reed SE, Hilty JA, and Theobald DM. 2014. Guidelines and incentives for conservation development in local land-
use regulations. Conserv Biol 28: 258–68. 
Journal 
article 
Richardson Jr. JJ. 2007. Conservation easements and ethics. San Joaquin Agric Law Rev 17: 31–58. Journal 
article 
Safstrom R. 1996. In trust: working with people to achieve conservation on private land in Victoria. In: Saunders 
DA, Craig JL, Mattiske EM (Eds). Nature Conservation 4: The role of networks. Surrey Beatty & Sons. 
Book chapter 
Smith G, Phillips E, and Doret G. 2006. The contribution of biodiversity conservation on private land to Australian 
cityscapes. In: 42nd ISoCaRP Council Case Studies 2006. Sydney, Australia. 
Grey 
Spooner PG, Niedra S, Doerr VAJ, and Cumming C. 2013. Slopes to Summit: Focussing on bite-size chunks that 
matter. In: Fitzsimons J, Pulsford I, Wescott G (Eds). Linking Australia’s landscapes: Lessons and 
opportunities from large-scale conservation networks. Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing. 
Book chapter 
Stolton S, Redford KH, and Dudley N. 2014. The futures of privately protected areas. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN. Book 
Taylor M and Kingdom D. 2011. The Tasmanian Land Conservancy : protecting Tasmania’s biodiversity through 
conservation on private land. Australas Plant Conserv 20: 9–10. 
Journal 
article 
Trust for Public Land. 1995. Doing deals: A guide to buying land for conservation. Washington DC: Land Trust 
Alliance and The Trust for Public Land. 
Book 
Whelan BR. 1997. The advantages of a trust in conservation for private land owners. In: Hale P, Lamb D (Eds). 
Conservation outside nature reserves. Brisbane: Centre for Conservation Biology, The University of 
Queensland. 
Book chapter 
Whisson G, Keighery BJ, Nunn D, and McGill G. 2000. Perth’s Bushplan - towards conserving the natural 
ecosystems of Western Australia's capital city. In: Craig JL, Mitchell N, Saunders DA (Eds). Nature 
Conservation 5: Conservation in production environments: Managing the matrix. Chipping Norton, NSW: 
Surrey Beatty & Sons. 
Book chapter 
Whitten S, Bueren M van, and Collins D. 2004. An overview of market-based instruments and environmental policy 
in Australia. In: Proceedings of 6th Annual National AARES Symposium. Canberra: Rural Industries Research 
and Development Corporation. 
Conference 
proceedings 
Whitten SM, Parris H, Doerr VAJ, and Doerr ED. 2013. Socio-economic issues in establishing and successful 
operation of landscape-scale connectivity conservation initiatives. In: Fitzsimons J, Pulsford I, Wescott G 
(Eds). Linking Australia’s landscapes: Lessons and opportunities from large-scale conservation networks. 
Collingwood: CSIRO Publishing. 
Book chapter 
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Williams P and Williams A. 2015. Managing urban intensification through conservation covenants. In: Leshinsky R, 
Legacy  C (Eds). Instruments of planning: Tensions and challenges for more equitable and sustainable cities. 
Milton: Taylor and Francis. 
Book chapter 
Winfree JA, McCluskey JJ, and Mittelhammer RC. 2006. Buyer-type effects in conservation and preservation 
property values. J Real Estate Financ Econ 33: 167–79. 
Journal 
article 
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Abstract
Conservation on private land is a growing part of international efforts to stem
the decline of biodiversity. In many countries, private land conservation policy
often supports in perpetuity covenants and easements, which are legally bind-
ing agreements used to protect biodiversity on private land by restricting activ-
ities that may negatively impact ecological values. With a view to understand
the long-term security of these mechanisms, we examined release and breach
data from all 13 major covenanting programs across Australia. We report that
out of 6,818 multi-party covenants, only 8 had been released, contrasting with
approximately 130 of 673 single-party covenants. Breach data was limited,
with a minimum of 71 known cases where covenant obligations had not been
met. With a focus on private land conservation policy, we use the results from
this case study to argue that multi-party covenants appear an enduring conser-
vation mechanism, highlight the important role that effective monitoring and
reporting of the permanency of these agreements plays in contributing to their
long-term effectiveness, and provide recommendations for organizations seek-
ing to improve their monitoring programs. The collection of breach and release
data is important for the continuing improvement of conservation policies and
practices for private land.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that stemming the decline of bio-
diversity requires a greater focus on conservation efforts
targeting private land. With private land covering a large
part of the terrestrial landmass and supporting impor-
tant biodiversity, its significance for conservation is gain-
ing prominence in many countries, including Australia,
Canada, the USA, New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa
(Langholz & Lassoie 2001; Ewing 2008; Fishburn et al.
2009; von Hase et al. 2010). The approaches used by
policy-makers to conserve biodiversity on private land
vary considerably, from voluntary to incentives-based
schemes to regulation. A number of studies have re-
cently evaluated these various approaches, including the
effectiveness of incentive-based programs to protect bio-
diversity (von Hase et al. 2010), the ability of volun-
tary stewardship programs to conserve habitat (Platt &
Ahern 1995), and the extent to which conservation ease-
ment programs contribute to reducing development pres-
sure and maintaining biodiversity (Pocewicz et al. 2011).
Studies have also looked at the degree to which private
land conservation aligns with strategic conservation goals
(Kiesecker et al. 2007; Adams et al. 2014). Yet important
questions still remain about the effectiveness and long-
term consequences of private land conservation mecha-
nisms (Merenlender et al. 2004).
Of growing importance in private land conservation
policy is the establishment of Private Protected Areas
(PPAs) - a protected area, as defined by the IUCN (Dud-
ley 2008), under private governance (Stolton et al. 2014).
PPAs are established in different ways in different coun-
tries, and the mechanisms used to protect biodiversity
through legal or other effective means also vary. Here,
we investigate two components central to private land
conservation policy; the permanence (duration) and se-
curity (resistance to removal) of conservation agreements
with landholders, focusing on conservation covenants as
one form of PPA. We focus on examining these issues
in Australia, which has a large number of individual
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conservation covenants (Stolton et al. 2014; Fitzsimons
2015). We first provide background information on our
case study and the challenges around permanence and
security for policy-makers, before presenting our results
and using them as context to highlight the central role
that monitoring and reporting of covenant releases and
breaches plays in ensuring the long-term effectiveness of
these agreements.
Private land conservation in Australia
As in many countries, conservation policy in Australia
has historically focused on public land (Figgis 2004).
Although public protected areas cover more than 65
million ha across 8.5% of the continent (DotE 2014),
private and leasehold land covers over 62% of Australia’s
land area (AUSLIG 1993), and contains significant
biodiversity value (Fitzsimons & Wescott 2001). Many of
Australia’s threatened species occur entirely outside of
public protected areas (Watson et al. 2011), as do some of
the most threatened ecosystems (Figgis et al. 2005; Taylor
et al. 2011). Although the long-term security of private
land conservation mechanisms is not yet clear, with the
continuing loss of biodiversity, and broad acceptance
that the public conservation estate is insufficient on its
own, private land conservation policies and programs are
increasingly important (Gordon et al. 2011).
Conservation covenants are an important component
of Australia’s private land conservation policy mix.
Similar to conservation easements in North America,
conservation covenants are mostly voluntary, legally
binding agreements between an authorized organization
and a landholder (Todd 1997). They can apply to all or
part of a property and are registered on the property title
(Figgis 2004), usually running in perpetuity. The vast
majority are established primarily to protect land with
high nature conservation value, where the landholder
retains ownership but has a reduced ‘bundle of rights’, in
effect giving up development and land-use rights incom-
patible with conservation (Iftekhar et al. 2014). Whilst
covenants can be tailored to individual properties (Adams
& Moon 2013) each covenant contains a standard set of
obligations which remain relatively fixed over the term
of the agreement, with limited, site-specific management
requirements determined during establishment (Figgis
et al. 2005). All Australian covenants are backed by
specific enabling legislation (Fitzsimons 2015), specifying
the body authorized to administer the covenant, typically
a statutory authority.
Since the creation of the first conservation covenant
in Australia, a Wildlife Refuge in New South Wales
in 1951 (DECCW 2010), the number of covenants has
grown considerably to 7,491 in 2014 (Figure 1). This in-
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Figure 1 Cumulative trend in the number and area of covenanted prop-
erties in Australia. Columns represent covenanted area, and the trian-
gles represent the number of covenants. Lighter green columns and hol-
low triangles indicate National Conservation Lands Database (DSEWPaC
2011) data, the darker green column and the filled triangle represent data
collected for this study.
cludes 4,894 covenants likely to meet the private pro-
tected area criteria in Australia, which require the area
to be valuable, secure through statutory provisions, well-
managed for conservation, and clearly defined (see Fitzsi-
mons 2015). With the number of covenants set to grow
further, it is important to evaluate their permanence as a
conservation mechanism.
Permanence and security
From a conservation policy perspective, the permanence
and security of agreements with private landholders are
central issues. Whilst permanence can relate to a number
of ecological and social factors in conservation, here we
focus on ‘permanence’ as the length of time that a conser-
vation agreement (e.g., a covenant or easement) remains
in place to protect conservation values (Fitzsimons 2006).
An agreement’s permanence can have substantial impli-
cations for the persistence of conservation values (Jones
et al. 2005), and is of particular importance on private
land, where landholders and land uses can change fre-
quently, especially amid pressure from mining, agricul-
ture, and other types of development (Cox & Underwood
2011; Pocewicz et al. 2011; Adams & Moon 2013). With
covenant restrictions typically associated with the prop-
erty title and lasting in-perpetuity, they are commonly
considered the most permanent private land conserva-
tion mechanism in Australia. Thus they are formally able
be classified as protected areas and can contribute to Aus-
tralia’s international protection targets (Fitzsimons 2006,
2015).
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Related to permanence is an agreement’s strength (its
“security”), which refers to the level of authority required
to establish, alter and/or terminate or extinguish (“re-
lease”) that agreement (Fitzsimons 2006). Although se-
curity provisions vary between programs, all covenants
in Australia are backed by legislation (Fitzsimons 2015),
with release usually requiring approval from multiple
parties including a government Minister. The exception
is the Wildlife Refuge program, which is only available
in the state of New South Wales and is unique amongst
Australian covenants for only requiring approval for
release from a single party (e.g., the landholder)
(Figgis 2004).
Threats to permanence
Although protected area downgrading, downsizing and
degazettement (PADDD) is a known policy issue and
has been noted as a threat to public reserves (Mascia
& Pailler 2011), some see covenants as less secure than
public protected areas (e.g., Centre for Environmental
Management 1999). Of particular importance here are
mineral exploration and extraction rights, which have
been identified as an emerging threat to the natural val-
ues on covenanted land (Adams & Moon 2013; Root-
Bernstein et al. 2013), although covenants in Australia
do not have the legal ability to prevent such activities
as mineral rights rest with governments, not landhold-
ers. Changing property ownership, market conditions
and government policy have also been noted as threats
to the permanence of private land conservation more
generally (Figgis et al. 2005; Jones et al. 2005). In Aus-
tralia, concerns over covenant permanence also relate
to their relatively recent adoption (most covenants have
been established since the 1990s (Fitzsimons & Carr 2014;
Figure 1), compared to public protected areas, which saw
considerable expansion in the mid to late 20th century
and some 274 (3.6%) of which are over 100 years old
(DotE 2014).
Beyond these broader issues, a particular challenge for
private land conservation policy globally is the identi-
fication and enforcement of “breaches,” which are in-
stances of landholders failing to meet their obligations
or violating the conditions of their agreement in some
way (Owley 2011). Breaches can vary in severity, and
in extreme cases could lead to a release of the covenant.
It is possible that the reasons behind breaches are simi-
lar to releases, and understanding these could allow for
early and targeted intervention to prevent release. How-
ever, identifying breaches can be difficult for adminis-
tering bodies, with the need to account for the agree-
ment’s flexibility (Rissman 2010), variability in permitted
land uses (Rissman et al. 2007), changing ecological and
social conditions (Rissman 2014), and financial and prac-
tical limitations on their capacity to monitor covenanted
land (Kiesecker 2007; Korngold 2007; Fitzsimons & Carr
2014). Moreover, how administering bodies respond to
breaches is important for ensuring the effectiveness of
these agreements, faced with the costs of pursuing le-
gal action (Rissman & Butsic 2011) or the consequences
of modifying the boundaries and/or obligations of these
agreements (“amendments”) through time (McLaughlin
2007; Jay 2013).
Little information exists on the permanence and
security of PPAs in Australia. Here, for the first time, we
collate and examine the available data on covenants from
all major Australian covenanting programs (Table 1).
Our initial motivation was to determine if data was
available to answer the following three questions: (i)
what proportion of conservation covenants within the
major covenanting programs have been released; (ii)
what proportion are known to have had their conditions
breached; and (iii) what were the main reasons for the
release or breach, and what factors could help predict
these; and if so what are the main issues affecting the
permanence of covenants?
Methods
Between October 2013 and January 2014, we asked indi-
viduals within the 13 major Australian covenanting or-
ganizations who were familiar with and had access to
database records to provide the numbers of and rea-
sons for covenant releases and breaches. We followed up
responses with further questioning where needed. The
programs involved cover all states and territories (with
the exception of the Australian Capital Territory, where
covenants are not present; Table 1).
Database records varied across organizations and pro-
grams – both in the detail (e.g., the type of impact caused
the breach) and the style of recording (i.e., hard copy or
electronic). Detailed information was not always avail-
able due to confidentiality, limited record-keeping, or the
difficulty of retrieving data when resourcing restrictions
precluded their ability to sift through hard copy records.
Where only limited data was available, we asked program
staff to instead provided estimates. The type of informa-
tion provided by staff clearly fell into two categories: (1)
“minimum bound estimates,” where staff provided the
known cases but indicated that the true number was
likely greater but unknown; (2) “rough estimates,” where
staff were unsure of actual cases and could only provide
a rough estimate. The description of the activities behind
the covenant release and breach data were used to cate-
gorize these into common themes.
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Table 1 Details of the covenanting programs included in this study
State Covenant program First covenant Covenanting organization Security
New South Wales Conservation Agreement 1990 Office of Environment and Heritage Multi-party
New South Wales Trust Agreement 2005 Nature Conservation Trust of NSW Multi-party
New South Wales Registered Property Agreement 1997 Office of Environment and Heritage Multi-party
New South Wales Wildlife Refuge 1951 Office of Environment and Heritage Single-party
Northern Territory Conservation Covenant 2009 Parks and Wildlife Commission NT Multi-party
Queensland Nature Refuge and Coordinated
Conservation Area
1994 Department of Environment and
Heritage Protection
Multi-party
South Australia Heritage Agreement 1994 Department of the Environment,
Water and Natural Resources
Multi-party
Tasmania Conservation Covenant 1999 Department of Primary Industries,
Parks, Water and Environment
Multi-party
Victoria Conservation Covenant 1986 Trust for Nature (Victoria) Multi-party
Victoria Section 69 Agreement 1987 Department of Environment and
Primary Industries
Multi-party
Western Australia Conservation Covenant 1971 The National Trust of Australia (WA) Multi-party
Western Australia Nature Conservation Covenant 1990 Department of Parks and Wildlife Multi-party
Western Australia Conservation Covenant 1980 Department of Agriculture and Food Multi-party
Covenant releases and breaches
We considered covenants “released” if they had been
signed over a particular piece of land in the past but had
subsequently been removed from the land title (i.e., the
covenant had been terminated in accordance with the
relevant security provisions). Because obligations vary
between programs, we considered a covenant “breached”
if its obligations had not been met, but the covenant had
remained in place. We did not count third-party damage
(e.g., by neighbors) as a landholder breach, but recorded
this information separately, as we consider this type of
damage reasonably beyond the immediate control of the
landholder and the administering body.
Results
Covenant releases
The single-party NSW Wildlife Refuge covenants had by
far the highest number of releases, although this was
based on the estimate provided by program staff (130 of
673). A total of eight out of 6,818 multiparty covenants
(0.12%) had been released across Australia, with Victoria
(4) and Western Australia (3) having the highest num-
bers of releases (Table 2).
For multi-party covenants, the reasons for release var-
ied considerably, ranging from unauthorized timber re-
moval to government acquisition or administrative error
(Table 3). As examples, two early covenants were estab-
lished on old farms, which were released after it became
clear they had limited conservation value and were un-
suitable for covenanting. Another covenant at Ironbark
Basin in Victoria was released when the land was trans-
ferred to the State Government for inclusion in a na-
tional park. Arguably, in this case “release” may not be
the most appropriate term given the conservation val-
ues remained protected. Equivalent data for single-party
Wildlife Refuges was unavailable, however indications
from program staff suggests that these releases occurred
predominantly at the request of the landholder.
Covenant breaches
Detailed breach data was not available from most pro-
grams, which precluded deeper quantitative analysis.
Of the available data, 71 breaches were reported (Table
2), with most of these in Western Australia (42) and
Tasmania (20). However, given the constraints on
covenant monitoring by the programs (Fitzsimons & Carr
2014), these reported breaches should be interpreted as
minimum bound estimates, with the true number likely
to be greater.
Some 43 of the 71 breaches (60%) had insufficient in-
formation for classification (Table 4). Of those able to be
categorized, as a percentage of all reported breaches, most
arose from land clearing and/or development (13%),
road construction (7%), forestry operations (7%), or
unauthorized timber removal (7%). Some 25% of all
breaches were attributed to a third party. In one third-
party breach, forestry contractors working on a neighbor-
ing property cleared vegetation on a covenanted property
where the boundary delineation was unclear; in another
case, a third party had gained illegal entry to the property
and collected firewood.
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Discussion
The importance of strong security provisions
Using Private Protected Areas (PPAs) to conserve biodi-
versity is a growing approach in conservation policy. By
definition, PPAs require protection through legal or other
effective means (Stolton et al. 2014), and by extension,
their effectiveness as a permanent conservation mecha-
nism relates directly to the ease in which that agreement
can be released, amended or enforced.
Focusing on Australian covenants as a form of PPA,
our case study found only a small number of multi-party
covenants had been released, suggesting they are a
conservation mechanism with high permanence. More-
over, our study also highlights a clear distinction in the
proportion of releases between covenants with differing
security provisions, with a relatively high proportion of
single-party Wildlife Refuge releases (19%) compared
with multi-party covenants (0.12%). Considering the
extent of legal challenges that permanent agreements
face (Rissman & Butsic 2011) and are likely to face in
the future, this is a clear demonstration to policy-makers
of the value of strong security provisions, whereby
requiring authorization from multiple parties reduces the
potential for release, and contributes towards ensuring
these agreements meet their promise of in perpetuity
protection (McLaughlin 2007). We thus emphasize the
importance for policy makers to consider and priori-
tize multi-party provisions to secure their agreements.
However, this extra security would have to be weighed
up against the potential for these provisions to act as a
deterrent to landholders entering the program (Kabii &
Horwitz 2006).
Preparing for threats to agreements
Whilst strong security provisions may help prevent re-
lease, the early identification of threats to these agree-
ments could help policy-makers prepare and adapt to
emerging issues. Part of this requires understanding the
reasons why covenants are being released. The data an-
alyzed in our study showed no standout cause for multi-
party covenant release and instead, each appears a prod-
uct of individual circumstances. However, in the single
party Wildlife Refuges program, the higher number of re-
leases was attributed to landholders opting to withdraw.
Further research is needed to understand why landhold-
ers are leaving the program, for example by investigat-
ing landholder commitment and satisfaction with the
covenanting program (e.g., Selinske et al. 2015).
Beyond release, some breaches of obligations are a po-
tential threat to the permanence of agreements, through
damage to ecological values of the property which may
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Table 3 Reported reasons for covenant releases
Reason No. reported cases
Multi-party releases Site subsequently deemed unsuitable 2
Acquired by state government for development 2
Ceded to government as reserve 1
Unauthorised timber removal 1
Administrative error – unintended covenant 1
Elderly landowner – unable to meet obligations 1
Total multi-party releases 8
Single-party releases Releases at landholder request 130a
Total single-party releases 130
aDetailed records unavailable and the type and number of releases represent staff member’s rough estimate.
Table 4 Summary of available information on covenant breaches and the responsible parties. Numbers represent minimum bound estimates
Party responsible
Reason Landholder Third party Unknown No. reported cases
Land clearing and/or development 6 3 – 9
Road construction 1 4 – 5
Forestry operations – 5 – 5
Unauthorised timber removal (e.g., firewood) – 5 – 5
Dumping rubbish 2 – – 2
Management actions incomplete 1 – – 1
Recreational vehicles – 1 – 1
Unknown/insufficient information – – 43 43
Total reported breaches 10 18 43 71
in some extreme cases cause major loss in values, lead-
ing to covenant release. It is possible that the reasons
behind breaches may be similar to releases, providing
room for organizations to intervene early to prevent re-
lease. In our study, of those breaches with sufficient in-
formation, land clearing showed up as the biggest issue.
Due to the limited available data, the extent of this is-
sue is unclear, as are the reasons for clearing, but it high-
lights one of the key challenges for policy makers – how
to minimize unwanted landholder behavior from a dis-
tance with minimal intervention. One approach could
be for private land organizations to increase the level
of enforcement and consider strengthening the compli-
ance components within the legal agreement if needed
(see Jay 2013). However, maintaining a strong and con-
structive relationship with landholders could help pre-
vent the substantial costs associated with enforcement
(Rissman & Butsic 2011) and as a preventative measure,
an increased focus on landholder support may help clarify
landholder understanding of their obligations (Stroman &
Kreuter 2014) and help uncover the reasons behind this
clearing.
In response to breaches, a number of organizations
mentioned covenant amendment as a preferred method
of resolution to release, provided the property’s ecolog-
ical values remained protected. This fits with the find-
ings of Rissman (2010), who noted that land trusts in
the United States have an incentive to act moderately
when obligations are not met. We did not look directly at
amendments, and the data available from our study was
insufficient to determine howmany covenants have been
amended, or even the nature of these changes (e.g., rene-
gotiating boundaries or obligations). However, as amend-
ments can relate to the permanence of covenant obliga-
tions and the effectiveness of these agreements for use
in conservation policy, we highlight the need for pro-
grams to monitor and record the nature and extent of
any amendments to permanent agreements and suggest
this as an important area requiring further research.
Some organizations suggested that the turnover of con-
servation covenants to successor landholders may be de-
veloping into a policy issue, which has also been noted
elsewhere (Collins 2000; Czech 2002; Rissman & Butsic
2011; Stroman & Kreuter 2014). These are landholders
who, for example, have purchased or inherited the prop-
erty from the original covenantor. Without being origi-
nal parties to the covenant, their ownership of protected
properties may result in higher rates of legal challenge
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(Rissman & Butsic 2011) and/or breaching of conditions.
It may be that successor covenantors prove an important
predictor of covenant breach or requests for release, al-
though understanding the reasons behind this requires
further research. Policy-makers would be well placed to
consider ways of engaging and supporting new owners,
as well as elderly covenantors who may need additional
support in order to meet their obligations (see also Fitzsi-
mons & Carr 2014).
Although a significant policy challenge, dealing with
current and future owners of protected properties is
only one dimension of permanence. Our case study
suggests that policy-makers also need to account for
actors outside of the direct agreement. Most breaches in
our study for which detailed information was available
were attributed to damage from a third party (25% of all
known breaches), also noted as an issue for easements in
the United States (Rissman & Butsic 2011). This raises an
important question for policy makers about who holds
responsibility for monitoring, preventing and rectifying
damage to covenanted properties resulting from trespass,
particularly if the third party remains unidentified.
Trespass is an issue for conservation areas in general,
impacting both the public and private conservation
estate.
As noted elsewhere, we also agree that the decoupling
of above- and below-ground property rights is an impor-
tant issue for conservation covenants (Adams & Moon
2013; Root-Bernstein et al. 2013). In Australia, covenants
do not provide protection for underground resources,
with mineral exploration and extraction rights remain-
ing in government ownership. Although this study shows
that mining activities have not yet resulted in covenant
release, it is likely that in the near future coal extrac-
tion will be permitted on a Nature Refuge covenant in the
Galilee Basin in Queensland (Lauder 2013). This is an im-
portant policy issue, not only because mineral extraction
can result in the loss of ecological value, but also because
of the potential loss of public investment (McLaughlin
2012) and faith in conservation that has played an im-
portant role in funding the development of the private
conservation estate.
A need for improved monitoring and recording
It is likely that the growth in permanent conservation
agreements will continue, particularly with their increas-
ing use via new pathways such as biodiversity offsets,
which are growing in prominence internationally and in
all Australian jurisdictions (Bull et al. 2013). It is possible
that this will also lead to an increase in the number of re-
leases and breaches, making effective monitoring of these
agreements essential for identifying issues, supporting
enforcement (Rissman & Butsic 2011), and evaluating
their ecological contribution. Whilst our study showed
few releases, detailed breach information was limited,
with the number of breaches occurring largely unknown.
This is surprising given the prominence of permanence
as a key feature of the mechanism, but such fragmented
and incomplete data is not unique to covenants, having
also been noted before for easements in the United States
(Wilson Morris & Rissman 2009).
The relevant policy questions therefore become where,
how and what to monitor? Limited resourcing of
covenanting organizations makes monitoring a particu-
lar challenge (Fitzsimons & Carr 2014), and organiza-
tions may be best to focus their efforts where and when
the probability of breach is highest (Czech 2002). From
this study, a starting point may be in areas with known
concentrations of successor covenantors or hotspots for
third-party trespass. Aerial photographs, remote-sensing
and predictive modeling techniques offer opportunities to
identify possible breaches remotely, which could be used
where resourcing limitations impede the recommended
annual site visits (LTA 2004). Where breaches are hard
to detect remotely, indirect observations, self-reporting
and direct questioning of landholders could be used (see
Gavin et al. 2010), and more generally, specialized land-
holder questioning techniques could help obtain esti-
mates of noncompliance (Nuno & St. John 2015; Thomas
et al. 2015). When organizations collect breach data, we
suggest other data should be recorded in addition to the
location, actor (i.e., the landholder or a third party), and
the type and extent of the damage. This should include
both the landholder type (i.e., originator or successor)
and where possible, the intention of the actor (i.e., ac-
cidental or intentional). Of course beyond identifying a
breach, organizations must also ensure there are suffi-
cient resources and capacity available for enforcement
(Rissman & Butsic 2011).
Our study provides insights into the methodological
challenges of multi-jurisdictional studies on conservation
agreements. Obtaining sufficient and consistent breach
data proved particularly difficult, due largely to organi-
zation resourcing constraints on its collection, differences
in how breaches are monitored and recorded across orga-
nizations (i.e., centrally or regionally, electronically or in
hard copy), and privacy concerns over sharing this type
of information. There were also challenges in analyzing
across different programs (e.g., what constitutes a breach
under different legislation or landholder agreements).
However, our study highlights an opportunity to share
data, pool resources and collaborate across organizations
to allow for more detailed quantitative and qualita-
tive studies in the future. For this, support is needed
from policy-makers for more consistency in covenant
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monitoring (e.g., LTA 2014), as well as a coordinated
approach to recording and sharing breach and release
data in ways that address confidentiality concerns. This
data should be in digital form in centralized and secure
databases, such as the National Conservation Easement
Database in the USA (USEFC 2014), with data sharing
provisions to allow for comparison across different
agreement types, such as U.S. easements and Australian
covenants. In Australia, the National Conservation Lands
Database (DSWEPaC 2011) has the potential to be an
equivalent portal, although its future viability is currently
uncertain.
As the role of PPAs in protecting biodiversity grows,
so does the need to ensure they remain an effective
part of the conservation policy toolkit. The numbers of
covenant releases and known breaches in our case study
were low, suggesting that covenants may be an enduring
mechanism for conservation, although we acknowledge
the likely under-reporting and minimal data available for
breaches. However, ongoing compliance monitoring of
covenant breaches and releases will allow policy-makers
to respond to issues as they arise, and will also enable fu-
ture comparison of the permanence of PPAs to the pub-
lic estate and other protected area categories. This data is
key to understanding the permanence and long-term ef-
fectiveness of these agreements and crucial for improv-
ing the sustainability of conservation policy on private
land.
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Appendix D 
Supporting information for Chapter 4 
 
Interview questions: Influences on revolving fund property selection 
Section 1 – Context and background 
1. Could you describe your organisation’s revolving fund?  
(e.g. Current size ($$$), geographic scale of activities, types of activities, no. of properties currently held, no. 
revolved to date, area protected, date established) 
 
2. Could you describe the objectives of your organization’s revolving fund? 
(e.g. financial growth or sustainability, high value conservation, community engagement, other?) 
 
Section 2 – Acquiring and selling properties 
3. Could you describe the process for purchasing a revolving fund property? 
(e.g. How do you find properties? How are they assessed? Who makes the final decision? Frequency of 
decisions?) 
 
4. Could you nominate all of the important factors you consider when deciding which properties to 
purchase?  
(What makes a good revolving fund property? What makes a bad revolving fund property?) 
 
5. Could you describe the process when selling a revolving fund property? 
(e.g. Any special considerations when selling? Any specific influences that make a revolving fund property easy 
to sell?  What makes a revolving fund property difficult to sell?) 
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Section 3 – Other influences on property selection decisions 
6. What other factors or challenges influence your property selection? 
(e.g. Resourcing constraints, knowledge and uncertainty, property availability) 
 
7. How would you describe decisions around the application of the revolving fund?   
(e.g. Easy/ complex? Certain/uncertain? Why/why not?) 
 
8. How do you measure the progress of your revolving fund, and how do you incorporate learnings 
from previous purchases and sales? 
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Coding manual 
Table A 6. Coding manual used to identify factors influencing suitability, and trade-offs in making property selection decisions. 
Category 
Numeric 
identifier Specific factor 
Conservation DI1 Threatened species, communities or ecosystems 
 endangered or threatened or at-risk species, communities or ecosystems 
DI2 Under-represented ecosystems / reserve network 
 National Reserve System (NRS), national reserve system, reserve system, comprehensiveness, 
adequacy, representativeness (CAR) 
 under-represented areas, species, ecosystems, communities 
DI3 Landscape scale and broader conservation 
 Corridors, connectivity 
 Buffers 
 Climate change 
DI4 Other conservation influence 
Social DI5 Amenity / liveability 
 Access, house site, domestic area, planning permit 
 Services, utilities 
 Lifestyle, proximity to local town, schools, shops etc. 
DI6 Community context 
 Demographics 
 Neighbours 
 Community attitudes, values and behaviour to conservation 
DI7 Aesthetics 
 Views 
 Visual appeal, aesthetics 
DI8 Other social influence 
Financial DI9 Acquisition and other costs 
 Acquisition costs, purchase price 
 Holding, management costs 
 Stewardship and ongoing costs 
 Administration / on-sale / covenant set-up costs 
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Category 
Numeric 
identifier Specific factor 
DI10 Resale price (re-sell, on-sale, on-sell etc.) 
 Return to the fund, recouping costs, making a loss 
 Administration / set-up 
DI11 Resale time 
 Time to re-sell, holding time, on-sale time 
DI12 Other financial influence 
Other DI13 Conservation story 
 Compelling story 
DI14 Organisation reputation 
 How supporters or the broader community might perceive the purchase 
DI15 Other influence 
Trade-offs DT1 Conservation and development 
 property potentially unsuitable / unsuccessful due to lack of house site / development 
potential (even if high conservation values are present) 
 property potentially suitable due to presence of house site / development potential 
DT2 Conservation and property turnover 
 property potentially unsuitable / unsuccessful due to concerns over lengthy resale time 
 property potentially suitable / successful due to fast resale time 
 property potentially suitable / successful due to availability, opportunistic acquisitions 
DT3 Conservation and land management 
 property potentially unsuitable due to high ongoing management costs, or effort required 
 property potentially suitable due to low ongoing management costs, or effort required 
DT4 Conservation and social values 
 property potentially unsuitable because it has low amenity values 
 property potentially suitable because it has amenity values thought to be of interest to 
prospective buyers (e.g. proximity to town, views, aesthetically pleasing) 
DT5 Conservation and financial viability 
 property potentially unsuitable because it is likely to produce a loss to the fund 
 property potentially suitable because it is likely to recover its purchase and/or other costs 
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Count data on factors influencing property selection 
 
Table A 7. Factors influencing property selection for revolving funds, including the number of times each participant mentioned 
each factor, and total mentions across all participants. (‘P’ refers to participants). 
 No. mentions in transcripts 
Factor P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Total 
Amenity 4 5 6 8 9 32 
Resale price 7 7 5 2 4 25 
Purchase costs 3 4 4 5 6 22 
Resale time 4 4 4 3 5 20 
Landscape attributes 4 6 1 2 3 16 
Threatened species and/or communities 4 6 1 2 2 15 
Complements reserve system 1 - 5 1 6 13 
Aesthetics 5 - 2 4 1 12 
Conservation story 5 3 - - - 8 
Community context 4 2 - - - 6 
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Appendix E 
Supporting information for Chapter 5 
 
 
Figure A 1.The conceptual Bayesian Belief Network of revolving fund property selection used in the decision workshop. 
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Appendix F 
Supporting information for Chapter 6 
 
Figure A 2. Distributions derived from historic revolving fund program acquisition and sale data. Distributions came from 
combined data of all programs listed in Table A 8, covering 245 properties in total, 115 of which had been assessed but not 
acquired. 
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Table A 8. Revolving fund programs providing data for this study 
Organisation Australian State Year 
established 
Total fund size 
(AUD approx.) 
Properties 
“revolved” 
Area protected 
(hectares) 
Nature Conservation Trust of NSW New South Wales 2002 $10m 25 19,567 
Queensland Trust for Nature Queensland 2004 $7m 17 104,000 
Nature Foundation SA South Australia 2002 $1.4m 28 12,242 
Tasmanian Land Conservancy Tasmania 2004 $6.5m 28 2,928 
Trust for Nature (Victoria) Victoria 1989 $4m 57 6,834 
  Total $28.9m 155 145,571 
* As of June 2016  
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a) 
 
b)  
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
 
f) 
 
Figure A 3. The overall and high conservation value gains over time for revolving fund acquisitions and sales for the high 
threshold scenario. Results are shown for the $1m fund (a and b), $5m fund (c and d) and $20m fund (e and f). The overall 
conservation gains are represented by the plots on the left (a, c and e) and the high conservation value gains by the plots on the 
right (b, d and f). Shaded bands represent the standard deviation, and thick lines represent mean values across all runs. 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
Figure A 4. Change in fund balance over time from property acquisitions and sales, for the high threshold scenario, for the $1m 
fund (a), $5m fund (b) and $20m fund (c). Shaded bands indicate the standard deviation, and thick lines represent mean values 
across all runs.  
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a) 
 
b)  
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
Figure A 5. Scatter plot showing the cumulative conservation gain and properties revolved (a and b), and cumulative 
conservation gain and fund balance (c and d) using the values at the end of the simulation (all for the $5m fund size) without 
uncertainty over acquisition or resale price. The low threshold scenario is represented by the plots on the left (a and c) and the 
high threshold scenario by the plots on the right (b and d). Hollow symbols represent model runs, and the filled symbols represent 
mean values across runs. Note the difference in y-axis scales between the low threshold and high threshold plots.  
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a) 
 
b)  
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
Figure A 6. Plots comparing the return on investment values at the end of the simulation for the $1m, $5m and $20m fund sizes, 
without uncertainty over acquisition or resale price. Overall conservation gain is shown in plots (a and b), and high conservation 
value gain is shown in plots (c and d). All plots use values from the end of the simulation, with error bars representing the standard 
deviation. Low threshold scenarios are represented by plots on the left side (a and c) and high threshold scenarios are represented 
by plots on the right side (b and d). Note the difference in y-axis scales between the low and high threshold plots.
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a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
 
f)  
 
Figure A 7. Comparison between low and high threshold scenarios across all strategies for the cumulative area protected (a-c) and cumulative conservation score (d-f), for the $1m fund (a 
and d), $5m fund (b and e) and $20m fund (c and f). All plots use values at the end of the simulation, with the error bars representing the standard deviation. 
